Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1985

Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research
Jeffrey N. Gordon
Columbia Law School, jgordon@law.columbia.edu

Lewis A. Kornhauser
New York University School of Law, lewis.kornhauser@nyu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law and Economics Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research,
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3139

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

EFFICIENT MARKETS, COSTLY INFORMATION,
AND SECURITIES RESEARCH
JEFFREY

LEWIS A.

N. GORDON*
KORNHAUSER**

Courts, administrativepolicy makers and legalscholars have widely embracedthe theory that well-developed markets are efficienL In this Article, Professors Gordon and
Kornhausercast doubt on the wisdom of reliance on the efficient market hypothesis as
applied to various areas of corporate law. Their charge is that legal decision makers
and scholars have misunderstood the assumptions and limitations of the theory and
have neglected recent critical economics scholarship. Professors Gordon and Kornhauserbegin by detailingthe assertions of the hypothesis in relation to the workings of
securities markets,focusing on various assetpricingmodels used to test the hypothesi&
They then examine critically the interrelationbetween the hypothesis and the processes
by which information isacquired and reflected in market price Finally, they explore
the legal policy implications of the problems they have exposed: markets are not as
"efficient" as once thought, and we may not be able accurately to test the efficiency of a
given market.
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INTRODUCTION

Judges, regulators and legal scholars rarely follow the fads and fashions of theoretical innovation in mathematical economics. Yet the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), formulated in the mid-1960's,1 has
strongly influenced not only legal theory but also prevailing doctrines
and regulations. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has amended its disclosure requirements to permit issuers with
large market capitalization to use abbreviated disclosure statements and
the pinpoint timing device of "shelf registration" in the sale of securities.2 The Commission premised its action on the belief that "investors
are protected by the market's analysis of information about certain companies which is widely available, both from the Commission's files and
other sources, and that such analysis is reflected in the price of the securiI See, e.g., Mandelbrot, Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, and "Martingale"
Models, 39 J. Bus. 242 (1966); Samuelson, Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate
Randomly, 6 Indus. Mgmt. Rev. 41 (1965), reprinted in 3 The Collected Scientific Papers of
Paul A. Samuelson 782-90 (R. Merton ed. 1972). An influential survey of theoretical and
empirical work appeared in 1970. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383 (1970).
2 The reference is to the SEC's "integrated disclosure" system and "shelf registration"
rule, discussed at text accompanying notes 119-70.
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ties offered." '3
The courts have on occasion also relied on the efficient market hypothesis. Some recent judicial decisions have held that the plaintiff in a
private securities fraud action need not have read the prospectus in
which the misstatement or omission occurred. 4 For the plaintiff to sustain a cause of action, these decisions require only proof that defendant's
misleading statements or omissions affected the market price of the relevant security. This startling conception of fraud rests on acceptance of
the efficient market hypothesis that the price of a security reflects all information available in the market. Consequently, the particular plaintiff
need not have read the prospectus to have "relied" on and been injured
by the misstatement or omission.
The efficient market hypothesis also lies at the center of the debate
over the theoretical bases of much of corporate law. Some scholars have
argued that the markets for corporate control and executive services minimize, to the extent possible, conflicts between shareholders and managers in large publicly held corporations and consequently obviate the need
for extensive legal intervention.5 Under this view, most legal rules regu3 SEC Securities Act Release No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693, 63,698 (1980), reprinted in
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) Spec. Rep. No. 875, second extra ed., at 28 (Sept. 10, 1980) [hereinafter ABC Release].
4 For citation and discussion of these so-called "fraud on the market" cases, see Black,
Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open
Market Transactions, 62 N.C.L. Rev. 435 (1984); Fischel, Use of Modem Finance Theory in
Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. Law. 1 (1982); Note, The
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1143 (1982).
5 A representative sample of important recent work arguing within these general contours
would include: R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 14.6, at 303-05 (2d ed. 1977); R.
Winter, Government and the Corporation (1978); Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency,
Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 738, 776-93 (1978); Easterbrook &
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale L.J. 698, 705-08, 733-35 (1982) [hereinafter
Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions]; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 116980, 1195-99 (1981); Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259,
1261-65, 1287-91 (1982); Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. Rev. 913, 917-20, 922-23, 937-41,
944-45 (1982) [hereinafter Fischel, Race to the Bottom]; Gilson, The Case Against Shark
Repellant Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 Stan. L. Rev.
775, 818-22, 831-34 (1982); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 821-24, 833-45, 875-76
(1981); Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
Legal Stud. 251, 264-73 (1977).
Much of this writing by legal academics looks to recent economic analysis of the business
firm. E.g., Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288 (1980);
Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976). Another important source is Manne, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110 (1965). For skepticism on the scope of
market discipline, see Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 1199-
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lating management behavior in the ordinary course of business would be
eliminated, while those rules that bar managements from interfering with
the operation of the market for corporate control would be nearly absolute. Apart from any other objections, this view is tenable only if stock
prices, including price changes, accurately reflect management performance and comparative company prospects. This means, in EMH terms,
that sufficient information about management performance and company
prospects must be available to the market and that prevailing prices accurately reflect such information.
Modem theories of "prudent" behavior by institutional investors
and other financial fiduciaries also rely heavily on the efficient market
hypothesis. 6 If markets are "efficient," the expenditure of resources on
securities research wastes beneficiary funds. 7 More importantly, efficiency, on this view, implies that an investment strategy attempting to
outguess the market must be suspect.
We think that the legal rush to embrace and apply the efficient market hypothesis has been overly precipitous and occasionally unwise. The
legal embrace of the EMH has been based principally on economists'
empirical tests of the hypothesis in the 1960's and early 1970's. Economic research and controversy about the hypothesis had a second flourishing that began in the late 1970's and continues today. The more
recent economic research and controversy about the hypothesis casts
1221 (1984). For a broader critique, see Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and
the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1403 (1985).
Other frequently cited legal articles on EMH and the modem finance paradigm include
Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 Yale L.J. 1604 (1971); Note, Broker
Investment Recommendations and the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis: A Proposed Cautionary Legend, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1077 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Broker Investment Recommendations); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the
Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1031 (1977). See also H. Kripke, The
SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation in Search of a Purpose 83-139 (1979) (EMH as
bearing on disclosure under federal securities laws); Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule lOb-5, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1307 (1981) (EMH as bearing on nonpublic outside
information question).
A more recent article discussing the means by which markets may attain at least relative
efficiency is Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549
(1984), discussed at notes 83, 192 infra.
6 See, e.g., R. Pozen, Financial Institutions: Cases, Materials and Problems on Investment Management 139-75 (1978); Junewicz, Portfolio Theory and Pension Plan Disclosure, 53
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1153 (1978); Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law,
1976 Am. B. Found. Research J. 1 [hereinafter Langbein & Posner, Market Funds I];
Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law: II, 1977 Am. B. Found. Research J. I [hereinafter Langbein & Posner, Market Funds II]; Langbein & Posner, Social
Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 72, 77-96 (1980) [hereinafter Langbein &
Posner, Social Investing]; Pozen, Money Managers and Securities Research, 51 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 923 (1976).
7 See notes 84-91 and accompanying text infra.
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doubt on EMH's empirical claims and theoretical underpinnings."
Whether markets are efficient in the sense claimed by the initial tests is
now highly suspect; indeed, even the ability to test for market efficiency is
subject to question. Virtually none of this doubt, however, has been reflected in the debates about the implications of the efficient market hypothesis for legal decisionmaking.
The deficiency in the legal debate extends well beyond a failure to
keep abreast of the economics literature. Lawyers have not seriously
considered the theoretical structure underlying the efficient market hypothesis. Specifically, the claim that the current price of a security
traded on an efficient market correctly values all available information
about the security must be understood within the context of a specific
model of the behavior of financial markets. EMH has influenced legal
policy making because it appears to offer an empirically verified account
of how markets "really" work. As we shall discuss below, however, any
test of market efficiency requires two additional assumptions. First, the
tests hypothesize an underlying theory about how the market prices assets. The particular theory used most often in EMH tests, the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)9 and its variants, has drawn increasing
economic skepticism. It may be only a slight overstatement to say that
only in the legal literature is CAPM considered an accurate account of
market processes. Second, tests must posit a process of information acquisition by investors. In most instances, tests, and theory, assume some
fixed amount of information distributed in some way among investors.
But in actual securities markets, the amount of information possessed by
the market depends upon investor decisions to acquire information.
This Article seeks to clarify the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the efficient market hypothesis. To formulate sensible legal policy, one must understand as precisely as possible the assumptions on
which the models rest and how closely these assumptions correspond to
markets affected by the proposed policy.
In Part I, we clarify what the efficient market hypothesis asserts.
This exposition requires three steps. First, we outline the functions that
capital markets ideally serve, so that we may better understand what
benefits we are able to achieve with legal policy. Second, we provide a
8 S. Sheffrin, Rational Expectations 114 (1983); see, e.g., Grossman & Stiglitz, On the
Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 (1980); Symposium
on Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. Fin. Econ. 95 (1978); Valuation Anomalies-Empirical, 39 J. Fin. 807 (1984). For recent popular accounts discussing the
increasing academic skepticism toward EMH, see Rohrer, Ferment in Academia, Institutional
Investor, July 1985, at 69; Some "Efficient-Market" Scholars Decide It's Possible to Beat the
Averages After All, Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1985, at 11, col. 4.
9 See text accompanying notes 30-65 infra.
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simple statement of the efficient market hypothesis and explain its relation to ideal capital markets. Third, we analyze the interrelation of the
efficient market hypothesis and asset pricing models. This background
underlies the discussion, in Part II, of market efficiency and information
acquisition. Part III applies this prior economic discussion to the specific legal context of securities research by institutional investors. This
context is significant because of the importance of the activities of institutional investors for market efficiency and the tremendous sums entrusted
to their fiduciary management. Moreover, the analysis puts into question
not only EMH and thus EMH-based policy prescriptions, but other received legal wisdom as well, particularly the view of appropriate investment strategy by institutional investors. Finally, and more cursorily, we
consider SEC disclosure policy and trends in corporate legal theory.
Much of this Article rests on a highly technical economic literature,
both theoretical and empirical. We have tried to state in simple terms
our understanding of this literature. Additionally, two appendices are
provided that outline in greater detail the empirical and theoretical aspects of the economic literature.
No doubt our understanding of the economic theories is not as deep
and thorough as we would wish nor our exposition as lucid and accurate
as we would hope. But we feel strongly that legal policy and its underlying corporate legal theory must rest not on what we would wish the
world to be or on the overinterpretation and haphazard use of dimly
understood economic models, but on the sensitive application of our best
understanding of these models and the phenomena they seek to describe.
To accomplish these tasks, legal policy makers and theorists alike must
grapple with the technical economic literature that underlies current conceptions of financial markets.
I
UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES MARKETS

Particular conceptions of the function and operation of securities
markets underlie every regulatory scheme for those markets. Formulation of intelligent policy requires an understanding of these conceptions.
In this Part, we outline some fundamental elements of the view of securities markets embedded in the efficient market hypothesis.
Before we begin, however, we offer two parallel distinctions: between "real" and "financial" assets and between "allocative" and "speculative" efficiency, on which much of our discussion of the efficient market
hypothesis turns. A real capital asset is the actual physical good, while a
financial asset represents a claim on the income generated from the physical good (or perhaps some other ownership right). Thus, an equity
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share in Company A represents a bundle of claims on the revenues generated by the physical goods (and employees) that constitute the real assets
called Company A.
The distinction between allocative and speculative efficiency depends on a distinction between (real) investment (i.e., the creation of
physical goods) and (financial) savings (i.e., the deferral of consumption
from one period to the next). In an allocatively efficient market, investment decisions are made optimally; in a speculatively efficient market,
savings decisions are made optimally. The subsequent discussion will
clarify and elaborate the role of these two distinctions.
A.

Ideal CapitalMarkets in Simple Worlds

Capital markets serve two functions. First, individuals may want to
shift consumption from one period to another. If A's income or anticipated expenses vary, she may wish to save during periods of plenty and'
to "dissave" (spend her savings) or borrow in periods of income shortfall.
Capital markets facilitate individual planning of consumption over time
in light of anticipated resources. Second, capital markets provide and
allocate investment funds. Investment funds are used to produce "new
capital," production facilities that will provide goods and services to be
consumed in future periods. These two functions are linked because the
consumption that individuals defer today releases resources to be invested in new capital that will produce the goods to be consumed tomorrow. To make a "good" savings decision, an individual must know
how much consumption she will get tomorrow for the consumption she
gives up today. That is, she must know the financialreturns of any security she purchases-namely, the payout of dividends or interest and
capital gain or loss. To make a "good" investment decision, the investor
must know how much value the new capital will produce in the future.
That is, she must know the real returns of the (real) investment-namely,
gross revenues less costs of production. We shall call a capital market
that induces "good" savings decisions "speculatively efficient" and one
that induces "good" (real) investment decisions, "allocatively efficient."
A speculatively efficient market need not be allocatively efficient. 10
Capital markets guide investment and saving decisions through
prices. In raising money for new capital expenditures, investors consider
the price they can charge in the sale of financial assets. In deciding how
10 This claim rests on a Keynesian view of macroeconomics. Keynes noted that financial
institutions mediated between the decisions of savers and those of investors. Because the people who decide how much consumption to defer differ from those who decide how much real
capital to create, these two decisions may not mesh exactly. An elaboration of how this failure
to mesh may lead to inefficiency in one market and efficiency in another lies well beyond the
scope of this Article.
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much consumption to defer, savers consider the security's financial returns given the security's price. Any claim that capital markets work
well, therefore, reduces to a claim about the "accuracy" of the prices
prevailing on the capital market. The efficient market hypothesis makes
a strong claim about the accuracy of prices on well-developed capital
markets such as the New York Stock Exchange or the market for government bonds. To evaluate this claim we must understand what it
means for prices to be "accurate."
To begin, let us identify accurate prices for a capital market in a
world much simpler than the one in which the New York Stock Exchange operates. The hallmark of this simpler world is certainty. Let us
assume that securities are identified by the date of maturity and the (invariable) (financial) returns on that date. Certainty suggests that each
trader knows the returns from owning any security. Prices should accurately reflect the relative returns of securities. Thus, if two securities, X
and Y, mature on the same date and offer the same returns, their prices
should be identical. Similarly, if X and Y have the same maturity date
but X offers higher returns than Y, the price of X should be higher than
the price of Y. In fact, prices in this perfect market would equalize the
financial returns available from purchasing different securities."l
Notice why accurate capital market prices are desirable in this certain world. Suppose some security was "undervalued." That would
mean that its price was lower than warranted by its returns. On the
maturity date a purchaser of the security would be pleasantly surprised;
she would receive more than the price entitled her to expect. At the date
of purchase, however, those who judged returns only by market prices
would thus have been less willing to purchase the undervalued security
than was warranted by the promised returns. In fact, a purchaser who
judged her savings opportunities only by market prices would have underestimated the amount of future consumption available to her from
saving. Consequently she would save too little. 12 The analysis reverses
itself in the case of "overvalued" securities; the individual would save
II This discussion assumes that asset prices are determined by financial payouts. It thus
illustrates the point discussed in greater detail below that analysis of the efficiency of prices
also requires a theory of asset pricing.
12 That the potential purchaser would save too little can be seen most easily if the market
consists of only one security. Then, for the security to be undervalued means that the purchaser's beliefs about the returns on the security are too pessimistic. But she bases her decision
on how much consumption to defer based on these beliefs about returns. As her beliefs become more favorable, she will defer more and more consumption. Thus, when the security is
undervalued-that is, priced too low given the true returns, she saves less than she would if the
market provided an accurate value.
If the market consists of many securities, the statement in the text still holds if all other
securities are either properly valued or undervalued. In this case, the returns on the market
portfolio will be less than they would under accurate prices, and the above argument applies,
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more than was warranted by the actual returns received. If prices were
accurate, however, the market would be speculatively efficient and savers
would make appropriate decisions about the proportion of their current
incomes they wished to save.13
Allocative efficiency in this certain world depends upon the connection between financial returns and real returns. 14 For example, assume
that two firms each desire to issue securities to finance a new plant. The
plant that will generate more profits per invested dollar is the more desirable real investment and should attract funds first. In a perfectly certain
world, the most productive real investments would receive funds first because financial returns would always correspond to real returns. Therefore, the capital market would be both speculatively and allocatively
efficient. Outside of this certain world, however, financial returns of securities may not be accurate measures of the real returns of the issuer's
investment in new capital. Thus, a capital market might accurately reflect financial returns but not accurately reflect real returns. It would
then be speculatively efficient, but not allocatively efficient. 15
Let us now turn to the decidedly uncertain world of the New York
Stock Exchange. Traders on the Exchange do not know with certainty
the financial returns of securities. They must predict future prices, dividends, and interest to estimate the returns they will receive. On the basis
of these estimated returns they will decide how much to save. If all traders held the same beliefs about returns, future prices could be extended
with little difficulty from a certain world to an uncertain one. Accurate
prices would reflect the shared belief of each person about the financial
13Note that the explanation of the desirability of a perfect capital market appears inconsistent. This apparent inconsistency arises because we have partially conflated two ideas in our
single assumption of certainty. The first idea requires that the returns be certain; the second
that investors know what those certain returns will be. Thus, the explanation apparently assumes both that people know the returns of securities and that they know only the prices. In
fact, knowledge of the certain returns need not be universal among investors. Even the existence of a substantial minority of informed investors, however, makes it difficult to explain how
a security could not be properly valued in a certain world. If security X is undervalued, traders who know the returns will bid up its price because its return per dollar invested is higher
than that attainable from other securities.
14 Recall that real returns are the profits that the real asset (each plant) will generate (i.e.,
gross revenue less costs). Financial returns are the monetary returns the security generates
(i.e., dividends, interest, and capital gains or losses).
15 Under uncertainty the concepts of speculative and allocative efficiency grow more complex. Financial yields are associated with probability distributions of future returns and future
prices while real yields are associated with probability distributions of future costs and income
streams. Because individuals may care about the average return of a security or real investment and also about the dispersion of possible returns, ranking alternative investments is not
as straightforward as it may seem. This difficulty increases if different individuals have different attitudes towards risk, which may cause them to rank two securities or investments in
different orders. See the discussion at text accompanying notes 172-73 infra.
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returns of securities. 16 If some price did not reflect this shared belief, the
security would be under- or overvalued and traders would either bid up
its price (because they thought it offered higher returns) or bid down its
price (because they thought it offered lower returns). This process would
result in speculatively efficient markets. A similar logic underlies the desirability of allocatively efficient markets when investors share beliefs
about prospective (real) returns.
The complexity of the analysis increases if we allow participants to
have divergent beliefs about real or financial returns.1 7 If investors' beliefs about returns differ, different individuals would rank potential investment opportunities in different orders. Consequently, traders
estimate future prices differently, and accurate prices become difficult to
identify. Ideally, we want the capital market to perform as it did under
certainty where stocks are "properly" valued. Security prices therefore
should reflect, in some sense, our "best estimate" of the returns of each
security. This best estimate would result in allocatively, as well as speculatively, efficient capital markets if the financial returns of securities were
also accurate measures of the real returns of the issuer.
B.

The Efficient Market Hypothesis

The efficient market hypothesis defines the best estimate of the financial returns of each security. Thus, a good estimate should take into
account all available information about future prices. Prices are "efficient" in two senses: (1) the current price of a security best predicts its
future price and (2) the prevailing price immediately assimilates new information provided to the market.18 As a consequence, no trader can
earn (financial) arbitrage profits in an efficient market because no one can
identify (except by chance) securities which are under- or overvalued.
The efficient market hypothesis thus posits that the mechanism that
sets prices in securities markets possesses a startling property. The
mechanism of price formation somehow captures information about and
predicts the future payout of a security (dividends, interest, and capital
gain or loss) as well as about the investor who happens to know, with
concrete particularity, all of this relevant information. Thus the efficient
market hypothesis embraces two different kinds of claims: that all rele16 This in fact is not so simple. As discussed at note 49 infra, one concept of efficiency also
requires "rational expectations"--the idea that investors' beliefs about the distribution of securities prices should be the true distribution of securities prices.

17For an argument as to why heterogeneity of opinion not only exists in but is essential to
the operation of capital markets, see Mayshar, On Divergence of Opinion and Imperfections in
Capital Markets, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 114 (1983).
18The theory requires that prices assimilate information faster than investors can adjust on
the basis of the information. If person A learned the information at time t, he would not be
able to act on it before the price reflected the acquired information.
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vant information will be available to the market and that the market rapidly, if not instantaneously, digests all information as it becomes
available.1 9 As we shall explain below, the efficient market hypothesis
20
makes a claim only for the speculative efficiency of the market.
It is not difficult to specify conditions under which capital markets
will inevitably be speculatively efficient: no transaction costs in trading
securities, costless access by all market participants to all available information, and agreement by market participants as to implications of such
information for the current price and distributions of future price of each
security (i.e., homogenous expectations). 2 l Prices that prevail under
these conditions by definition "fully reflect" all available information.
The efficient market hypothesis, however, purports to make a strong
statement where some of these conditions are not present. It states that
despite transaction costs, the lack of universal access to available information, and differing assessments of information, prevailing prices fully
reflect available information.
What justifies extending the efficient market hypothesis to circumstances in which its truth is not logically compelled? We might test the
hypothesis empirically to discover whether markets are efficient, but unfortunately the efficient market hypothesis cannot be tested in a straightforward way. It is not a hypothesis subject to relatively simple
observation, such as "all the balls in the urn are white." The basic data,
19 Because much turns on how we interpret the phrase "all relevant information," some
precision in the statement of the hypothesis is useful. A market is efficient with respect to
information set Xifat a given time t the information that the market uses to determine security
prices at t includes all the information available in X. E. Fama, Foundations of Finance 136
0976); see also Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. Fin.
Econ. 95, 96 (1978) ("A market is efficient with respect to information set 0, if it is impossible
to make economic profits by trading on the basis of information set 0,.").
This understanding of the efficient market hypothesis as a statement about sets of available information is the basis for the distinctions among the "weak form," "semi-strong form,"
and "strong form" of the hypothesis. Weak form tests use the information set of past prices.
Semi-strong form tests use the information set of all publicly available information. Strong
form tests use the information set of all information, including private and inside information.
Thus, EMH may be true with respect to past price information but false with respect to more
inclusive definitions of the information set.
The precise definition of efficiency is controversial. A widely-accepted definition is Beaver's: the market is efficient with respect to an information set if revealing that information to
all investors (while they keep the information they have) would not change prices. Beaver,
Market Efficiency, 56 Acct. Rev. 23 (1981). Latham shows that this definition is insufficient to
encompass the necessary (for EMH tests) "subset property": efficiency with respect to an information set necessarily implies efficiency with respect to any subset thereof. He proposes a new
definition: efficiency with repect to an information set means that revealing that information to
all investors would not change prices, or change investors'portfolios Latham, Informational
Efficiency and Information Subsets, 41 J. Fin. 39, 41, 50-51 (1986).
20 See text accompanying notes 178-83 infra.
21 See Fama, supra note 1, at 387.
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prices and price changes, are interpretable only through the lens of a
larger model of investor behavior and market processes. Thus we cannot
test the validity of the efficient market hypothesis alone; every test of
EMH also assumes some particular theory of what the "right" price for
an asset is. These asset pricing models establish the benchmark of "normal" returns in order to determine the efficiency of the market. Consequently, every empirical test of the efficient market hypothesis is a "joint
test" of both the hypothesis and an asset pricing model. If the test yields
evidence consistent with market efficiency, it also yields evidence consistent with the asset pricing model. If, however, the test yields anomalous
evidence, either the market is inefficient or the asset pricing model used is
incorrect (or possibly both EMH and the pricing model are wrong). Understanding EMH therefore requires that we consider the asset pricing
models that have been used to test it.
C. Asset PricingModels
A variety of asset pricing models has been used in tests of the efficient market hypothesis. In Appendix B we consider the asset pricing
model underlying the "random walk" hypothesis. 22 Here we concentrate
on two other asset pricing models. The first, a positive expected returns
model, was used to test the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis.
This model illustrates the implications of joint tests of the EMH and
asset pricing models. The second, the Capital Assets Pricing Model
(CAPM), allowed more sophisticated tests of stronger forms of the efficient market hypothesis.
1. Positive Expected Returns Model
One claim made by technical analysts was that they could identify
trigger points for purchases and sales (and short sales) by observing patterns of price movements of a stock. This claim, labeled a filter strategy,2 3 is obviously inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis; it
supposes that the history of stock price movements is not fully reflected
in the prevailing prices.
Filter strategies have been scrutinized by efficient market tests based
on a positive expected returns asset pricing model. 24 All asset pricing
models used in tests of the efficient market hypothesis are "expected returns" models: the price of a security (or any risky asset) at time t directly relates to the return expected as of the end of the relevant holding
period, t+ 1 (where return is dividends, interest, and capital gain or
22 See Appendix B infra.
23 See text accompanying note 27 infra.
24 See text accompanying note 28 infra.
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loss). 25 The positive expected returns model makes the very limited claim

that this expected return is positive. 26 This is a claim with strong intuitive appeal. Why would anyone acquire a risky asset without the expectation that its value would increase? The implication of this model,
however, is that filter strategies cannot outperform a buy-and-hold
strategy.
A filter strategy has the following form: Suppose an investor at time
0 notices that the price of a stock is P,. She should purchase the stock
when it moves up x percent (to [1 +x]Po). She should hold the stock
until it passes its first "peak" price P and declines from that peak by x
percent (to [1 -x]P 1). At this point (P = [1 -x]P), the investor sells the
25 Formally, expected returns models assume that:

E(P,., ,ih,) = [1+E(ij.,+,/h,)] Pj.,
where E is a procedure for determining expected value of a distribution;
P,, is the price of security j at time t;
Pj, +I is its price at t-+I (including reinvestment of dividends or interest in respect of the
security);
r ,.+I is the one period percentage return for security j [i.e., (Pj,,+ - Pj / Pj,];
h, is a general symbol for whatever set of information is assumed to be "fully reflected" in
the price at t;
and the tildes (-) indicate that Pj,+ and r,+1 are random variables at t.
In words, this expression states that, at time t, the expected price of a security at time t-+1
will be the sum of the price at time t and the expected returns from time t to t+ 1. The
expression, thus, effectively calculates how much money an investor would have at the end of
period t+ I if she invested P, at period t with a return of rjt+
1. The expression assumes a
relation between prices and returns resulting from a price formation process in which, on the
basis of all the information available at time t, investors predict the expected value of the
distribution of possible prices. This prediction of the expected price requires that investors
predict, given their information h,, the range (or "distribution") of prices for securityj at time
t-+1 (Pjt+ 1) and the probability that any price within the range will be the observed price at
t+ 1. The expected price is simply the weighted average of possible prices. This expected
value determination of Pj+ 1is based on a similar expected value determination of the distribution of returns during the t to t+ I period of securityj [E(j,,+ 1/h,)], again using all the information available at time t for the determination. The equilibrium price for securityj at time t (Pj,)
balances the guesses and desires of different investors. At the equilibrium prices each investor
is satisfied with his own portfolio; no one desires to trade any security. The market "clears."
In the abstract formulation presented, however, the model does not allow empirical testing. It
does not specify the nature of investor expectations or preferences. The challenge of course is
to devise expected return models that allow the investor and the experimenter to calculate the
expected return E(rj,,+ 1/ht). See E. Fama, supra note 19, at 134-37.

To understand what is meant by designating prices or returns as random variables, one
should imagine that actual prices (or returns) are determined by drawing a ball from an urn on
which the price (or return) is recorded. The notation Pj (or f,) refers to this process of drawing
a particular ball from the urn. The number recorded on the ball is the realization of P, (or f).
The distribution of all possible Ps's (or r,'s) is determined by the composition of balls in the urn.
The probability of drawing any particular price Pj (or return r) is simply the number of balls
with that price (or return) recorded on them divided by the number of balls in the urn.
26 In formal expression, E (j.
+1/h,) >0. That is not to say that oberved returns (or "realizations") at time t+ I may not be negative, only that the expectations at time t of returns at
I+ I are positive.
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stock and goes short (i.e., sells borrowed stock that she promises to replace). The price will now fall to some "trough" P 2. When the price
rises by x percent above the trough (to [1 +x]P 2), the investor covers the
short position (i.e., buys enough stock to replace the borrowed stock) and
buys additional stock for her own account. The investor's profit in this
first cycle of the filter consists of two parts: her gain on the first purchase
and sale ([1-x]P1 - [1+x]Po) and her gain on the short transaction
([1-x]P - [l+x]P 2).27
Such a strategy conflicts with the assumption that the expected return on a security is positive. At the time of the short sale, this investor
expects negative returns. She expects to replace the borrowed stock at a
lower price. A buyer who purchased the stock at the time of the short
sale would have suffered a capital loss by the time the short seller covered. Hence, the filter strategy will have outperformed the buy-and-hold
strategy, in seeming contradiction of the positive expected returns model.
A technical analyst who uses a filter theory, however, need not dispute the proposition that current prices are set with the expectation of
positive future returns. He might instead challenge market efficiency by
claiming that the market, in projecting future returns and, thus, setting
current prices, incorrectly assesses information contained in past prices.
The market would, thus, anticipate positive expected returns from a security when, in light of past prices, the "correct" expected return is negative. Demonstrating that filter strategies do not generate trading profits
refutes the analyst's market inefficiency claim.2 8
Observe how an experiment in which fiter strategies outperform the
buy-and-hold strategy rejects the joint hypotheses of an efficient market
and of the positive expected returns equilibrium model. That filter strategies outperform buy-and-hold does not necessarily discredit the efficient
market hypothesis; perhaps the positive expected returns model does not
offer the correct benchmark for normal returns. On the other hand, the
model makes a very limited claim about equilibrium market prices. To
reject the equilibrium model requires the rather unlikely assumption
27 It is not necessary for the percentage price change trigger to be identical for buy and sell
signals. The text uses the same percentage for ease of exposition.
A filter strategy admits that one cannot predict which price is the peak or trough. How-

ever, it asssumes that one can predict turns in the market. (If P, is very close to P. the investor
suffers a loss due to transaction costs; so she must notice significant turns in the market for the
security.)
28 When various filters were tested for profitability against a passive strategy of buy-andhold, the latter strategy provided superior returns in all cases relevant to market participants.
Although some very small filters generated some theoretical gains, the fees and commissions
resulting from the numerous transactions triggered by such filters would wipe out any profits,
even for floor traders. Fama & Blume, Filter Rules and Stock-Market Trading, 39 J. Bus. 226
(1966).
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that, in general, individuals hold securities expecting to have nonpositive
or possibly negative returns.29 Thus, for filter strategies to outperform
buy-and-hold strategies would be significant evidence against the efficient
market hypothesis.
2.

CapitalAsset PricingModel

The positive expected returns model has only limited use in tests of
the efficient market hypothesis. First, it models the investment decision
simply as a choice between holding cash or holding a security. It also
assumes decisionmaking on a security by security basis whereas investors, particularly institutional investors, more plausibly evaluate their decisions on a portfolio basis. Second, investors seem to select securities on
the basis of comparative expected performance. The positive expected
returns model provides no way to compare relative prices and price
movements. 30 Third, the model allows us to test the efficiency of the
market only with respect to a restricted information set-that of past
prices (i.e., a filter strategy). Because the model places so little structure
on the mechanism of asset pricing, we cannot test the efficiency of the
market with respect to more varied information sets.
To "strengthen" the efficient market hypothesis, economists devised
market efficiency tests with respect to three other classes of information
sets. First, "public announcement tests" examine market reaction to
public announcements of company-specific information: stock splits, div31
idends, earnings and primary and secondary securities offerings.
Second, "privately-produced information tests" examine whether institutional investors, using sophisticated analysis of publicly available information, achieve results superior to individual investors. 32 Third,
"private information tests" examine whether particular investors, having
access to private corporate information not yet reflected in securities
29 It may be the case that investors also include in their portfolio securities having negative
expected returns as a means of increasing the covariance between stocks in order to reduce
risk. See text accompanying notes 37-43 infra. But it seems unlikely that such a strategy
would predominate.
30 Empirical observations of monthly price changes on the New York Stock Exchange
show that, although successive price changes for a security are not correlated, such changes
correlate in a relatively stable way with general market movements. E. Fama, supra note 19,
at 14. For example, if the market, as measured by a representative index, moves up 10%, some
stocks will regularly move up 15%, others 10%, and still others 5%. This observation is
particularly important for the efficient market theory, because tests of greater than expected
returns should correct for gains (and losses) from general market factors. For example, suppose during a bull market a securities analyst regularly picked stocks that outperformed the
market. A test of whether this success was inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis
must account for the stocks' regular relationships to market movements.
31 See Appendix A at text accompanying notes 200-07, 225-41 infra.
32 See Appendix A at text accompanying notes 208-20, 241-45 infra.
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prices, are able to outperform other investors. 33
To test market efficiency with respect to these broader information
sets requires the identification of a "normal" or "appropriate" price for
each security, as a constant against which to measure superior performance claims. Through such a comparison one could determine whether
investors with access to particular information sets can outperform investors whose knowledge is limited to information reflected through the prevailing securities prices. To accomplish this task, economists have
employed more extensive theories of asset pricing. The most prominent
of these theories, the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM), addresses
both the problem of testing nonprice information sets and the problem of
portfolio versus security selection. Thus, CAPM has implications not
only for understanding the efficient market hypothesis but also for legal
duties governing fiduciaries.
CAPM makes operational a model of investor behavior-portfolio
theory-that rests on the assumption that investors seek to maximize
their "expected utility" in an uncertain world.34 This utility increases as
returns rise and decreases as risk grows. Thus, "risk aversion" means
that individuals are willing to accept a lower return in order to avoid
risk. 35 A risk-averse investor will evaluate asset performance in a portfolio rather than in isolation. She will select an "efficient portfolio"-a
collection of assets such that for a given level of risk, the investor receives
36
the greatest expected return.
33 See Appendix A at text accompanying note 209 infra.
34 See generally Jensen, Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence, 3 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt.
Sci. 357 (1972).
35 To take a simple example, imagine two assets, Able and Baker, maturing in one year,
with the following distribution of projected returns:
Return(Able) Return(Baker)
25% chance
100
0
50% chance
200
200
25% chance
300
400
Even though the expected return of each asset (the weighted arithmetic average or "mean") is
identical (200), Baker is a riskier investment because the dispersion of possible returns is
greater. In particular, there is a greater probability of poor outcomes from Baker. Thus the
typical risk-averse investor would prefer Able. The price of Able will be bid up relative to
Baker, meaning that the expected return on Able (in this case, year-end payout divided by
purchase price) will be lower. Both assets are riskier, and hence less desirable to a risk-averse
investor, than an asset that guarantees a payment of 200. The typical measures of risk are
"variance" or "standard deviation" (the square root of variance). These measures compare the
riskiness of securities in terms of unit risk per unit expected return. For elaboration, see R.
Brealey & S. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 119-22 (2d ed. 1984); J. Weston & E.
Brigham, Managerial Finance 95-99 (7th ed. 1981).
36 This follows from the investor's desire to maximize utility, rather than expected returns.
For example, an investor may have an appetite for higher expected returns, yet also desire
peace of mind. Regardless of an investor's particular trade-off (or "indifference curve") between risk and return, she will prefer the highest expected return for the risk borne. Standard
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To evaluate the performance of a portfolio the investor must determine both its expected return and its risk. Expected portfolio return
37 If
equals the weighted sum of the expected returns of portfolio assets.
we measure the risk of the portfolio by the dispersion in its returns, however, the portfolio risk will not equal the weighted sum of dispersion in
return of the assets that comprise the portfolio. The returns of individual
assets may vary in ways that reduce the dispersion of total return. Consequently, portfolio risk (or dispersion) is primarily a function of the
"covariance" (or comovement or association) of the returns of individual
38
assets in the portfolio.
The dependence of portfolio risk on the covariance 39 of individual
asset returns implies that investors will hold a diversified portfolio, because the return on a collection of assets whose returns vary in response
to different events is more stable than the return on a single asset. More
precisely, by selecting securities whose expected returns fluctuate out of
synch with one another, one can reduce the dispersion in returns from
the portfolio without lowering expected returns. Assets whose returns
have "negative covariance" reduce risk the most. 40 But as long as the
risk characteristics of two assets are not identical, a portfolio combining
them will be "more efficient" than holding either one separately.4 1
discussions of portfolio theory are provided by J. Lorie & M. Hamilton, The Stock Market:
Theories and Evidence 198-211 (1973); W. Sharpe, Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets
(1970); J. Weston & E. Brigham, supra note 35, at 456-69. More rigorous discussions are
provided by E. Elton & M. Gruber, Modem Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis (2d ed.
1984); E. Fama, supra note 19, at 212-56.
37 For example, the expected return of a portfolio consisting of 25% Able and 75% Baker
would be (.25)(200) + (.75)(200) = 200.
3s For elaboration, see, e.g., J. Lorie & M. Hamilton, supra note 36, at 174-83.
39 Covariance is a measure of how stock prices move in relation to one other. If the price
movements are highly correlated, then the absolute value of the covariance is high. More
technically, the covariance of two random variables x and y is given by coy (x,y) =
E[(x-Ex)(y-Ey)], the expected value of the product of the deviations from the mean.
40 A negative covariance between stock price A and stock price B means that positive deviations from the mean price of stock A are more often associated with negative deviations from
the mean price of stock B. The more uniform the associated movements are between A and B,
the more highly (negatively) correlated are the stocks. For example, the raincoat manufacturer in note 41 infra, who will have higher-than-expected returns in a mild, rainy winter, may
offset the disappointing returns of a snowblower manufacturer for the same time period.
41 Consider the story of three firms: Raincoat Manufacturer, Inc. (R); Snowblower Manufacturer, Inc. (S); and Woolen Coat Manufacturer, Inc. (W). For simplicity's sake, assume
there is a 25% chance of an unusually cold and snowy winter, a 25% chance of an unusually
mild and rainy winter, and a 50% chance of an average winter, resulting in the following
payoff structure:
Exp.
Risk
Stock
Snowy
Average
Rainy
Return
(Variance)
R
6.0
10.0
14.0
10.0
8.0
S
18.0
8.0
6.0
10.0
22.0
W
13.0
12.0
3.0
10.0
16.5
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The opportunity to diversify has implications for the pricing of individual securities. The risk associated with the return on any particular
asset divides into two elements: the risks peculiar to the issuer ("unsystematic" or "company-specific" risk) such as a labor dispute, an unanticipated change in consumer tastes, or a major discovery or invention; and

the risks to issuers generally ("systematic" or "nondiversifiable" risk)
such as a recession, economic upturn, or inflation rate variations. Appropriate diversification eliminates virtually all of the unsystematic risk
in a portfolio. 42 Because investors compete to assemble efficient portfolios, an asset's price reflects only the risk it contributes to a perfectly
diversified portfolio. The market compensates investors, through greater
expected return (the "risk premium"), only for that element of risk that
43
cannot be eliminated by diversification.
CAPM makes an explicit assumption about the relation of asset return to the market return and to the asset's systematic risk. It states that
the expected returns on an asset (or portfolio) is the sum of the return on
a risk-free asset (rf) and a risk premium. The risk premium is the difference between the expected return of the market index, "M," and the riskAssume that an investor can choose a portfolio of two stocks or less. Because the risk of
the portfolio is a function of a security's covariance, the investor can maintain the same expected return while lowering risk, as illustrated by the following payoff structure for these
equally-weighted securities portfolios.
Exp.
Risk
Portfolio
Snowy
Average
Rainy
Return
(variance)
R,S
12.0
9.0
10.0
10.0
1.5
R,W
9.5
11.0
8.5
10.0
1.1125
S,W
15.5
10.0
4.5
10.0
15.125
(Those wondering about the derivation of the variance should examine, e.g., R. Radcliffe, Investment: Concepts, Analysis, and Strategy 140-56 (1982).)
Note that the R,W portfolio is the most efficient, because manufacturers of raincoats and
woolen coats have the highest degree of negative covariance. The RS portfolio is more efficient than holding any of the stocks alone, but less efficient than R,W. Note further that
although combining stocks with negative covariance best reduces risk, portfolios with securities of positive covariance (such as S, W) may still be more efficient than holding the stocks
alone.
The construction of actual portfolios is more complicated than this simple illustration.
For example, our simplifying assumption of equal weights of securities in the portfolio is arbitrary; one can adjust expected return and risk of portfolio by varying proportions of particular
securities.
42 Studies have shown that high levels of diversification may be obtained with portfolios of
relatively few stocks. Indeed, "[o]nce the portfolio has 20 securities, further diversification has
little effect." E. Fama, supra note 19, at 253-54. Yet, highly diversified portfolios (as many as
100 stocks) do contain small but significant amounts ofnonsystematic risk. W. Sharpe, Investments 116-17 (1978).
43 Alternatively stated, a security's price is a function of its risk. The relevant risk, however, relates to its returns vis-i-vis the returns on an efficient portfolio, not vis-i-vis itself. In
other words, a security's price is based on its performance in an efficient portfolio, not its
performance in isolation.
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free rate, multiplied by a term, "Beta." Beta reflects the volatility of the
asset (or portfolio) in comparison to the market index. 44 CAPM divides
the asset's expected return into two components: the return on a risk-free
asset, such as a Treasury bill, and the return in respect to the asset's
systematic (nondiversifiable) risk.45 CAPM has important implications
44 Formally, one writes:
E(,) = rf + 3im (E(fM) - rr)
where E is a procedure for determining expected value of a distribution;
r, is the percentage return on asset i (or portfolio i);
rf is the percentage return on a risk free asset;
rM is the percentage return on the market index of all risky assets;
I3,Mis a measure of the volatility of asset i (or portfolio i) relative to the market index;
and the tildes (-) indicate that r, and rM are random variables.
"Beta" may be more formally expressed as follows:

(1)

03i -

coy (Qji)
2
F)

where u(,r is the variance of the returns on the market index.

(corr iM) (aiaM)
(2)

R

=

2

where (corr iM) is the correlation coefficient between asset i and
the market index M, (a) is the standard deviation of returns on
asset i, and (aM) is the standard deviation of returns on the
market index.
In unpacking covariance, equation (2) shows that for assets having identical correlation to
the market index, the riskier asset will have a higher beta, and that for assets of the same risk,
the asset with less correlation will have a lower beta.
This version of CAPM is known as the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin model. See Lintner, The
Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 13 (1965); Mossin, Equilibrium in a Capital Asset
Market, 34 Econometrica 768 (1966); Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market
Equilibirium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. Fin. 425 (1964).
45 CAPM may also be stated as a series of statements about the pricing of risk: first, that
investors will insist on compensation for accepting risk; second, in a competitive market the
only kind of risk for which investors will obtain compensation is the volatility of a security's
return vis-a-vis return on the market generally; third, the key parameter in establishing the risk
premium of a risky security is a measure of that volatility, i.e., a security's beta.
in this way CAPM operationalizes portfolio theory. Directly applied, portfolio theory
requires the computation of expected returns, variances, and covariances for all assets, and
maximizes the combinations for efficiency (highest expected returns, least risk) for portfolios of
varying degrees of risk. Even with current high speed computers, the computation burden
could prove insurmountable. (For example, a direct application of portfolio theory for 1,000
securities requires approximately 500,000 computations; with CAPM, the number falls to only
3000. J. Lorie & H. Hamilton, supra note 36, at 199). The appeal of CAPM is the focus on one
presumptively efficient portfolio, the market index, and measurement of risk of single assets or

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:761

for portfolio management. 4 6 Here we focus attention on the relation of

CAPM to the efficient market hypothesis.
As we discuss in Appendix A, the initial tests in the early 1970's
using CAPM tended to confirm the efficient market hypothesis. 47 Test-

ing continued, however, using a more refined methodology. The results
of these recent empirical tests have contradicted the earlier evidence reportfolios in comparison to the market index. CAPM also has considerable aesthetic and
methodological appeal to economists. It derives an estimatable equation from principles that
govern individual choice and thus unifies financial theory with the rest of microeconomics.
46 CAPM implies that efficient portfolios consist of a combination of the market portfolio
and the risk-free asset, in positive or negative amounts. Because optimal diversification eliminates nonsystematic risk, the best portfolio is the market portfolio, which by definition is subject only to systematic risk. An investor who wishes a portfolio less risky than the market
should reduce her holdings of the market portfolio and acquire risk-free assets. Conversely, an
investor seeking greater risk should leverage her holdings of the market portfolio by borrowing. This may be illustrated by the following graph:

(Expected Return)
Capital Market Line
Efficient Portfolio Frontier

IM/
.5

1.0

1.5

Risk (P)

The capital market line represents expected returns at particular levels of risk from combinations of the most efficient portfolio of risky assets (presumably the market portfolio A4) with
the risky asset in positive (lending) or negative (borrowing) amounts. The gap between the
capital market line and the efficient portfolio (of risky assets) frontier represents the gains from
using this so-called "Separation Theorem" in the construction of portfolios. See Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk, 25 Rev. Econ. Stud. 65 (1958).
For those more accustomed to algebra, consider the following example: Assume that the
risk-free return is 8%, that the expected return on a low beta (0.5) stock portfolio is 12%, and
that the expected return on the market portfolio (beta = 1.0) is 20%. An investor seeking a
risk level (or beta) of 0.5 can improve on the 12% expected return available from a portfolio
solely of risky assets by putting half her funds in the market portfolio and half in risk-free
assets (Treasury bills, e.g.). Her expected return from such a portfolio is 14%. ((.5 X .08) +
(.5 X .20) = .14). For further discussion, including an examination of current assumptions
about taxation and ability to borrow at the risk-free rate, see R. Pozen, supra note 6, at 158-61,
165-69.
Though the above argument indicates that the "standard" CAPM implies that every investor holds the same portfolio of risky assets, more sophisticated "nonstandard" models entail
some variation in portfolios. See the discussion of Black's model at notes 53, 88 infra. In these
nonstandard models, the market portfolio will not be the uniquely efficient portfolio of risky
assets.
47 See Appendix A at text accompanying notes 200-20 infra.
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garding the efficient market hypothesis. 48 As with the filter tests, however, these recent tests are "joint tests" and could therefore lead us to
49
abandon either the EMH or CAPM.
There are strong reasons to reject CAPM rather than EMH. First,
many of the contradictory tests are public announcement tests. Because
much publicly available information can be acquired costlessly, one
would expect prices to reflect this information. Second, CAPM itself depends upon an efficient market assumption, because the assembling of
efficient portfolios requires an accurate assessment of risk and expected
returns for individual securities. Third, EMH is highly desirable from a
policy perspective. 50 Securities markets that are not speculatively efficient are unlikely to be allocatively efficient. Allocatively inefficient capital markets present important and perplexing policy problems. 5 1
48 See Appendix A at text accompanying notes 221-45 infra.
49 There is another assumption made by EMH tests using CAPM: "rational expectations."
CAPM asserts that expected returns from a security are linearly related (through beta) to
expected returns on the market portfolio. Unfortunately, expectations are not readily observable. Therefore, tests using CAPM almost always adopt the rational expectations assumption:
that investors' expectations are correct. Thus the distribution of actual returns is adopted as
investors' expectations.
Rather than rejecting EMH or CAPM it is tempting to reject instead the rational expectations assumption. First, the rational expectations assumption itself implies that investors share
ex ante beliefs about the distribution of future prices. Such a presupposition, however, contradicts naive observations and the widely held view that differences and changes in beliefs are,
along with differences and changes in endowments and risk preference, the occasions for trade.
On the other hand, the homogeneity presupposition is necessary for CAPM itself: if investors
had different beliefs, each would idertify a different portfolio as efficient. The measure of the
beta of a given security would then vary from individual to individual (because beta is a
measure of volatility relative to the most efficient portfolio). See also Appendix B at note 247
infra.
The second and most important reason for rejecting the rational expectations assumption
arises from a paradox that we will address below: namely, that investors will pay for information that the market provides for free. Despite these difficulties, however, abandoning the
rational expectation assumption would prove problematic. Because expectations are difficult
to observe, virtually every empirical test requires the assumption. Two published studies have
attempted to observe actual expectations, J. Cragg & B. Malkiel, Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices (1982) (using analysts' forecasts); Friend, Westerfield & Granito, New
Evidence on the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 33 J. Fin. 903, 906-08 (1978) (surveying institutional investors), and some institutions may study their own expectations, see W. Sharpe,
supra note 36, at 315-19 (discussing Wells Fargo Bank).
5o How can the desirability of a theory affect our acceptance of it? Recall that the tests of
EMH are joint tests with CAPM (and the rational expectations hypothesis). While at least one
of them is false, our research strategy may be affected by which one we think most likely to be
false and by which one we understand to be most central to our research program. See I.
Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in I Philosophical Papers (J. Worrall & G. Currie ed. 1978). Our strategy for formulation of legal policy
should admit similar concerns.
51 See. e.g., E. Fama, supra note 19, at 133: "An efficient capital market is an important
[1]f the capital market is to function smoothly in allocomponent of a capitalist system ....
cating resources, prices of securities must be good indicators of value."
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Nevertheless, we shall argue below that compelling reasons require modi52
fication of EMH.

Critics have raised two significant objections to CAIPM's reliability
as a benchmark of normal returns: (1) they have challenged the accuracy
and adequacy of the model; and (2) they have challenged the testability
of the CAPM model.
Consider, first, the accuracy and adequacy of CAPM. The model
makes two separate claims: first, that the expected return of a security is
linearly related to its market risk; second, that its expected return is
solely related to its market risk in combination with the risk-free rate.
The empirical tests generally support the first claim, but not the second. 53 Many researchers have claimed superior results with asset pricing
52 See text accompanying notes 66-83 infra.
53 Empirical studies showing the linear relationship between expected returns and market
risk include Black, Jensen & Scholes, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some Empirical Tests,
in Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets 79 (M. Jensen ed. 1972); Blume & Friend, A New
Look at the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 28 J. Fin. 19 (1973) (generally regarded as a particularly important study); Fama & MacBeth, Risk, Return, & Equilibrium: Empirical Tests, 81 J.
Pol. Econ. 607 (1973). See Jensen, Tests of Capital Market Theory and Implications of the
Evidence, in Handbook of Financial Economics 13-54 (J. Bicksler ed. 1979) (discussing evidence). But see Tinic & West, Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: A Revisit (forthcoming in J.
Pol. Econ. (1986)) (relationship between stock returns and systematic risk shows significant
nonlinearities).
While showing linearity, the studies also demonstrate significant discrepancies in the exact pricing of risk as predicted by CAPM. Based on the equation in note 44 supra, the "price
of risk" may be written with somewhat simplified notation as follows:
E(r,) -

rf =

Pi (E(rM) -

rf)

The empirical work showed that the price of risk on security i, the left-hand term, did not fit
the data. The market appeared to undervalue risk. Moreover, the linear relationship varied
from period to period and did not prevail in all periods. Thus, the studies have been viewed as
rejecting the specific "one factor" CAPM model. See E. Fama, supra note 19, at 368. Black
proposed a more complex model in the CAPM form that would substitute the return on a
"zero-beta" portfolio (the efficient portfolio uncorrelated with the market portfolio) for the
risk-free return. Black, Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing, 45 J. Bus. 444
(1972). The zero-beta term relaxed the assumption that investors were able to borrow or lend
at the risk-free rate and contemplated short-selling. For Black's "two factor" model one formally writes:
E(r,) = E(r) + ,(E(rm) - E(r.)), which means that the price of risk on security i, the left
hand term, may be described as: E(r) - E(r,) = [3, (E(rM) -E(r,)).
Black's model fits the data more closely in direct CAPM tests and has frequently been
used in other tests relying on CAPM. The shift to Black's model also has important implications for optimum investment policy, discussed at note 88 infra. For an intuitive account of
the zero-beta CAPM, see E. Elton & M. Gruber, supra note 36, at 303-06. Moreover, because
return on the zero-beta portfolio can vary (whereas the risk-free rate is regarded more as a
constant), Black's model could account for periodic changes in the slope of the so-called "security market line." See S. Scheffrin, supra note 8, at 133-37.
Some researchers disbelieve CAPM's basic claim, and particularly doubt that market risk
is the primary factor in asset pricing. E.g., Douglas, Risk in the Equity Markets: An Empirical Appraisal of Market Efficiency, 9 Yale Econ. Essays 3 (Spring 1969) (variance of individual
security returns better explains securities prices than beta); Friend, Westerfield & Granito,
supra note 49, at 906-08 (showing that firm-specific risk is as significant in asset pricing as beta
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models that considered variables in addition to market risk-for example, industry risk, 54 asset size, 55 the "skewness" of expected returns, 5 6 the
effect of taxes, 57 or investor time horizons. 58 Indeed, researchers producmeasure); Levy, Equilibrium in an Imperfect Market: A Constraint on the Number of Securities in the Portfolio, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. 643 (1978) (for all but most widely held securities,
variance of individual security returns provides a better explanation of price behavior than

beta); Reinganum, A New Empirical Perspective on the CAPM, 16 J. Fin. & Quantitative
Analysis 439 (1981) (returns on NYSE-AMEX stock portfolios with widely different estimated

betas are statistically indistinguishable, suggesting that CAPM may lack significant empirical
content). See also Ayres & Barry, Prologue to a Unified Portfolio Theory, 37 J. Fin. 625
(1982) (variance of individual firm cash flows (the internal rates of return) is key variable).
One source of the questioning of CAPM's basic claim is recent evidence showing that
individuals tend to hold undiversified portfolios. M. Blume & I. Friend, The Changing Role of
the Individual Investor 46-50, 117-20 (1978); Blume & Friend, The Asset Structure of Individual Portfolios and Some Implications for Utility Functions, 30 J. Fin. 585 (1975). Of course,
the significance of this finding in a market increasingly dominated by institutional investors
who do hold diversified portfolios is doubtful. Researchers also note some of the serious technical problems in testing CAPM; in particular, the determination of beta proves troublesome.
It is agreed that individual security betas are unstable over time, but that portfolio betas are
very stable. Thus, CAPM tests generally rely on returns of portfolios of a particular beta. The
problem, of course, is that "it is the returns on individual assets which the theory is trying to
explain and individual asset deviations from linearity may cancel out in the formation of portfolios." Friend, Westerfield & Granito, supra note 49, at 908. Another serious criticism of the
grouping technique used in CAPM tests is Roll, Testing a Portfolio for Ex Ante Mean/Variance Efficiency, in Portfolio Theory, 25 Years After 135-49 (E. Elton & M. Gruber ed. 1979).
54 E.g., J. Farrell, The Multi-Index Model and Practical Portfolio Analysis (1976) (portfolios based on multi-index model using industry sectors outperformed single-index portfolios),
discussed in D. Harrington, Modem Portfolio Theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model 5759 (1983); Langetieg, An Application of a Three-Factor Performance Index to Measure Stockholder Gains from Merger, 6 J. Fin. Econ. 365, 378 (1978) (addition of industry factor to
CAPM increases explanatory power for merger gains); see also Meyers, A Re-examination of
Market and Industry Factors in Stock Price Behavior, 28 J. Fin. 695 (1973).
55 E.g., Brown & Barry, Anomalies in Security Returns and the Specification of the Market
Model, 39 J. Fin. 807 (1984); Chan, Chen & Hsieh, An Exploratory Investigation of the Firm
Size Effect, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 451 (1985) (multifactor pricing model explains firm size effect
consistent with market efficiency); Reinganum, Misspecification of Capital Asset Pricing: Empirical Anomalies Based on Earnings' Yields and Market Values, 9 J. Fin. Econ. 19 (1981)
("small firm" effect, in which portfolios of smaller capitalization firms appear to earn abnormal
returns, attributable to CAPM misspecification); Schwert, Size and Stock Returns, and Other
Empirical Regularities, 12 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 4 (1983) (association between firm size and average
stock returns "is about as strong as the association between risk and average returns").
56 E.g., Kraus & Litzenberger, Skewness Preference and the Valuation of Risk Assets, 31 J.
Fin. 1085 (1976) (beta as surrogate for systematic "skewness," or expected returns beyond
normal distribution); Lee, Functional Form, Skewness Effect, and the Risk-Return Relationship, 12 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 55 (1977) (skewness as predictor of returns).
57 Litzenberger & Ramaswamy, The Effect of Personal Taxes and Dividends on Capital
Asset Prices: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 7 J. Fin. Econ. 163 (1979).
58 Bergman, Time Preference and Capital Asset Pricing Models, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 145
(1985); Levhari & Levy, The Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Investment Horizon, 59
Rev. Econ. & Statistics 92 (1977).
A general theory of a multifactor returns generating process is presented by Ross, The
Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing, 13 J. Econ. Theory 341 (1976), and is tested in,
e.g., Roll & Ross, An Empirical Investigation of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory, 35 J. Fin. 1073
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ing contradictory EMH studies frequently assert that CAPM is incomplete or "misspecified." In a survey of contradictory public
announcement tests, Ball argued that CAPM neglected some important
determinants of expected returns and that the earnings and dividends
variables studied in the tests served as a "proxy" for the factors that had
not been included.5 9 To use Ball's example, imagine an equilibrium returns model that did not account for securities' relative risks. An efficient market test would find dramatic differences in the securities' yields,
suggesting significant excess returns from analysis of yields. But these
differences would result from the observed variable (here, yield) substituting for an omitted variable (here, relative risk) in the "true" equilibrium returns generating process. In other words, the problem would lie
not in EMH itself but rather in the particular equilibrium model used in
the test. Thus, even if the first claim of CAPM-that there exists a linear
relationship between market risk and expected return-is true, its failure
to capture other important factors in asset pricing may make it an inadequate benchmark for EMH tests.
A second objection to CAPM is that it cannot be tested and thus
may not be used to test other hypotheses. 60 This argument is very complex, but the basic theme relates to the market index against which risk is
(1980) (finding at least three, possibly four, "priced" factors). Accord Bower, Bower & Logue,
Arbitrage Pricing Theory and Utility Stock Returns, 39 J. Fin. 1041 (1984) (in comparative
tests, arbitrage pricing theory better estimates expected returns than does CAPM). See also J.
Cragg & B. Malkiel, supra note 49, at 163 (concluding after survey that "systematic risk is not
entirely captured by single measures of covariance with the market index"). For further work
on arbitrage pricing theory, see, e.g., Ingersoll, Some Results in the Theory of Arbitrage Pricing, 39 J. Fin. 1021 (1984).
The explanatory power and testability of the arbitrage pricing theory is one of the hottest
debates in current finance. Compare Dhrymes, Friend & Gultekin, A Critical Reexamination
of the Empirical Evidence on the Arbitrage Pricing Theory, 39 J. Fin. 323 (1984); Dhrymes,
Friend, Gultekin & Gultekin, New Tests of the APT and Their Implications, 40 J. Fin. 659
(1985); Shanken, The Arbitrage Pricing Theory: Is It Testable?, 37 J. Fin. 1129 (1982);
Shanken, Multi-Beta CAPM or Equilibrium-APT?: A Reply, 40 J. Fin. 1189 (1985), with
Roll & Ross, A Critical Reexamination of the Empirical Evidence on the Arbitrage Pricing
Theory: A Reply, 39 J. Fin. 347 (1984); Dybvig & Ross, Yes, The APT Is Testable, 40 J. Fin.
1173 (1985).
59 Ball, Anomalies in Relationships Between Securities' Yields and Yield-Surrogates, 6 J.
Fin. Econ. 103, 111 (1978). The tests are discussed at greater length in Appendix A. Other
CAPM tests have identified rather quixotic seasonal factors on stocks such as a "January
Effect." See Tinie & West, Risk And Return: January vs. The Rest of The Year, 13 J. Fin.
Econ. 561 (1984). Such factors seem likely to proxy for "real" variables in the return generating process.
60 The objection is generally attributed to Roll, A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's
Tests-Part I: On Past and Potential Testability of the Theory, 4 J. Fin. Econ. 129 (1977).
Simpler accounts of Roll's critique are provided in R. Radcliffe, supra note 41, at 202-04; S.
Scheffrin, supra note 8, at 137-39. See also Ross, The Current Status of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM), 33 J. Fin. 885, 891-94 (1978) (technical account); Wallace, Is Beta
Dead?, Institutional Investor, July 1980, at 23 (popular account).
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measured. Tests of the model necessarily employ the wrong market index; the "true" market index, "M," contains all risky assets, such as real
estate or gold held for investment, not simply those traded on well-organized securities markets. 61 Tests of CAPM, however, cannot possibly employ "M" because it is not susceptible to measurement; instead, these
tests rely on the Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500 or the Wilshire 5000 or
some other index used as a proxy for "M," and the substitution gives rise
to profoundly misleading results. This point is clearly illustrated by the
observation of completely opposite outcomes in tests of comparative
portfolio performance when the proxy shifts from the S&P 500 to the

more broadly based Wilshire

5000.62

A more fundamental objection to the above observation about "M"
is that in its simplest form, CAPM amounts to a claim that the market
portfolio is efficient. If "M" cannot be determined, however, then its
efficiency cannot be evaluated and CAPM cannot be tested. Previous

tests of CAPM are fatally flawed: the observed linear relationship between actual returns and market risk turns out to be nothing more than a
63
mathematical tautology.
Whether CAPM is testable, and thus usable with confidence in any
tests, is a matter of debate among financial economists. 64 At the very
61 Indeed, nonmarketable assets, such as human capital (for example education), should be
included in "M."
62 B. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street 225 (2d ed. 1981); see Roll, Ambiguity
When Performance Is Measured by the Securities Market Line, 33 J. Fin. 1051 (1978) (shift in
proxy for market index significantly shifts performance results and rankings).
63 This is because when we examine the data "there will always be some portfolio which is
ex-post efficient and will bring about exact observed linearity among ex-post sample mean
returns and ex-post sample betas. If we do not know the composition of the market portfolio,
we might by chance select a proxy that is close to mean-variance efficient." Roll, supra note 60,
at 138 (emphasis in original). If it should happen that the market proxy is efficient, the results
will be consistent with CAPM, and if the market proxy is not efficient, the results will be
inconsistent, but in neither case will CAPM have been tested. For an additional proof of
Roll's point, see Levy, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Empiricism, 93 Econ. J.
145 (1983). The proofs are very complicated, but the reader may get some intuition from
examining Black's CAPM equation, supra note 53, and noting the necessary relationship between the zero beta portfolio and the proxy chosen for the market portfolio.
64 Compare, e.g., Cheng & Grauer, An Alternative Test of the Capital Asset Pricing
Model, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 660 (1980) (agreeing with Roll that all previous tests of CAPM
have been ambiguous, suggesting that the problem is regarding beta as exogenous, not endogenous, and offering unambiguous test but finding evidence against CAPM); Elton & Gruber,
Non-Standard C.A.P.M.'s and the Market Portfolio, 39 J. Fin. 911 (1984) (extending Roll's
conclusions to all CAPM variations); Gibbons, Multivariate Tests of Financial Models: A
New Approach, 10 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1982) (offering another unambiguous test and rejecting
CAPM); Shankin, Multivariate Tests of the Zero-Beta CAPM, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 327 (1985)
(rejecting CAPM for equally weighted market portfolio, even correcting for firm-size seasonal
effects); Tinic & West, supra note 53 (showing non-linear relationship between risk and return
on various market proxies, even after correcting for firm-size effects and seasonal anomalies)
with Stambaugh, On the Exclusion of Assets from Tests of the Two-Parameter Model, 10 J.
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least it appears that an asset pricing model more sophisticated than
CAPM is required. Moreover, as discussed below, 65 adjustments to
CAPM may have significant legal consequences for financial fiduciaries.
Even if CAPM's basic claim is sustained, it seems an insufficiently sensitive instrument to conduct reliable tests for EMH or for other purposes.
Independent reasons exist, however, to question and to reformulate our
understanding of EMH. To this problem we now turn.
II
INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND EFFICIENT MARKETS

The efficient market hypothesis boldly claims that informed participants (except for corporate insiders who possess unique access to certain
information) cannot outperform other market participants. 66 Sweeping
policy pronouncements flow from this claim. For example, legal rules
should discourage institutional investors, acting as fiduciaries, from expenditures on securities research. But the claim also leads to a curious
paradox: the market will remain efficient only if most market participants
believe it is not and accordingly engage in the securities research necessary to create efficiency. This conundrum raises a third concern to complement those of speculative and allocational efficiency already noted. A
market, efficient or not, should be in informational equilibrium: investors
should not only lack incentive to change their portfolios, they should also
have no incentive to change their information acquisition strategies.
The efficient market hypothesis makes two distinct claims: that all
relevant information will be available to the market, and that the market
rapidly digests all such information as soon as it becomes available.
EMH makes no claim about the source of information reflected in the
Fin. Econ. 237 (1982) (suggesting tests of CAPM not strongly affected by absence of certain
assets from market proxy); Mayers & Rice, Measuring Portfolio Performance and the Empirical Content of Asset Pricing Models, 7 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1979) (defending CAPM empirical
results) (criticized in Cornell, Asymmetric Information and Portfolio Performance Measurement, 7 J. Fin. Econ. 381 (1979); Roll, A Reply to Mayers and Rice, 7 J. Fin. Econ. 391
(1979)).
Ironically, despite the profound doubts about CAPM, particularly its sensitivity, financial
economists continue to employ it in a wide variety of contexts, including, for example, the
determination of merger gains. See note 176 and accompanying text infra. But see Gibbons,
supra, at 23 (warning about use of CAPM in market efficiency and other tests). The theoretical problems identified by Roll, which would make CAPM totally unreliable as a measure of
comparative portfolio performance, do not necessarily eliminate its usefulness in other tests, if
used with special care and if approximations are sufficient. See Roll, supra, at 397-99. On the
other hand, the empirical work cited above suggesting the inadequacy or misspecification of
CAPM makes CAPM highly suspect as a testing device. See Appendix A at text accompanying note 203 infra.
65 See text accompanying notes 88-95 infra.
66 See note 19 supra (citing literature).
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price. Models of market efficiency relied upon in the legal literature treat
the available information as exogenous by simply asking how the market
will respond given a certain amount of information; they fail to account
for individual decisions to obtain information. A better approach would
regard the information set relative to which the market is efficient as
endogenous; the efficient market hypothesis should be embedded in a
general model that simultaneously explains both investors' decisions to
acquire information and the process of market aggregation of information held by investors. By choosing legal rules or taking other actions on
the basis of the partial models, policy makers may unwittingly interfere
and the process by
with both the process of information acquisition
67
which this information is reflected in price.
Only recently have economists begun to model these two processes
jointly. Before discussing the different models, however, an examination
of the concept of "information" as used in the efficient market hypothesis
would be helpful. Market participants seek to predict at time t the return they will earn on their investment at time t + 1; in many cases this
amounts to predicting the price at t + 1. Consider for example a stylized
version of the future market for wheat. Traders must decide at time t on
a contract for delivery of wheat at time t + 1. The profitability of a
future contract for wheat at price pt depends on the spot market price at
time t + 1, p, . The spot market price in turn depends on the realized
supply of wheat at time t + 1, uncertain at time t, and the realized demand for wheat at time t + 1, which might also be uncertain at time t.
Future supply might be uncertain because weather conditions are uncertain or because, though the crop already has matured, its realizable size
is not known with certainty. Demand schedules might be uncertain because the demand for wheat from the Soviet Union or other potentially
large purchasers is not known at time t. In an efficient market the future
price and the spot price are related because the future price is the "best"
unbiased predictor of the spot price available given all the information
68
known by market participants.
Anything that assists a trader in predicting the spot price of wheat
constitutes "information." Information in this broad sense might be
costly in two different ways. First, it might be costly to acquire "elementary" bits of information. In our example, investors might seek facts
about soil conditions, actual crop yields of selected domestic growers, or
67 Two recent articles consider the process by which markets become efficient. Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669
(1984); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 5.
68 Thus, if investors imagined that the factors affecting variations in the crop and variation
in international demand were constant over time, FP represents the average spot price realized
over many periods.
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pictures of Soviet grain fields. Acquisition of these facts may require vast
expenditures of resources. Second, one might strive to understand the
process by which these various elementary facts combine to determine
the spot price. In some sense this process might entail no more than
determining how particular facts determine the supply of and demand
for wheat. These calculations seem easy to perform in the simple example described above, but in the complicated markets of the real world
such calculations often prove complex and expensive. For instance, an
investor might make the elementary observations that the rice crop was
unusually large and the potato crop unusually small. Because wheat,
rice, and potatoes all substitute partially for each other among consumers
these two facts influence the demand for wheat. Predicting this combined effect on the demand for wheat, however, is a difficult and expensive task.
A model of both information acquisition and price determination
must explain how investors decide the nature and amount of information
to acquire. An economic model will assume that investors make these
decisions by comparing the costs of acquisition to the benefits from the
information (extra trading profits). The costs will vary with the nature of
the information. Some information may be virtually costless to obtain.
One can easily obtain the past prices in a market by simply reading the
newspaper daily and recording the price. Thus, obtaining the "elemen69
tary" information necessary for technical analysis is virtually costless.
We might therefore expect large numbers of market participants to share
this information. Other information-about the size of the crop or the
size of substitute crops or the size of the Soviet harvest-may be very
difficult to obtain. Traders will expend resources to obtain this information only if it is profitable. So, if learning about the Soviet harvest allows
the trader to determine that future contracts for wheat are undervalued
(i.e., the future price of wheat is lower than the expected spot price), the
trader could profit through the purchase of future contracts. Conversely,
if the information about the Soviet harvest showed that future contracts
were overvalued, she could profit by selling short.
The effects of an efficient price determination mechanism on incentives to acquire information depend on how one models the investor's
decision to acquire information. In the previous paragraph we assumed
that the extra information allowed the investor to identify under- or overvalued future contracts. In an efficient market (as conventionally defined), she would be unable to profit from the acquisition because the
future price of wheat would instantaneously reflect the information about
69 Technical analysis examines trends in past prices in order to determine what securities
to purchase.
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the Soviet harvest that the trader had acquired. The impact of market
efficiency on the investor's information acquisition decision, then, depends on whether she recognizes that the market is efficient. If she assumes that the market is inefficient, she would expect to earn extra profits
(though she may fail to do so), and thus would acquire the information.
If she believed that the market was efficient, however, she would recognize that she could not profit from acquiring the information, and therefore would lack any incentive to acquire costly information.
The two models of information acquisition thus assume different
levels of investor sophistication. In "naive" models, the investor does not
recognize that markets are efficient. Consequently she does not use the
market price to infer information about the value of the securities. Thus,
prices serve only as budget constraints. The size of the portfolio
purchased is limited by her own wealth and the prices of the securities.
In "sophisticated" models, the investor knows the market price is efficient and "fully revealing." Hence, she can infer from the price as much
information about future returns at time t +1 as someone who had engaged in painstaking research. For the sophisticated investor, prices
serve two functions: they constitute budget constraints and they convey
information about the securities' values.
While the concept of efficiency in both the naive and the sophisticated models conforms to the basic definition of efficient markets provided above, in neither model, as required by the conventional definition
of efficiency, can an investor make trading profits. The naive trader believes she can make trading profits but cannot. The sophisticated investor knows she cannot make trading profits. This knowledge leads to a
paradox in the sophisticated model. As a result of the sophisticated
trader's knowledge, she will not acquire costly information. If she fails
to acquire any costly information, however, the market might fail to be
efficient. Acquisition of costly information would then be a profitable
endeavor. An equilibrium of both efficient security prices and decisions
to acquire information would not exist. 70 No such equilibrium paradox
besets the naive model, but that model manifests its own inconsistencies
that it will repay us to consider.
Naive models suffer from two related flaws that may be understood
more clearly in the context of a particular model. We shall consider a
model presented by Verrecchia. 7 1 In Verrecchia's model, each investor
may choose to learn something about the expected value (or mean) of the
70 It is also possible that the market remains efficient as to the information acquired because available information would be accurately reflected in price, but security prices would
carry very little information.
71 Verrecehia, Consensus Beliefs, Information Acquisition, and Market Information Efficiency, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 874 (1980).
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distribution of future prices. She will use this information to adjust her
beliefs about prices and thereby affect her portfolio choice. The effect on
her portfolio choice depends, then, on her initial beliefs about possible
future prices. A sophisticated investor would have "rational expectations": her beliefs about the distribution of future prices would be correct. In Verrecchia's model, however, the investors are naive; they have
inaccurate beliefs about the mean price. Verrecchia justifies this assumption by noting that each investor is a price taker 72 and therefore she
should not expect her actions to affect the price. In particular she should
73
not expect the information she gathers to be reflected in the price.
The rational expectations assumption suggests the more fundamental objection to Verrecchia's assumption of naivete. Investors repeat the
process of portfolio adjustment every period. After many periods they
should notice that their naive belief (that the price does not reflect an
available information) is wrong and that they are not earning a return on
their research investments, or more precisely that they could improve
their predictions by using the price of the security to predict future
prices. If they made use of price in this way, they would discover that
the information they acquired had no value. Hence, the naive investor is
transformed into the sophisticated investor. This discovery should occur
as long as the process that generates prices is stationary. If the process
changes from period to period, investors will not learn the true distribution because it will change constantly. Further, if the process is not stationary, the inference problem for the naive investor also grows more
difficult. 74
A second, related problem arises in Verrecchia's model. The model
assumes that investors do not believe that price carries information about
security values. No one then should be interested in technical analysis of
past prices because it assumes that one can infer future prices from ob72 A market participant is a price taker if, when he makes his decisions, he assumes that his
actions will not affect market outcomes. In competitive markets, each participant purchases or
sells only a very small part of the market and hence his decisions have no (or very little) effect
on market price and quantity traded. We generally assume that participants in competitive
markets understand that their decisions have little effect and hence make their decisions without calculating market responses to their acts. In particular, each consumer in a competitive
market is generally modeled as having an infinitely elastic (perfectly horizontal) demand curve.
73 Verrecchia, supra note 71, at 881.
74 More generally, lack of stationarity makes testing of hypotheses extremely difficult. In
Verrecchia's model, investors know the form of the distribution and need only estimate its
mean and variance. Nonstationarity might only change the mean and variance from period to
period. If this is so, Verreechia's model is adequate; but it might also change the distribution
of returns. This is not the place to explain the importance of the stationarity assumption to
asset pricing models generally (including CAPM), but "[w]ithout stationarity. . , or some
explicit model of nonstationarity, econometrics itself is in jeopardy and this seems too tragic to
take seriously." Ross, supra note 60, at 890 n.5. See also Appendix B at note 247 infra.
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serving past prices. While efficiency in Verrecchia's sense is consistent
with no technical analysis because whatever information carried by past
prices might also be carried by fundamental 75 information, investors do
purchase technical analysis. Their behavior is inconsistent with the
assumption.
Sophisticated models assume that investors realize that securities'
prices carry information about value. Investors use price to infer the
future returns of securities. These models replace the problematic assumption of no learning made by naive models but they do so at the cost
of gathering information. Investors can acquire information about future
returns by either expending resources and gathering information, or observing the current price at no cost. Because the amount of information
known by any participant in the market is endogenous (i.e., is a function
of the expected gain), the efficiency paradox noted above arises. Let us
consider this paradox in the context of the market for wheat futures. If
no one acquired the information about the Soviet harvest, then everyone,
including the "market," could better predict the spot price by gathering
the information. The efficiency of the market, however, discourages an
investor from acquiring the information because no individual can secure
76
the gains.
If choices that confront investors are analyzed, however, it is apparent that investors still may retain incentives to do research. Thus, effi75 Fundamental analysis is research into the value of an investment by analysis of market
and investment-specific factors.
76 At first glance, the paradox seems to derive from the fact that everyone purchases on the
same market so that the efficiency of the market seems to be a public good. Because the
market is efficient, the acquiror of the information cannot prevent other people from appropriating the benefits of the information. All market participants profit equally.
The theory of public goods suggests that there will be an insufficient level of goods in a
market because of the free-rider problem. This problem may be explained as follows: because
each person enjoys the use of the good regardless of how much she pays for it, each person, if
asked how much of the good she would be willing to support, would understate her willingness
to pay. Unfortunately, the situation is symmetric and society would purchase too little of the
good.
One simple model of this problem is the prisoner's dilemma game. This game, most simply described, consists of two players, each of whom has two possible actions (or strategies)cooperate (C) or defect (D). The payoff to each player depends not only on what she chooses
but also on what the other player chooses. We may represent the payoffs (Player I/Player II)
by the following matrix:
Player II's strategies
C

C

D

1/1

-. 5/1.5

Player I's strategies
D
1.5/-.5
0/0
Each player has two strategies C (cooperate) and D (defect). Each player's payoff from
the game depends not only on his own strategy choice but also on the strategy choice of his
opponent. For example, if Player I chooses C and Player II chooses D, Player I receives -. 5
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cient markets do not have the property that the strategy "no research" is
always best regardless of what other investors do (technically, "no research" is not a "dominant" strategy) or the property that "no research"
is best given that all other investors are doing no research (technically,
"no research" is not a "symmetric Nash equilibrium"). 77
To begin we must consider possible investor strategies. In actual
markets investor research strategies are quite complex. Decisions are required not only about the amount to spend, but also about how to divide
it up: which securities to research and whether to do technical or fundamental research. Whether a securities market will be efficient or not depends on the joint, but independent, choices of all investors. Some
patterns of research choice will lead to efficient markets while others will
not. The pattern in the market today appears to produce a very high
level of market efficiency, but we do not know what types of restrictions
we can impose on research strategies without hindering the generation of
an equally efficient market. For example, banning technical research
might lead to an inefficient market if no amount of fundamental research
could capture the information carried by past prices. (More likely the
amount of fundamental research done might have to increase
dramatically.)
For simplicity let us ignore the complications of allocating research
funds. Instead assume that market efficiency depends only on the
amount expended on research. Let R* be the cutoff point; if more than
R* is spent on research the market will be efficient, otherwise not. Suppose that all investors are alike and each chooses a research level R',
where R = 0 (no research) or R i = 1 (a certain level of research). If the
investor chooses no research, she pursues a diversification strategy by
and Player 111.5. Each entry in the matrix first gives the payoff to Player I followed, after the
slash, by the payoff to Player II.
Examination of this game situation reveals that Player I is always better off choosing the
strategy D. But the game is symmetric; Player II therefore is also always better off choosing
strategy D. Consequently, the outcome for both players is 0, which is worse than if they
cooperated.
A strategy like D that is best regardless of what strategy other people choose is called
"dominant." In public goods situations it is a dominant strategy not to contribute in the
supply of the public good even though one desires the supplied good.

The equilibrium pair of strategies (DD) has another property. It is a "Nash equilibrium,"
which means that if Player I is using strategy D, then Player II has no incentive to change his
strategy, and similarly for Player I contingent on Player II's strategy choice. The pair (CC) is
not a Nash equilibrium. If Player II is playing C, Player I has an incentive to switch to
strategy D to increase his income.
The text suggests that, in fact, the information paradox is not a free-rider or prisoner's
dilemma problem. Rather, it is better modeled by a different game.
77 See note 76 supra.
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selecting the market portfolio.7 8 (Any other strategy would be irrational.
The investor would lose the benefits of diversification without gaining the
possibility of selecting undervalued securities.) If the investor chooses to
do research, she selects an "optimum" portfolio in light of the research
information. In an efficient market, the investor will not outperform the
market and her return will be reduced by research expenditures. But if
the total amount of research by all investors (who face similar payoff
matrices and the temptation to free ride) is not sufficient to produce an
efficient market, then the investor could earn a return on her research
expenditure.
We assume only that the payoff to the nonresearching investor in an
efficient market exceeds her payoff when the market is inefficient. This
assumption means that a pure diversification strategy is less profitable in
an inefficient market than in an efficient one. 79 We may represent the
schema of this game in a matrix where the entries represent the payoffs to
an individual investor. 80 The game looks as follows:
Investor
Strategies
R
NR
Result of
R>R*-1
- 1
0
choices of
other
R<R*-1
>0
<0
investors
The game matrix reveals that no research, R! = 0, is neither a dominant strategy nor a Nash equilibrium (if each investor i chooses it). R! =
0 is not a dominant strategy because, if few other investors do research,
the resultant market inefficiency provides an opportunity to improve payoff through research. R = 0 is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium because, if everyone chooses no research, the total amount spent on
research R will be less than R* and the market will be inefficient. Consequently, an investor could profit by doing research. Therefore, given that
everyone else chooses R' = 0 an investorj should choose Rj > 0.
For some payoff structures when the market is inefficient, this model
78 The investor may actually choose to invest in a mutual fund or stock index in order to
select closest to the market portfolio.
79 Market inefficiency will interfere with the investor's ability to create efficient portfolios
(i.e., those consisting of securities whose returns covary in the optimum way). See notes 34-43
and accompanying text supra. Conceivably the investor could acquire the market portfolio,
but would incur greater transaction costs in assembling such a large portfolio and might still
not be able to solve the problem of deciding in what proportions to hold particular securities.
In fact, we need only assume that in an inefficient market, the payoff to research exceeds the
pay-off to no research.
8o Note that if all other investors have spent more than (R*- 1) on research, the market
will be efficient when the last investor makes his unit expenditure on research since total research expenditures will be greater than R *.
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will have a set of Nash equilibrium research strategies in which some but
not all investors purchase research. In this simple model, the equilibrium
cannot be symmetric in pure strategies; if each investor acts like every
other investor then everyone must do research, or no one must do research, neither of which is in equilibrium. The equilibria must either be
asymmetric, or in mixed strategies. In a mixed strategy equilibrium,
each investor would choose with some positive probability to do research. As a result the market would be efficient with some positive
probability. For equilibria in which the probability of doing research is
high, markets would generally be efficient. Because some investors will
undertake research expenditures only if they reasonably expect to earn a
positive return, the market will, at times, be inefficient and those doing
research will earn a return. Most of the time, however, the market will
be efficient. A series of equilibria in which investments in securities research earn a competitive return will result.
A slightly more complicated model yields a few other interesting
conclusions. Assume that investors vary in size. A certain amount of
research costs all investors the same dollar amount, but on a portfolio
dollar basis is much cheaper for the large investor. Thus the same research will produce a proportionately greater percentage return for the
large investor.8 1 Then there is some critical size below which an investor
does no research but above which investors will invest in research with
some positive probability.
Thus far we have shown that rational investors will choose to invest
in securities research if they are large enough even though the pattern of
research investment leads, with high probability, to an efficient market.
This does not imply that the aggregate amount of research is necessarily
optimal. Thus, investors might frequently invest more in research than
necessary for an efficient market. We might not be able, however, to
introduce a legal rule that would improve the performance of the securities research market; no legal rule may exist which would lead investors
to choose an aggregate level of research closer to the optimal one.
Three more comments about the model may be helpful. First, competitive markets are often described as those in which an actor need not
consider the strategic implications of his choice. Thus, if securities research markets were competitive one might argue that investors need not
take into account others' research expenditures. Taken too literally this
approach is obviously paradoxical. But assuming that each investor has
some probability distribution over the amount of money the rest of the
market will expend on research, then we may model each investor as
81Returns to research may differ with size for another reason as well. There may be a high
threshold amount of research necessary to exploit possible market inefficiency.
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maximizing his expected income by his choice of research expenditure.
Again, small investors will choose R! = 0 but large investors will choose
some positive research expenditure.
Second, this informal model suggests that the prohibition of securities research by institutional investors might have serious repercussions
for market efficiency. Moreover, it questions whether a pure diversification strategy would be wise in the event that markets are inefficient. If
markets are inefficient, our models do not predict that diversification will
be a good strategy, nor do they predict that it will be a bad strategy. We
have no asset valuation theory for inefficient markets.
Third, the existence of an equilibrium in this model depends on the
benefit to an investor who purchases research on an inefficient market
exceeding her benefit from an inefficient market when she purchases no
research. If this ratio of benefits were reversed, no equilibrium would
exist.
Recently economists have developed models that make precise the
conclusions suggested by the informal heuristic model we have outlined.
Grossman and Stiglitz provide a model in which a research market and a
securities market simultaneously achieve equilibrium.8 2 In their model an
investor must expend a certain amount to become informed about one
aspect of the uncertainty as to the price of the security. In equilibrium,
the price of the asset reveals only partially the information possessed by
informed investors. Prices are only partially revealing because the investors are uncertain about two factors that influence prices-supply and
demand-and the uncertainty about only one of these factors can be resolved by research. Uninformed investors who observe the price cannot
tell how much of the price is determined by the unresolved uncertainty
and how much by the events about which informed investors learned.
Because price only partially reveals the information held by informed
investors, they earn sufficient trading profits to compensate them for
their expenditures. Profits to informed investors, however, are "normal." Informed and uninformed investors earn identical returns on their
total expenditures (investments in securities plus investments in research)
because securities research is a competitive industry. If informed investors earned more than uninformed investors, it would be profitable for
some uninformed investors to purchase research. As more investors
purchase research, the price grows more informative and the value of
doing research declines. Conversely, if the uninformed earned higher
profits than the informed, it would pay for some of the informed inves82 Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 8; see also Verrecchia, Information Acquisition in a
Noisy Rational Expectations Economy, 50 Econometrica 1415 (1982) (extending Grossman
and Stiglitz).
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tors to cease doing research. When the amount of research decreased,
the profit to the informed would rise.
In Grossman and Stiglitz's model, it is important that the information acquired does not completely eliminate the price uncertainty. The
future market for wheat discussed at the outset of Part II provides a
convenient illustration. Grossman and Stiglitz require that investors be
able to resolve uncertainty about either supply or demand but not both.
If only one uncertainty, say that of supply, is resolvable, uninformed
traders would be unable to distinguish variations in price caused by the
known (to the informed investors) changes in supply from those price
variations caused by the unknown changes in demand. The unresolved
uncertainty is called "noise." The larger the impact the unresolved uncertainty might have on the price, the greater the noise. The greater the
noise, the more valuable is extra information. Thus, if demand conditions may vary widely, the price conveys less of the information available
to the informed traders. Similarly, as the cost of information acquisition
declines, the price becomes more informative.
It may be helpful to restate the Grossman and Stiglitz model in
terms we developed above. Because information is endogenous, not all
relevant information will be available to the market. Prices therefore will
not fully reveal information that is not available to the market through
securities research, and those engaging in research can earn a positive
expected return.
Both the heuristic game theory model and the formal analysis in
Grossman and Stiglitz point to the same conclusion: we should not expect 100% "efficiency" from securities markets. Markets that are substantially efficient nevertheless afford investors the opportunity to earn
competitive, positive returns from securities research. Thus the efficient
market hypothesis, and the policy prescriptions that flow therefrom,
83
must be understood on this basis.
III
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A.

Market Efficiency and Regulation of InstitutionalInvestors

Our survey of the theory and evidence of market efficiency has iden83 For a different approach to these issues, which also seeks to resolve the "efficiency paradox," see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 5. Gilson and Kraakman postulate that the efficient
interaction between capital and information is determined by the initial distribution of information among traders, which is a function of costs. The cheaper the information, the more
efficient the market. They do not purport to try to disentangle the assumption and consequences of the efficient market hypothesis from asset pricing models and rational expectations
generally. As we point out, market "efficiency" is an insufficient basis for policy. See text
accompanying notes 92-93 infra.
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tified a number of serious problems in the application of the efficient market hypothesis to legal policy. First, a substantial body of empirical work
questions whether even the most well-developed capital markets are efficient. 84 Second, as a theoretical matter, it seems unlikely that markets
will be efficient in any conventional sense. In markets with minimally
sophisticated investors, the information relative to which we measure the
efficiency of the market will be endogenously determined. Investors will
determine the amount of information to acquire on the basis of the return
they receive from information acquisition in comparison to the return
they can earn simply from inferring future returns from prices. The endogeneity of information implies that the market can be efficient relative
only to a restricted set of information and that it will be inefficient rela85
tive to more costly information.
Third, because of both empirical and theoretical problems with market efficiency, and for independent theoretical and empirical reasons, we
doubt that CAPM accurately portrays the normal return generating
process.8 6 Fourth, because efficient market tests are joint tests, doubts
about CAPM as a benchmark of normal returns have undercut the empirical studies that are cited to demonstrate efficiency. If the measure of
normal returns is inaccurate, we cannot infer that excess trading profits
are impossible. These doubts apply with particular force to tests of mutual fund performance claiming that sophisticated investors spending
considerable resources on securities research cannot outperform
87
nonresearchers.
To understand the impact of these problems on policy formulation,
consider the policies that we might decree for institutional investors and
other financial fiduciaries in a world without such problems. If markets
were efficient and the capital asset pricing model accurately predicted
normal returns for securities, diversification would be the only reasonable
investment strategy. All investors should identify the level of risk they
wish to accept and choose an efficient portfolio that maximizes return
given that level of risk. Where the investor could borrow or lend at the
risk-free rate, that portfolio would consist of the market portfolio, as appropriately leveraged or unleveraged. 88 Some research to determine
whether smaller (than market) portfolios closely approximated full diver84 See Appendix A at text accompanying notes 221-45 infra.
85 See text accompanying notes 77-83 supra.
86 See text accompanying notes 53-65 supra.
87 See Appendix A at text accompanying notes 208-20 infra.
88 See note 46 supra. The text refers to the standard CAPM model. If Black's "zero-beta"
CAPM model is employed, optimal "passive" investment strategies would be more complex.
This is because the zero-beta CAPM does not assume an investor can borrow at the risk-free
rate, meaning that the market portfolio would not be the efficient portfolio for all levels of risk.
This is illustrated as follows:
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sification would be justified if the slight loss in efficiency were compensated by the decrease in transaction costs necessary to form and maintain
that portfolio. 89 For investors, such as mutual funds, who cannot readily
borrow or borrow near the risk-free rate, 90 and who seek greater risk
than provided by the market portfolio, the task is to assemble the efficient

Expected
Return

/
C

RB

A--

Borrowing

Rate
RL

Lending
Rate
Risk
The efficient frontier becomes LABC. The market portfolio is on the frontier, but unlike
the standard CAPM, it is not the optimal portfolio for all investors. Investors who wish a risk
level below that provided by portfolio A should mix A with lending at the risk-free rate; for
risks greater than B, by acquiring more of portfolio B through borrowing; for risks between A
and B, by acquiring the appropriate portfolio of risky assets. The market portfolio loses its
uniqueness as a guide for investment (although its identification remains essential for the
model). Thus, translating the model's prescriptions into an appropriate passive portfolio strategy becomes problematic.
The matter becomes more problematic still if other "nonstandard" CAPM models are
employed, such as a CAPM that looks at returns on an after-tax basis, or an inflation-adjusted
CAPM. See generally Elton & Gruber, The Lessons of Modem Portfolio Theory, in B. Longstreth, Modem Investment Theory and the Prudent Man Rule (forthcoming 1986). Financial
economists frequently criticize the legal literature in this area on grounds of overemphasis on
the market index as the only appropriate portfolio of risky assets for the investor diversifying
at a particular level of risk. The result holds only under the standard one-factor CAPM, with
its artificial assumptions about borrowing at the risk-free rate.
89 See Langbein & Posner, Market Funds I, supra note 6, at 11 (suggesting significant loss
of correlation with the market index due to diversification with significantly fewer stocks).
90 See Appendix A at text accompanying notes 215-17 infra (discussing limitations on borrowing by mutual funds). In general, financial fiduciaries are not permitted to leverage investments through borrowing. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 227 comment f (1959)
(purchasing of stocks on margin regarded as "speculation"). This fact may help explain the
recent wave of corporate restructurings, in which debt is substituted for equity in corporate
capital structures. Institutions that cannot attain their desired leverage directly may therefore
show some preference for securities of highly leveraged firms.
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portfolio of risky assets. CAPM makes this possible by postulating a
linear relation between expected return and relative risk, and defines the
risk of a security in an operational way. Thus, research expenditures to
determine the covariance of the return of a given security with the return
of the market are both necessary and justified. In short, the "unproblematic" truth of the efficient market hypothesis and the CAPM
would dictate comparatively clear and succinct rules of prudent investment and securities research. Indeed, these rules, based on such an unproblematic world, have been the basis for recent legal policy-making
proposals. 9 1
How do these proposals change if we acknowledge the doubts outlined above? The discovery that efficient market theory is not necessarily
true does not free the law from theory; rather it deprives the law of a
coherent theoretical framework within which to evaluate policy proposals. In the absence of such a framework, we must at least make explicit
the empirical and theoretical judgments we use in prescribing specific
legal policies.
Suppose that information was exogenous (because investors are naive and will continue to engage in securities research without regard to
returns) and markets were efficient but that the capital asset pricing
model presented an inaccurate or unimplementable standard of normal
returns. 92 Diversification would still be the only prudent strategy to undertake, but criteria against which to appropriately diversify one's holdings at a specific level of risk would be lacking, even if only an efficient
proxy for the market portfolio were desired. 93 One might then require
91 See, e.g., Junewicz, supra note 6 (proposing pension plan disclosure of investment risk as
measured by beta to enable participants to choose desired risk level); Langbein & Posner,
Market Funds I, supra note 6, at 14-18 (suggesting that trustees should buy shares in a mutual
fund or a market fund rather than try to choose particular stocks); Langbein & Posner, Market
Funds II, supra note 6, at 21-23, 28-31, 33-35 (supporting the use of passive investment strategy, commingling of small accounts, and deviation for trusts with few securities); Langbein &
Posner, Social Investing, supra note 6, at 83-96 (questioning social investing on the grounds
that it reduces diversification and adds administrative costs without increasing expected returns-a view of social investing that is significantly undercut by the move from the standard
CAPM model to nonstandard models, because of the loss of a single efficient portfolio of risky
assets); Pozen, Money Managers and Securities Research, supra note 6, at 949-53 (recommending presumptive permissive rules for portfolio management and purchase of securities
research); Note, Broker Investment Recommendations, supra note 5 (advocating a mandated
warning from brokers to investors disclosing that returns from portfolio theory strategy generally exceed stock-picking strategy).
92 See text acccompanying notes 34-65 supra. Note that even if we believed CAPM to be a
correct theory of asset pricing, the problem of devising an appropriate market index to measure relative risk could make it unimplementable.
93 Traditional trust doctrine provides a good illustration of the vagueness of the general
prescription "to diversify" without a guiding theory. See, e.g., H. Bines, The Law of Investment Management 6.02[4] (1978); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 228 (1959) (imposing a
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fiduciaries to hold the entire market, but this requirement presents difficulties. It fails to identify the proportions in which each security should
be held. It also prevents investors from conserving on transaction costs
by holding less than the full market. The claim of efficiency alone is
therefore not a sufficient claim on which to base legal policy making for
financial fiduciaries. We need a separate asset pricing theory to evaluate
and regulate fiduciary conduct.
Suppose that markets are not efficient though the amount of information known to market participants remains exogenously determined.
Inefficiency has dramatic implications. Most immediately, diversification
is no longer the sole prudent investment strategy. If market prices do not
reflect available information, then an investor may identify misvalued
stocks, potentially enabling her to earn a return above the return available through diversification at a given level of risk. Consequently, inefficiency would recommend the legitimacy of fundamental research if one
believes that the underlying asset pricing model is tied to real economic
characteristics of firms and that these real values are eventually reflected
in financial markets.
Nonetheless, there are several notable complications to recommending fundamental research. First, if no generator of normal returns
exists then we have no benchmark from which to test the relative efficiency of the market. An investor may have no basis for knowing
whether it would be more prudent to pursue diversification or to hunt for
above normal returns by investing in research. Second, without CAPM
or another asset pricing model linking expected return to risk, it becomes
very difficult to evaluate investment performance by fiduciaries. 94 Thus
the absence of a benchmark generator of normal returns implicates quesduty of "reasonable diversification... unless under the circumstances it is prudent not to do

so").
94 Crude measures of portfolio performance will be available, such as comparison to returns on specific market indices or to historical returns on particular types of portfolios and so
forth. Such measures do not account for the comparative risk of different portfolios. See
Cornell, supra note 64, at 385-88 (rebutting efforts subsequent to Roll to use CAPM as performance measure and proposing "oldtime" test based on positive expected returns model but
with limited power); Roll, supra note 62 (CAPM problems eliminate its use as comparative
measure).
One interesting implication is to point out the difficulty of performance-based fee setting
by investment advisers. Thus the SEC in its recent adoption of Rule 205-03 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 wisely limited the availability of such fee structures to clients likely
to be sophisticated (i.e., having net worth more than $1 million or at least $500,000 under the
adviser's management). SEC Investment Advisers Act Rel. No. 996, reprinted in [Current
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 83,939 (Nov. 14, 1985). Performance-based fees
may nevertheless test the ingenuity of sophisticated investors in devising compensation arrangements that limit strategic behavior by advisers, such as unusual risk-taking at the end of a
marking period, early profit-taking, or distorting the benchmark. See Another "May Day"
Worries the Market, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1985, at F10, col. 3.
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tions of performance as well as of efficiency. Third, if markets are not
efficient, diversification becomes a problematic strategy not only because
of the foregone opportunities from stock-picking but also because successful diversification requires the assessment of the "true" variation in
expected returns. 95 Market inefficiency interferes with this assessment.
Fourth, an investor cannot earn above-normal returns simply by identifying over- or undervalued stocks. She must identify misvalued stocks that
the market will in the (near) future value accurately or misvalue in the
opposite direction. In discussions of misvalued stocks one frequently
adopts the implicit assumption that the market eventually corrects its
misvaluations. Absent an understanding of the process that generates
market inefficiency and a standard of appropriate return, such an assumption lacks justification. An undervalued stock might remain perpetually undervalued in an inefficient market, in which case an investor will
not improve her return by uncovering misvalued securities.
Finally, consider the problem of endogenous information. If we believe that investors are sophisticated, then the amount of information
available to the market is not fixed. Investors will spend resources on
research only if they can earn at least a competitive return. Though we
might conclude from an examination of the empirical evidence that
CAPM is false but still retain our faith in the efficiency of markets, endogeneity gives us a strong reason to believe that markets will not be
efficient in any conventional sense. In the heuristic model we provide, the
opportunity to profit from securities research is seen as a consequence of
the strategic behavior of investors facing a matrix of possible choices and
outcomes. 96 In Grossman and Stiglitz, informed traders purchase information because prices do not fully reflect what they learn. They earn a
competitive return on their research expenditures because they assume a
position of superior knowledge compared to those who observe only
97
price.
We shall examine the implications of endogeneity for legal rules
governing fiduciary expenditures on research. In this discussion, we shall
assume that misvaluations do not persist for long periods. Although no
true model of the securities process exists to support this assumption, it
conforms to intuitions shaped by the theory and evidence underlying efficient markets. 98 The studies suggest that the opportunities to outperform the market via various filter strategies or more sophisticated
strategies are limited if we accept CAPM as a first approximation of the
95 See
96 See
97 See
98 See

note 79 supra.
text accompanying notes 77-82 supra.
text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
Appendix A infra.
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standard of normal returns. 99
In addition, we shall assume that as inefficiency increases, the returns to identifying misvalued stocks increase relative to the returns to
diversification. Successful diversification requires the assessment of the
"true" variation in expected returns. Market inefficiency interferes with
that assessment. The returns to diversification probably decline when the
returns to securities research increase. Furthermore, a diversified portfolio will contain both undervalued and overvalued securities; the gains
from one may counterbalance the losses from the other.
Finally, our discussion assumes that legal policy seeks to further two
distinct social interests. Society desires that the most profitable real investment opportunities be funded first. This requires accurate signals of
the valuation of different real production opportunities. Financial markets ideally provide such signals: if security prices accurately represent
the valuation of production opportunities, such markets would be allocatively efficient. °0 Moreover, we would desire that the market be efficient
relative to as large an information set as was economic. Any information
that improved capital allocation more than it cost to acquire that information should be acquired. Assuming that real and financial capital
markets are linked, the law should select rules promoting the efficiency of
financial markets relative to the optimal information set.
Rules governing institutional investors' expenditures on securities
research bear directly on this social interest. Institutional investors hold
a large percentage of assets traded on exchanges and represent an even
larger proportion of those investors with portfolios of sufficient size to
warrant substantial expenditures on research.10 1 Expenditures on security research by institutional investors will play a major role in any mechanism that leads to efficient markets. In this way, legal rules on research
expenditures can affect the social interest in efficient markets.
The law also seeks to protect a second interest: that of beneficiaries
of managed funds. This interest includes prevention of waste of fund
assets on unnecessary research and trading costs. It also seeks to insure
that the investment policies of managers yield the highest return for the
level of risk selected. As will become more apparent in the following
discussion, the legal interest in protecting fund beneficiaries produces an
ambivalent attitude towards efficient markets. On the one hand, as we
have seen, evaluation of investment policies is most feasible if markets
are efficient. Arguably, efficiency identifies a single optimal investment
99 See id.
100 See text accompanying notes 10-16 supra.

101See Branson, Securities Regulation after Entering the Competitive Era: The Securities
Industry, SEC Policy, and the Individual Investor, 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. 857, 858-63 (1980) (dis-

cussing rise of importance of institutional investors).
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strategy and, coupled with CAPM, suggests how that strategy should be
implemented. At the very least, efficiency permits a benchmark strategy
against which alternate strategies can be evaluated. On the other hand,
to maintain efficient markets requires expenditure of funds on research
that does not necessarily yield positive returns. The effect of this ambivalence is that every beneficiary would prefer that other beneficiaries bear
the cost of maintaining efficient prices.
Three different approaches could dictate legal rules governing institutional investors that engage in securities research: (1) prohibition (a
"must not" rule); (2) permission (a "may" rule); and (3) requirement (a
"must" rule). More accurately, the last two approaches identify classes
of rules. For instance, permissive rules might allow investors to decide
unconditionally on the nature and amount of research to do. Or a permissive rule might be conditioned on disclosure of the nature and costs of
the research or on the research's meeting some substantive requirement.
Similarly, a research requirement might specify precisely the nature and
amount of research each institutional investor must undertake or, alternatively, might permit some leeway in the research choices available to
investors.
The previous discussion allows us to consider summarily a rule of
prohibition. "Must not" rules make sense only if the efficient market
hypothesis and CAPM are unproblematic and we assume that the institutional investor cannot benefit from any economies in transaction costs
that might accrue from less than full diversification. The first of these
conditions implies that the only prudent investment strategy is diversification at the selected level of risk.10 2 The last condition eliminates any
need to calculate the optimal portfolio or to consider the possibility that
slight losses in the optimality of the portfolio would be compensated by
reduced transaction costs. The investor should simply purchase the market portfolio.10 3 Under these conditions, the beneficiaries' interest, which
dictates that funds not be wasted on research that bears no yield to the
fund, is protected. The social interest, under these same conditions, is
unaffected by the rule. If the set of information reflected in prices in
efficient markets is exogenously given, the absence of securities research
on the part of institutional investors will not, by definition, alter the efficiency of the market.
Unfortunately, none of the prior conditions necessary to sustain a
rule of prohibition prevail. At the very least, we expect that institutional
investors would profit from research that allowed them to identify the
102 See text accompanying note 88 supra.

103 However, because nonstandard CAPMs, such as the zero-beta CAPM, seem more likely
to hold, see note 88 supra, investors must calculate efficient portfolios other than the market
portfolio.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:761

efficient portfolio and to reduce transaction costs in the creation and
maintenance of an optimal portfolio. Thus, at a minimum, our understanding of the operation of financial markets requires some type of limited permission rule. More importantly, if the amount of information
available to the market is indeed endogenous, then a rule prohibiting research might dramatically alter the efficiency of the market. In this case,
our heuristic discussion suggested that investors could then profit from
research because they could identify misvalued securities. Moreover, because a must not rule would lock institutional investors into a diversification strategy, their beneficiaries would be disfavored relative to investors
free to engage in research. Thus neither social interest would be
promoted.
The dependence of the efficiency of markets on the research activities of participants provides the strongest argument for a must rule. A
naive argument for such a rule would emphasize the importance of institutional investors in securities markets: absent research expenditures by
them, we could expect neither to achieve the social interest of efficient
markets nor to simplify the task of monitoring managers' investment
strategies. Moreover, a must rule could allocate fairly the costs of maintaining efficient markets among beneficiaries: for instance, we might require institutional investors to purchase research in proportion to the size
of the asset pool managed.
Four related difficulties beset these arguments for a must rule. First,
if such a rule were implemented, beneficiaries as a class would bear the
costs of maintaining market efficiency, a kind of tax. Direct market participants (those not investing through institutional investors) would escape this burden, although individual participants tend to be wealthier
than beneficiaries. 1o Second, the aggregate level of research expenditures
would have to be determined. This might present a problem because too
low a requirement would mean that markets may function inefficiently
(particularly if we prohibit research expenditures in excess of the mandated amounts), while too high a requirement might insure efficiency but
waste resources. Third, the must rule would have to provide criteria to
guide the expenditures. At any given level of expenditure the investment
manager may have no incentive to purchase the right information.
Under a permissive rule, it seems reasonable to allow profit incentives to
dictate research expenditures, but under a must rule, profit incentives
may be dissipated. A must rule could outperform an unrestricted permissive rule only if the must rule reduced duplicate research expendi104 See, e.g., Pozen, Competition and Regulation in the Stock Markets, 73 Mich. L. Rev.
317, 357 n.256 (1974) ("[W]ealthy families own over 80 per cent of the market value of all

corporate stock held by noninstitutional investors.").
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tures that would occur in an unregulated market without reducing the
amount of useful research. Neither courts nor administrative agencies,
however, are likely to provide such accurate and precise research programs for institutional investors.
These last two difficulties point to a fourth problem with a must
rule: What test will be used to guide institutional investors in the selection of mandatory research expenditures? Unless investors use a positive
expected return test, attempt to discern information not already reflected
in market price, and profitably exploit such information, we have no reason to believe that mandated research will lead to efficient markets. On
the other hand, because the use of a criterion of positive expected returns
appears to be in the self-interest of institutional investors, there is no
reason to mandate such a rule. A must rule begins with the endogeneity
assumption-that the amount of information reflected in prevailing
prices is a function of research expenditures-but then misunderstands
its implications. As our heuristic model demonstrates, sophisticated investors acting independently will adopt research strategies leading to a
very high probability of a high degree of market efficiency.105
With an understanding that information is endogenously determined, the Efficiency Paradox does not support a mandatory rule for
research expenditures in order to achieve the social interest in efficient
markets. The Paradox arises out of a partial model of market efficiency
that takes the size of the information set reflected in prices as fixed-a
model that regards information as exogenous-and fixed at a level where
returns to additional information-generating activity are nonexistent.
Once it is assumed that information is endogenous, the Paradox disappears. In accounting for the research-generating activity of investors, the
endogeneity of information explains why a must rule is unnecessary.
Therefore, some version of a permissive rule seems most appropriate. Assuming endogeneity and investor sophistication, we must first ask
whether there should be any limitation on a permissive rule. The answer
lies in the questionable ability of the beneficiaries of institutional investors to monitor performance. The endogeneity and sophistication as105 There may be a further, more limited claim lurking behind a must rule: That even for
informationally efficient markets (markets where investors' research expenditures earn only a
competitive return) there will be some information desirable for allocative efficiency that is so
costly to gather that no single investor could expect to earn a positive return. Thus, an administrative agency might play a useful coordinating role in directing mandatory research expenditures for this purpose. To some extent this claim must motivate much of the government's
extensive data collection, from crop forecasts to census-taking, and indeed, provides a basis for
the mandatory disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws. A different version of
this point is presented in Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 67, at 680-87 (focusing on securities laws). Notice, however, how antithetical such a claim is to the premises of the efficient
market hypothesis.
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sumptions do not require that all institutional investors be equally adept
at intelligent research decisions. As in any competitive market, some
firms will be superior performers. A problem arises, however, if many
institutional investors are significantly insulated from beneficiary monitoring and therefore survive despite wasteful research expenditures.
The classic response would be to adopt a rule of limited permission
requiring institutional investors to report on the nature and expense of
securities research. This rule relies on the market to police such research
activity; a manager pursuing inappropriate research activity would face,
in theory, a decreasing pool of assets. Such policing presumes that investors will be able both to evaluate the disclosed data and to move assets
among institutional investors. These presumptions may be open to question. For example, many mutual fund shareholders invest through such
an intermediary precisely because they lack the necessary sophistication
to evaluate performance except on crudest terms and their small stake
makes it irrational to develop greater sophistication. Beneficiaries of
trusts managed by bank trust departments are frequently deemed incapable of investment management, may not yet be alive, or may be so numerous and possess such different interests as to make coordinated
monitoring impossible.106 Moreover, trust instruments may make shifting among institutional investors very difficult. There are frequently similar capacity, coordination, and shifting problems for pension plan
beneficiaries.

107

In light of these problems, various limited permissive rules have
been suggested that would impose specific substantive requirements on
the investment manager. For instance, a rule might permit only research
directed at optimum diversification, while prohibiting research that seeks
to identify misvalued securities. A rule of such limited permission
amounts to a rule of prohibition and the objections are the same as raised
earlier. Given that information is endogenous, we have no assurance that
such rules would maintain market efficiency, and if markets become (or

are) inefficient, such rules might hurt beneficiaries relative to individual
investors.
Another form of limited permission rule would prohibit (or discourage) certain kinds of securities research in light of a demonstrable inefficacy.10 8 Technical research is frequently placed in this category because
106 See J. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule (unpublished manuscript) (collective action problems of trust fund beneficiaries).
107 Current rules generally subject financial fiduciaries such as bank trust departments and
pension funds to prudence tests while requiring only disclosure from mutual funds.
108 See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 6, at 953 (suggesting presumptive rules would tend to inhibit
expenditures on technical and fundamental research while encouraging research for efficient
diversification).
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of the negative results of random walk and filter strategy tests. Even this
limitation would be inconsistent with the endogeneity assumption. The
history of securities prices must contain some information about future
prices, otherwise market participants would not gather it. But because
the information is relatively costless and widely disseminated, the opportunities for any particular investor to make substantial profits must be
small. Precisely because of the relatively low costs of generating technical information and because of the uncertain effects of its elimination,
there seems to be no reason to single it out for prohibition. Thus, it can
be questioned whether there is any research that might properly be prohibited. For example, what about research into the sunspot cycle on the
theory of a correlation with stock market turns? 10 9 Or hiring an astrologer to help search for undervalued securities? These are not easy questions to answer. Suppose it is known that a significant group of investors
believe in the sunspot theory. A better understanding of the cycle would
give any investor (even a profound skeptic) a better chance of projecting
future prices. The implications of this reasoning make it difficult to justify prohibitory rules.1 10
Given the difficulties in formulating specific substantive rules, a general substantive rule imposing a standard of prudence may seem attractive. In an important sense, however, the "reasonably prudent person"
test is circular. It may screen out the incompetent, but it does not tell the
competent how to behave. What counts as prudent depends on our understanding of how markets function. The dictates of prudent investment a half-century ago-well-chosen stocks from legal lists and giltedged bonds-were presumably based on a theory of market operation.
This theory viewed an individual investment as risky independent of its
portfolio, and evaluated the risk of an individual security in terms of its
legal claim rather than in terms of reasonable expectations of the security's income flow."' Today we subscribe to the portfolio theory, which
109 See W. Jevons, Commercial Crises and Sun-Spots, in Investigations in Currency & Fi-

nance (2d ed. 1909) (claiming relation between sunspots and business cycle). An interesting
"rehabilitation" of Jevon's work is presented in Sheehan & Grieves, Sunspots and Cycles: A
Test of Causation, 48 S. Econ. J. 775 (1982) (showing that economic activity "causes"
sunspots).
110 We pursue the implications of this reasoning, based on the distinction between allocative
and speculative efficiency, at text accompanying note 181 infra.
111 See Langbein & Posner, Market Funds I, supra note 6, at 4 (eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury English and American judges and legislators had bias for "safe" investments, defined
as long-term fixed-income government bonds or mortgages); Shattuck, The Development of
the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 Ohio St. L.J. 491, 503-04 (1951) (collecting legal list statutes); Note, The Regulation
of Risky Investments, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 604, 618 (1970) (state blue sky laws, federal margin
requirements, and "legal lists" for trustees and financial fiduciaries derive from focus on risk of
particular security, not portfolio); Note, Prudence in Trust Investment, 8 Mich. J.L. Reform
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appears to account better for risk. Prudence demands that diversification
be part of any reasonable investment strategy. Because we have no clear
way to operationalize portfolio theory, however, the parameters of prudent diversification are not clear. Similarly, because our understanding
of the mechanisms through which markets aggregate and (partially) reveal information is hazy at best, we cannot prescribe canons of prudence
for the acquisition of information.
We can, perhaps, establish a rule of procedural prudence: that an
institutional investor be self-conscious of its research strategy. Does it
have a theory of market operation on the basis of which it operates?
Does it monitor its research strategy to assess whether its research expenditures have been effective? Under its strategy, is the expected return
from research expenditures equal to or better than the return from diversification? But such a comparison test depends on our ability to measure
the return both from research expenditures and from diversification.
Currently we can perform neither measurement with any confidence. 12
Thus our ability to assess the efficacy of a rule of procedural prudence is
questionable at best.
The problems we have encountered in trying to devise a limited permission rule arise from the difficulty in stating an adequate substantive
rule to guide institutional investors, while lacking confidence in usual
market policing. The usual model of market policing depends upon disclosure to and monitoring by beneficiaries. Such policing would be more
effective if the model were restructured to include a professional monitor
whose sole role was to evaluate investment performance, including expenditures on research. This monitor would be empowered to shift assets
among institutional investors. In the bank trust department case, the
policing problem arises because the trust function, which might be understood as selecting the appropriate level of risk for the trust corpus in
light of the interests of various beneficiaries, is not separated from the
investment management function. A limited permission rule separating
3
those functions would make real monitoring possible.'1
491, 503-04 (1975) (nineteenth-century bias against common stocks arose in part from undeveloped nature of security markets). The argument in H. Bines, supra note 93, 1.02[2][c], at
1-31 to -33, that rigid attitudes about investments stemmed more from doubts about compe-

tence of trustees than from the courts' "primitive understanding" of investment theory, seems
improbable. If courts and other legal policy makers believed in the utility of diversification,
why would they impose rules that they thought inevitably led to less than optimal results?
112 We might try to evaluate the prudence of research expenditures through comparative
performance tests, requiring a prudent investment manager to perform approximately as well
as the average manager. Whatever the problems with such a test for overall performance, see
note 94 supra, it would not properly isolate the return to research versus the return to other
aspects of investment strategy.
113 Separation of such functions is, of course, counter to traditional trust law's animus to
the trustee's delegation of any part of his function. See B. Longstreth, Modem Investment
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A separation rule already operates, to some extent, among institutional investors. For example, because of the pressure from the "prudent
expert" rule of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), 114 trustees of most large pension funds have not internalized
investment management. Rather, they have employed managers in
arms-length relationships and thus independently evaluate expenses and
other performance. 1 5 In theory, mutual funds also rely on separation of
function for the policing of expenses. The "disinterested" directors of
the fund must approve the advisory contract with the investment adviser.1 16 Many doubt the efficacy of this review, partly because the customary links between a fund's investment adviser and main underwriter
make changing an investment adviser highly unlikely. Recent SEC rule
changes permitting mutual funds to internalize distribution expenses arguably will enhance fund independence.1 17 Note should be taken whether
these changes result in shifts of investment advisers on performance
grounds.
In conclusion, the present state of financial economies must be frustrating for the legal policy maker. Theories of markets and investor behavior that were once embraced for their explanatory power and clear
prescriptions now disappoint. This is not to suggest that portfolio theory
should be abandoned, or that in competitive markets prevailing prices
will not reflect a significant amount of relevant information. The modem
finance paradigm may be "wrong" but may nevertheless provide genuine
insights into market function, particularly if it seems to organize experience more effectively than existing alternatives. But rules ought not be
Theory and the Prudent Man Rule (forthcoming 1986) (proposing "modem paradigm of prudence"); 2 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 171 (3d ed. 1967) (discussing traditional view). Alternatively, one might claim that the bank trust department's goal of attracting future trust
accounts from sophisticated settlors is sufficient incentive to maximize returns on existing
accounts.
114 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1982). The statute requires ERISA plan fiduciaries to act
with the care of "a prudent man.
familiar with such matters," language some commentators have read as creating a "prudent expert" standard. See, e.g., Cummings, Purposes and
Scope of Fiduciary Provisions Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
31 Bus. Law. 15, 35 (1975). But see Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 n.26
(1983) (arguing that the legislative history does not support the "prudent expert" view).
115 The claim is frequently made that banks working for pension funds achieve superior
results for the pension funds than for their trust departments. See, e.g., Use of Trust Account
Assets Is Questioned In Bank of America Trial Set for Monday, Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1984, at
8, col. 2. But cf. Pension Funds Feud With Money Managers Over Brokers' Rebates, Wall St.
J., Oct. 4, 1984, at 1, col. 6 (difficulties of pension funds in constraining "churning" by money
managers and in eliminating or recovering "soft dollar" elements of commissions).
116 See § 15(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1982).
117 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-I (1980); Investment Company Act No. 10,862 (Sept. 7, 1979);
Investment Company Act No. 11,414 (Oct. 28, 1980); 4 T. Frankel, The Regulation of Money
Managers ch. XXVII, D § 18, at 112-19 (1980); id. 1982 supp. at 2-3.
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established that lock in a false paradigm. The rules may come to have an
independent existence in the legal culture, irrespective of the validity of
their premises.'

18

B.

The SEC and Market Efficiency

On an avowedly efficient market rationale, the SEC has recently enacted significant changes in the advance notice and disclosure requirements for the issuance of securities. Our analysis would not argue for
significant changes in the SEC disclosure policy as adopted. This is partially because some of the changes do not rest on any strong claim about
market efficiency. The SEC's use of efficient market notions is also not a
procrustean application of the efficient market hypothesis, but rather an
attempt to accommodate policy to actual market institutions. On the
other hand, we think the SEC's elimination of advance notice requirements for certain securities offerings raises serious questions and warrants further investigation and perhaps modification.
1.

Integrated Disclosure

In general, securities can be offered for public sale only if an effective
registration statement, describing the issuer and the offering transaction,
is on file with the SEC. The new SEC disclosure policy introduces abbreviated registration statements for two broad categories of securities issuers. Public companies believed to be widely followed by market analysts
may use abbreviated registration statements to issue any securities--common stock or debt. Most other public companies may also use such abbreviated registration statements to issue "investment grade" debt or
investment grade nonconvertible preferred stock. This abbreviated registration statement, called a "Form S-3," contains information about the
specific transaction (e.g., number of shares issued, price per share, use of
proceeds, underwriters' fees) but presumes that general information
about the issuer will be known by the market through the issuer's prior
disclosure reports.'1 9 The Form S-3 is one of the fruits of the SEC's
118 See J. Gordon, supra note 106 (contemporary courts are locked into outmoded conceptions of prudence because of authoritative commentary, situation of beneficiaries, and related
trust law doctrines).
119 The integrated disclosure system was adopted in SEC Securities Act Release No. 6383,
47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982), reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 956, extra ed. (Mar. 11,
1982) [hereinafter Release No. 6383]. The adopted system establishes three kinds of registration statements, successively more abbreviated. The "Form S-l" is not abbreviated at all.
"Complete information about both the transaction and the registrant is required to be
presented in the prospectus." Id. at 11,383, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 19. The "Form S-2" permits
substantial abbreviation of issuer information, requiring only what would be disclosed in an
annual report, and indeed contemplating that in most instances the issuer would simply supply
its most recent annual report. SEC Form S-2: Information Required in Prospectus, Item 11,

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

November 1985]

EFFICIENT MARKETS

strenuous efforts to integrate disclosures for public offerings of securities
required by the 1933 Securities Act with the disclosures periodically required of virtually all publicly traded companies by the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act.' 20 In fashioning such an "integrated disclosure system"
the SEC decided that the same or "equivalent" information would be
material to investors in either trading or distribution transactions, then
and to whom
defined that information package and determined when
121
dissemination of particular information was necessary.
For the SEC, the efficient market hypothesis justifies its Form S-3
policy as follows. Information contained in 1934 Act disclosures is
widely disseminated through the financial press, is publicly available for
reprinted in 2 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 7143. The "Form S-3," as noted in the text, requires
disclosure only of transaction-specific information, and does not require delivery of the annual
report. Because the Form S-3 presents the efficient market questions most vividly, and for
conciseness, the text disregards the Form S-2.
The practical effect of the disclosure scheme is to permit abbreviated registration for certain classes of securities. The actual regulatory scheme is, however, more complex. The Form
S-3 may be used in the issuance of any securities-common stock or debt (whether or not
investment grade)-by a company that satisfies certain requirements of the 1934 Act reporting
system (filing all required reports for at least the preceding 36 months, timely filing of all such
reports for at least the preceding 12 months, and no material failure to make preferred stock
dividend or debt payments since the most recently filed audited financial statements) and that
satisfies a certain public "float" test that marks it as widely followed. See text accompanying
note 128 infra. A public company satisfying the reporting system requirements but not the
public float test may register investment grade debt and nonconvertible preferred stock on the
Form S-3 as well. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(2) (1985), reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
7152. Most publicly traded companies satisfy the reporting system requirements. The Form
S-2 is also available to such companies for the issuance of any securities. 17 C.F.R. § 239.12
(1985), reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7142.
120 The notion of integrated disclosure was spurred by Cohen, who discussed the overlap of
disclosures required under the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. Cohen, "Truth
in Securities" Revisited, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1340 (1966). Two advisory commissions on disclosure policy provided additional impetus. See U.S. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Disclosure
to Investors: A Reappraisal of Federal Administrative Policies under the '33 and '34 Acts
(1969) (the so-called Wheat Report); Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the SEC, House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
(Comm. Print 1977). The impact of these analyses first manifested itself in 1978 with adoption
of Form S-16, a short-form registration statement for issuers who had filed 1934 Act reports
for at least three years and who had public "floats" of at least $50 million. SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5923, 43 Fed. Reg. 16,672 (1978), reprinted in [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 81,561 (April 11, 1978). The SEC first proposed full scale integrated disclosure
in 1980. ABC Release, supra note 3, 45 Fed. Reg. at 63,693. There were additional refinements proposed in 1981. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6331, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,902 (1981),
reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), Spec. Rep. No. 926, extra ed. (Aug. 13, 1981) [hereinafter S-1-2-3 Release]. As noted above, supra note 119, final adoption occurred in 1982. For a
discussion of the adoption of the integrated disclosure system and the strengthening and revision of 1934 Act disclosures, see generally Nicholas, The Integrated Disclosure System and Its
Impact Upon Underwriters' Due Diligence: Will Investors Be Protected?, 11 Sec. Reg. L.J. 3
(1983).
121See ABC Release, supra note 3, 45 Fed. Reg. at 63,694, Fed. See. L. Rep. at 6-7; Release
No. 6383, supra note 119, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,382-83, Fed. See. L. Rep. at 14-15.
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free or at nominal cost, and, for at least a certain set of issuers, is closely
studied by financial analysts and other sophisticated market participants.
Therefore, such public information should be reflected in the price of the
issuer's securities. There is no reason to repeat such information in
either a registration statement or a prospectus delivered to investors for
the sale of new securities. 12 2 The only new unassimilated information
accompanying a public sale is the specifics of the new issuance. Such
"transaction-specific" disclosure is the focus of the Form S-3. 123 SEC reliance on the efficient market hypothesis, however, may be unjustified. It
is therefore useful to distinguish those aspects of the policies adequately
justified by EMH from those that rely on other aspects or views of market operation.
Consider first the policies governing the issuance of equity. The
SEC very practically delineated the class of companies eligible to use an
abbreviated registration statement to issue common stock. 124 Rather
than condition eligibility on a determination of the efficiency of a particular market (such as the New York Stock Exchange), the SEC tried to
identify those particular securities likely to be efficiently priced. The
SEC acted on the theory that market efficiency results from the competitive research and trading activities of market participants. 125 The SEC
chose to use major investment institutions, such as large broker-dealers,
as a proxy for market participants. 126 After some informal evidence-gathering, 127 the SEC decided on two alternative benchmarks for coverage by
such participants sufficient to guarantee competitive market activities:
companies whose public "float" (i.e., aggregate market value of outstanding voting stock held by nonaffiliates) exceeds $150 million, and companies whose public float exceeds $100 million and whose annual trading
122 See ABC Release, supra note 3, 45 Fed. Reg. at 63,694-95, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 8, 12-15;
S-1-2-3 Release, supra note 120, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,904-05, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 15.
123 See SEC Form S-3: Information Required in Prospectus, reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep
(CCH) %7153 [hereinafter S-3 Required Information]; SEC Form S-3: Information Not Required in Prospectus, reprinted in 2 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 7154. In addition to transaction-specific information, the prospectus must also disclose any material change in the issuer's
affairs or certain restated financial statements not reported in, or appropriately incorporated by
reference from, prior 1934 Act filings. S-3 Required Information, supra (Item 11).
124 Companies eligible to use a Form S-3 for registering equity can also use it for debt, see
note 119 supra. Because of the role rating agencies and institutional and large corporate pur-

chasers play in debt issuance, see text accompanying notes 145-48, this part of the text focuses
on equity issuances.
125 See S-1-2-3 Release, supra note 120, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,907-08, Fed. See. L. Rep. at 2430.
126 See id., 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,907, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 26-27; ABC Release, supra note 3,
45 Fed. Reg. at 63,698, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 28.
127 See S-1-2-3 Release, supra note 120, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,906, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 22-40;
Release No. 6383, supra note 119, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,384, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 24.
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volume exceeds three million shares. 128 Using these criteria, the SEC estimated that approximately 32 percent of all companies listed on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or
NASDAQ (or 17.6 percent of all publicly reporting companies) would be
12 9
eligible to use the Form S-3 for issuances of common stock.
In reading the SEC's analysis one could clearly disagree with the
logic behind the precise line drawing. For example, approximately 1600
companies will be eligible to use the Form S-3, even though the SEC
found that a typical major research firm follows only 300 to 500 companies.130 The SEC did not determine the identity of the companies regularly followed and the extent to which companies are followed by more
than one firm. Nevertheless, the SEC sought a reasonable way to use
newly developed insights about market performance to simplify disclosure requirements in the issuance of common stock. Most important, the
attention to the functioning of actual marketplace institutions makes it
unlikely that this change will interfere with market efficiency. Even if
prices do not fully reflect all publicly available information, the use of
abbreviated registration statements by widely followed companies will
not restrict the competitive research and trading activity of firms and
13
individual market participants. '
Notwithstanding the announced reliance on efficient market theory,
128 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(1) (1985), reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7152, at 6252.
The SEC's articulated rationale invites the belief of a compromise. The public float requirement for use of the Form S-16, see note 120 supra, had been set at $50 million based on a
report of the Financial Analysts Federation to the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, see S-1-2-3 Release, supra note 120, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,908, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 32-33,
but was rejected for the Form S-3 after the Commission determined that such a threshold
would cover about half of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ-listed companies (and more than
a quarter of all publicly reporting companies), or approximately 2500 companies. "The Commission does not believe that such a large number of companies is actively and widely followed
in the market place." Id., 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,909, Fed. See. L. Rep. at 34-35. The SEC then
considered a $250 million float threshold, which it estimated would cover approximately onefifth of all such listed companies (and one-eighth of all publicly reporting companies), or
roughly 1100 companies. Id., 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,909, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 36. To avoid
"unduly restrict[ing] the use of the abbreviated prospectus," the SEC rejected the $250 million
threshold in favor of $150 million, a figure neatly in between, as "providing the necessary level
of assurance that eligible issuers will be subject to ongoing monitoring and evaluation." Id., 46
Fed. Reg. at 41,909, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 36-37.
129 S-1-2-3 Release, supra note 120, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,910, Fed. See. L. Rep. at 38-39.
130 See id., 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,909-10, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 35, 38.
131 Note the extent to which the SEC has employed a sophisticated investor model rather
than a naive investor model of efficient markets. In deciding whether to purchase a company's
newly issued common stock, for example, a naive investor would want access to prior disclosures to figure out the right price. Unless the naive investor was a market research firm or had
ready access to prior disclosures, she might be frustrated by the abbreviated registration statement. A sophisticated investor, by contrast, would know that the price prevailing after announcement of the offering is the right price, or at least a price that reflects prior disclosures as
well as the new information about the offering. Because old shares and new shares of the same
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much of the SEC's integrated disclosure initiative appears to take the
theory as somewhat beside the point. For example, the SEC regards the
abbreviated registration statements as explicitly "incorporating by reference" prior 1934 Act disclosure documents 132 and, in the case of a
delayed or continuous offering, disclosures that are subsequently filed
(which are not explicitly added to the statement by a "post-effective
amendment"). 133 The efficient market hypothesis implies that prevailing
prices fully reflect prior and subsequent disclosures, regardless of any explicit incorporation by reference. Thus, if the SEC were actually relying
upon efficient market theory, it would regard incorporation as
unnecessary.
Incorporation by reference is intended to serve another objectiveverification of the disclosures by third parties who are subject to a legal
liability rule. Sections 11134 and 12(2)135 of the 1933 Securities Act impose liability on underwriters under a "due diligence" standard for material misstatements or omissions in a registration statement or a
prospectus.136 Incorporation by reference is designed to put such disclosures "in" the registration statement and prospectus.1 37 Presumably, Seto verify
curities Act liability will lead an underwriter of a new issue 138
fraud.
financial
police
to
serves
arguably
thus
and
disclosures,
class of stock are equivalent, the sophisticated investor knows what to pay for the new shares
without access to a data base.
132 S-3 Required Information, supra note 123 (Item 12). The rules require explicit incorporation by reference and listing in the prospectus of virtually all 1934 Act reports (except proxy
statements) beginning with the issuer's most recently filed Form 10-K (an annual report with
extensive audited financial statements that is significantly more detailed than the annual report
sent to shareholders) and including filings thereafter. The prospectus must also state that any
subsequently filed 1934 Act reports (including proxy statements) will be deemed incorporated
by reference into the prospectus until the offering is terminated.
133 See text accompanying notes 152-54 infra for a discussion of shelf-registration, which
permits an eligible company to register on a single form all the securities it reasonably expects
to offer over a two-year period, and then to offer ("take off the shelf") such securities at
various times throughout the period.
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
135 Id. § 771(2) (1982).
134

Section 11 covers registration statement misinformation, which will cover the preliminary and statutory prospectuses distributed to investors pursuant to section 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j
(1982), because the prospectus is filed as part of the registration statement itself. Section 12(2)
specifically covers prospectus misinformation. See generally Scott, Resurrecting Indemnification: Contribution Clauses in Underwriting Agreements, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming
1986).
137 S-1-2-3 Release, supra note 120, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,914, Fed. See. L. Rep. at 59-60.
Indeed, the SEC took some pains to assure that the statement of incorporation by reference
and the listing of documents ro incorporated would occur in the prospectus. "Investors thus
will be afforded the full protections of the liability provisions under the Securities Act ..
Id., 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,914, Fed. See. L. Rep. at 60.
138 In order to reduce fraud, the assignment of liability must induce "independent" auditors
to verify information provided by the company. The liability rule presumably gives the third
136
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One question is whether the filing of a Form S-3 registration statement is necessarily the appropriate time for a special verification requirement. By comparison, the SEC does not require verification of other
events that may prove more significant to investors than a new issuance-for example, the announcement of a significant change in anticipated quarterly earnings.1 39 Given the large public float of companies
eligible for general use of a Form S-3, misinformation in such an announcement can easily cause greater damage to investors than misinformation in a registration statement.14° The incorporation by reference
requirement, however, may be a tactic for verification for virtually all
disclosures by a broad range of public companies. To this end, the SEC
apparently contemplates that underwriters will engage in "anticipatory
and continuous due diligence" for companies that have issued or may
issue an abbreviated registration statement,14 1 so as to verify both prior
and subsequent disclcsures. Thus, to avoid later problems, underwriters
party leverage that allows it to condition the provision of its underwriting, or other function,
on access to otherwise private information of the company. In the absence of liability, compa-

nies not engaged in financial fraud might try to signal to the market their honesty by opening
their books to third party auditors. Firms that failed to allow third party audits would then
signal a risk of financial fraud. Liability of the third party makes it more likely that market
participants will view them as truly independent. In the absence of liability, the third party
might have to bond itself against its own mistakes to establish credibility. This is similar to the
problem faced by the various rating services, almost all of which receive their fees from the
issuers they rate. See Small Bond Rating Firms are Competing Aggressively for a Bigger
Share of Market, Wall St. J., Sept. 7, 1984, at 29, col. 4 [hereinafter Rating Firms Compete].
On the rating services generally, see J. Peterson, The Rating Game: Report of the Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on Municipal Bond Credit Ratings (1974). Some would challenge
the necessity of third party liability on the ground that as repeat players in the market, auditors and rating services have a stake in their reputations exceeding the gains from any single
company's business. Cf. DeAngelo, Auditor Size and Audit Quality, 3 J. Acct. & Econ. 183
(1981) (discussing greater ability of large auditing firms to resist threats by a client to terminate relationship if auditor reports a discovered breach).
139 The SEC appears to have virtually plenary authority under §§ 12(b), 13(a)-(b) and 15(d)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b), 78m(a)-(b), 78o(d) (1982), to regulate the content of
periodic filings, including the extent to which financial statements must be audited and certified. Well-established principles of secondary liability applicable to accountants under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), would presumably enhance the value of the
verification. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (accountants' liability
under scienter standard). Similarly, through its control over the content of registration statements and prospectuses, see sections 7 and 10 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j (1982),
the SEC can significantly expand or limit the extent of verification of a company's financial
condition when it offers securities.
140 One might claim a special vulnerability for purchasers from a primary offering because
of greater profits to underwriters on such sales than from ordinary brokerage transactions.
Nevertheless, given the comparative sizes of the primary and trading markets, the total damage to investors from misstatements will almost always be greater for trading market
participants.
141 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 6499, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,889, 52,892-93 (1983), reprinted in [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,449, at 86,339-41 (Nov. 17,
1983) [hereinafter Release No. 6499].
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may decide to undertake verification of each disclosure as it is made. 142
Indeed, the SEC foresees that even before a particular underwriter is chosen for a prospective issue, a group of potential underwriters will retain a
single counsel to represent them in due diligence activity. 14 3 Ironically
the only companies for whom this verification tactic may not work are
those for whom it may be most critical: public companies whose financial position is so precarious as to deny them access to the public capital
markets. In any event, the "centrality" of incorporation by reference in
the new rules is driven by what the SEC believes will produce verification
of disclosure, not efficient market theory. 144
142 Id. In the proposal stages of integrated disclosure, underwriters objected to the SEC's
incorporation by reference policy for abbreviated registration statements because of their exposure to liability for misstatements in documents that they did not help prepare. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 6335,46 Fed. Reg. 42,015,42,017-18 (1981), reprinted in Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH), Spec. Rep. No. 926, second extra ed., at 65, 76-78, 80-82 (Aug. 13, 1981). The
SEC, however, rejected the underwriters' call for exemption from liability, "strongly affirm[ing] the need for due diligence and its attendant vigilance and verification." Id., 46 Fed.
Reg. at 42,020, Fed. See. L. Rep. at 91. The adoption of Rule 176, which regards nonresponsibility for an incorporated document at its original filing to be among certain "relevant circumstances" bearing on the reasonableness necessary to establish a defense to registration
statement liability, may not offer much comfort. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1985), reprinted in
2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5736A.
143 SEC Release No. 6499, supra note 141, 48 Fed. Reg. at 52,892, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at
86,340. The SEC also contemplates other activity, such as the holding of "drafting sessions"
for prospective underwriters and the retaining of counsel prior to the filing of 1934 Act reports,
in addition to periodic due diligence sessions between management and underwriters. Id., 48
Fed. Reg. at 52,893, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 86,340.
Note that "anticipatory and continuous due diligence" could lead to verification of disclosures not only for companies eligible to use the Form S-3, but also for companies using the
Form S-2, i.e., virtually all publicly traded companies. Form S-2 contemplates delivery of the
most recent annual shareholders report and incorporation by reference of subsequent 1934 Act
filings. Further, the underwriters' exposure to liability is virtually the same as for the Form S3. The remaining question is whether the potential business from companies who could use
Form S-2 is sufficiently great to lead underwriters to incur the expense of anticipatory and
continuous due diligence. For a skeptical view on this point, see Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 Va. L. Rev.
1005, 1027-28 (1984).
144 The SEC does not claim that improved verification increases the allocational efficiency
of markets by giving investors a better description of real economic outputs. Such a claim
would depend on comparison of the costs of the new verification with the gains. For a spirited
debate on whether the improved quality of information reaching investors that results from
underwriter due diligence produces worthwhile benefits, compare Fox, supra note 143, at
1009-25 (arguing that it does), with Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf
Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 Va. L. Rev. 135, 176-84 (1984) (arguing that it does
not). Regardless of the wisdom of the SEC's verification strategy, there is no inconsistency
with the efficient market hypothesis in the desire for verification, contrary to the views of some
commentators, see, e.g., Pickholz & Horahan, The SEC's Version of the Efficient Market Theory and Its Impact on Securities Law Liabilities, 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 943, 949 (1982).
Even the proponents of the hypothesis concede that the market is not efficient with respect to
inside information. E.g., E. Fama, supra note 19, at 166. For example, a company's involvement in financial fraud is necessarily inside information until it bursts into the marketplace.
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Other SEC policy objectives outweigh the efficient markets rationale
in another context. The new rules permit virtually all public companies
to register investment grade debt and nonconvertible preferred stock on
the Form S-3. 145 The new rules allow a company to use the Form S-3, so
long as a recognized debt rating agency (such as Moody's or Standard &
Poor's) rates the particular debt (or quasi-debt) security as "investment
grade," irrespective of whether the company meets the float or trading
volume indicators of a widely followed company. 14 6 The SEC claims that
investors generally purchase high grade fixed income securities on the
basis of yields and security ratings anyway. 147 Justification of this regulation does not rely on the efficient market hypothesis for two reasons.
First, the number of raters in the market seems to be small. 148 The market thus appears insufficiently competitive to justify the conclusion that
the rating reflects all, or nearly all, available information. Therefore, if
use of the Form S-3 is appropriate, it is because the market relies on the
rating agencies to investigate and assess the creditworthiness of the issuer. Market participants have presumably found it cheaper to rely on
the rating agencies than to perform independent analyses, particularly
where issuers' debt is rated investment grade. Second, information other
than a security's investment grade should be relevant to an investor. The
investment grade provides a point estimate of the bankruptcy risk of a
company, a risk of particular interest to debt holders. But equity risk
and information relevant to equity is also relevant to the debt holder.
For example, if a company were to suffer losses in successive quarters,
the probability of bankruptcy increases. Therefore, it is not obvious that
the investment grade is an adequate summary of the information an investor wants.
Further, the new rules also permit the use of the Form S-3, irrespective of the float or trading volume of the issuer, in areas such as secondary offerings and rights offerings. 1 49 The SEC's use of abbreviated
145 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(2) (1985), reprinted in 2 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)

7152.

146 The rating agency must be a nationally recognized statistical rating organization as that
term is used in 1934 Act Rule 15e3-1(c)(2)(vi)(F), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(F) (1985),
reprinted in 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,126, i.e., one whose ratings may be used by SECregistered brokers and dealers in valuing bond assets for purposes of net capital requirements.
"Investment grade" will typically be one of the agency's four highest general rating categories.
17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(2) (1985), reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7152.
147 S-1-2-3 Release, supra note 120, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,910, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 40; Release

6383, supra note 119, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,384, Fed. See. L. Rep. at 24.
143 As of September 1984, there were five SEC-recognized raters. The two leaders, Standard & Poor's and Moody's, each cover approximately 2,000 companies. The remaining three
each cover approximately 400-500 companies. Coverage frequently, but not necessarily, overlaps. See Rating Firms Compete, supra note 138.
14) See 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.13(b)(2), (3) (1985), reprinted in 2 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
7152. Permitted secondary offerings are limited to classes of securities listed and registered
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registration statements in such instances is inconsistent with the efficient
market theory. In the case of a secondary offering (for instance, offerings
of outstanding securities for the account of a person other than the issuer), the investor is in the same position as if she were purchasing directly from the issuer. If we suspect that the market may not price the
particular issuer's securities efficiently, the investor will need the prior
disclosures. The comparison the SEC draws between this investor and
one purchasing shares of the same issuer on the trading market 1 0 goes
too far; it would equally justify permitting all companies to use the Form
S-3 for equity securities. The SEC has simply decided that capital formation will be best served by a rule permitting an insider easy exit, and
thereby the agency has trumped its efficient market theory. 5 1
2. Shelf Registration
The SEC's most controversial application of its efficient market theory arises in the context of security offerings permitted under its "shelfregistration" rule, Rule 415.152 Rule 415 permits a company to register
securities for "continuous or delayed" offering over a two-year period
provided that it is eligible to use Form S-3. This means that under Rule
415, a company may register in advance all the securities (debt or equity)
it reasonably expects to offer and sell during a two-year period, and during that period "take off the shelf" any of such securities for immediate
on either a national exchange or as part of the automatic quotation system of a national securities association (such as NASDAQ). Permitted rights offerings are generally confined to rights
extended to existing holders of a company's securities and include dividend and interest reinvestment plans.
150 Release No. 6383, supra note 119, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,384, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 26.
151 Compare S-1-2-3 Release, supra note 120, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,911, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at
46 (finding "no rational basis for. . differentiation" of investor protection needs in secondary
versus primary offering), with Release No. 6383, supra note 119, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,384, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. at 25-26 (possible interference with venture capital activity).
152 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1985), reprinted in 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3383. A variant
of Rule 415 was initially proposed by the SEC in December 1980 as part of its original proposals on integrated disclosure. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6276, 46 Fed. Reg. 78 (1981),
reprinted in Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH), Spec. Rep. No. 893, pt. 2 (Jan. 7, 1981) [hereinafter
Release No. 6276]. The proposal was subsequently modified, SEC Securities Act Release No.
6334, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,001 (1981), reprinted in Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH), Spec. Rep. No. 926,
second extra ed. (Aug. 13, 1981). A temporary rule was adopted at the time of the adoption of
the integrated disclosure system. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6383, supra note 119. Because the rule elicited such significant controversy, the temporary period was extended with
minor modification to the rule. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6423, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,799
(1982), reprinted in [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,250 (Sept. 2, 1983)
[hereinafter Release No. 6423]. After studying the temporary rule's effect over an 18-month
period (and perhaps to accommodate the stinging dissent of Commissioner Thomas, 47 Fed.
Reg. at 803-09, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 279-90), the SEC adopted a modified version in final form.
Release No. 6499, supra note 141. For a discussion of the history, the controversy, and the
specifies of Rule 415, see generally Banoff, supra note 144.
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sale. No advance notice or waiting period is required. In light of the
Form S-3 eligibility requirements discussed above, virtually any public
company will be permitted to issue investment grade debt (or nonconvertible preferred stock) on this basis. Companies meeting the float and
trading volume tests may shelf-register equity (and any debt). 153 Thus
Rule 415 provides companies with significant flexibility to locate propitious moments, or "market windows," for the sale of particular
1 54
securities.
The SEC rationale assumes that security prices accurately reflect information available in the market, and that new information supplied on
the Form S-3 will be reflected rapidly in the price. If the SEC is correct
in assuming that purchasers of investment grade debt securities (and
nonconvertible preferred) care only about rating and yield, sales of debt
(or such preferred) off the shelf present no particular information problem. 15 5 At the time of their investment decision these purchasers (who
are generally institutional or large corporate investors) will know this
relevant information. On the other hand, when shelf-registration of equity securities is in issue, the speed with which the market assimilates the
information grows in significance.
In its adoption of its three-tiered registration system, the SEC refused to make Form S-3 filings automatically effective. The SEC proposed instead that administrative discretion be exercised in light of the
need to assure that all information, including information incorporated
1 56
by reference, "is publicly available and assimilated by the market."'
The minimum period for SEC review of a Form S-3 registration statement appears to be forty-eight hours. Yet shelf-registration contemplates
153 Such debt securities may include non-investment grade debt. See note 119 supra. For
simplicity, and because most corporate debt is acquired by institutional or large corporate
investors, the discussion is cast in terms of equity offerings.
154 Taken literally, the notion of a "market window" is inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis. A company cannot generally predict the future course of its stock price or

interest rates. The phrase actually refers to the particular price or interest rate at which the
company is prepared to issue securities. The company wants to move at these breakpoints,
despite the possibility of future market improvement, because of the possibility of market deterioration. The company's desire to move quickly reflects a form of risk aversion.
A debate rages between investment bankers (who generally opposed shelf registration)
and issuers as to whether the rule increases or decreases new issue costs, and whether the
overhang from shelf-registered securities depresses the price of a firm's outstanding shares. A
recent study of new common stock issuances on the NYSE and the AMEX from March 1982
through December 1983 indicates that the issuing cost of equity securities sold under Rule 415
is approximately 13% less than a comparable syndicated offering, and rejects significant overhang effects. Bhagat, Marr & Thompson, The Rule 415 Experiment: Equity Markets, 40 J.
Fin. 1385 (1985).
155 A similar argument could be made for the debt, even if not investment grade, of the
companies meeting the float and trading volume tests.
156 S-1-2-3 Release, supra note 120, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,913, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 55.
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that once a Form S-3 is effective, equity securities may be sold virtually
immediately after announcement of the offering. This is so even when
material or fundamental changes in the company have occurred after the
filing of the registration statement (so long as such changes are reflected
in periodic reports under the 1934 Act, which are incorporated by reference into the Form S-3).157

Thus the shelf-registration rule may require a much stronger claim
about market efficiency than the claim underlying the use of abbreviated
registration statements generally. The rule assumes that the markets will
all but instantaneously digest new information about the shelf offering,
such as the number of shares offered of a particular class of equity, with
particular dilutive effects on corporate control and earnings, and any
other information signaled by the new issuance.'5 8 The empirical work
does not support such an efficiency claim. Because of technical difficulties associated with daily price movements, much of the empirical studies
of market efficiency use monthly time intervals or, occasionally, weekly
time intervals.1 5 9 Recent empirical studies focusing on daily price
changes in response to company announcements suggest that such new
157 Rule 415(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(3) (1985), reprinted in 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 3383, in combination with the cross-referenced Regulation S-K, requires a shelf registrant to update the registration statement with any new information about the offering (such
as the specific terms of a new debt issue) or which amounts to a "fundamental change in the
information set forth in the registration statement." Such updating may occur either by a
post-effective amendment or automatically if included in a subsequent 1934 Act filing (because
such filings are incorporated by reference into a Form S-3). Regulation S-K, Item 512(a)(1).
17 C.F.R. § 229.512(a)(1) (1985), reprinted in 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 71,062; S-3 Required Information, supra note 123 (Item 12(b)).
158 Recent empirical and theoretical work suggests that announcement of a stock issue is
associated with a drop in the corresponding stock price because management acting for current
shareholders will be reluctant to issue stock when it believes the firm's assets are undervalued
by the market. See e.g., Asquith & Mullins, Equity Issues And Offering Dilution, 15 J. Fin.
Econ. (forthcoming 1986) (empirical analysis); Krasker, Stock Price Movements in Response
to Stock Issues under Asymmetric Information, 41 J. Fin. 93 (1986) (theoretical analysis). For
a summary of factors bearing on stock price changes upon announcement of a new issuance,
see Bhagat, The Effect of Pre-emptive Right Amendments on Shareholder Wealth, 12 J. Fin.
Econ. 189, 295 (1983).
159 The determination of abnormal returns from announcements generally involves a returns generating model, such as CAPM, which assumes that price changes are "normally"
distributed, i.e., according to a familiar bell-shaped distribution. See Appendix A infra.
Monthly returns are very close to being normally distributed; daily returns are not. E. Fama,
supra note 19, at 21-35. Moreover, nonsynchronous trading makes the estimation of key parameters such as systematic risk difficult on a daily basis. Scholes & Williams, Estimating
Betas from Nonsynchronous Data, 5 J. Fin. Econ. 309 (1977). But see Brown & Warner,
Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1985) (technical
problems of daily data can be corrected for or do not affect outcomes; daily data may be
empirically more powerful). Other less precise techniques may also be used: for example,
measuring abnormal daily returns on the assumption of a constant return model, or examining
volatility effects of specific announcements (i.e., the period and extent of significant increases in
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information is digested over a two-day period. 160 Moreover, when a shelf
offering is of a new class of a company's shares, a market efficiency argument may not be sustainable. At the time of the offering, there is no
"prevailing price" for such shares. An investor will have to make a complicated decision based on the rights and privileges of this new class of
securities, as well as information reflected in prevailing prices of previ161
ously issued classes.
Will Rule 415 disadvantage any market participant from a market
trading volume and price movement). E.g., Hillmer & Yu, The Market Speed of Adjustment
to New Information, 7 J. Fin. Econ. 321 (1979).
There is a separate body of empirical work considering market efficiency with respect to
daily or even intraday price movements, but these "weak form" tests are generally limited to
finding correlations of price movements on which to base a trading strategy. E.g., Dann, Mayers & Rabb, Trading Rules, Large Blocks, and the Speed of Price Adjustment, 4 J. Fin. Econ. 3
(1977); Grier & Albin, Nonrandom Price Changes in Association with Trading in Large
Blocks, 46 J. Bus. 425 (1973). See Appendix A infra.
Io E.g., Foster, Quarterly Accounting Data: Time-Series Properties and Predictive-Ability
Results, 52 Acct. Rev. 1, 17 (1977) (quarterly earnings announcements); Hite & Owers, Security Price Reactions Around Corporate Spin-Off Announcements, 12 J. Fin. Econ. 409, 435
(1983) (spin-off announcements); Morse, Price and Trading Volume Reaction Surrounding
Earnings Announcements: A Closer Examination, 19 J. Acct. Research 374, 382 (1981) (quarterly and annual earnings announcements); see also Pastena, Some Evidence on the SEC's
System of Continuous Disclosure, 54 Acct. Rev. 776, 782 (1979) (suggesting that strong market reaction to Form 8-K extends over three-day period); Patell & Wolfson, The Intraday
Speed of Adjustment of Stock Prices to Earnings and Dividend Announcements, 13 J. Fin.
Econ. 223 (1984) (while new dividend and earnings information causes price changes within
minutes, price effects may persist over two-day period). One serious technical problem with
many of these studies is the difficulty of determining the exact day on which an announcement
was publicly released, and whether the announcement occurred at the end or beginning of a
market day. For instance, the Morse study noted that the most significant price changes and
excess trading volume of a particular security occurred on the day prior to and the day of the
official announcement. The study concluded that the activity the day prior to the announcement could be due to a misspecification of the public announcement because the exchange
would often receive the information on the day before the public announcement. Morse,
supra, at 382.
161 One way to approach this problem is to imagine the help that the market gives to investors in determining the right price to pay for a security. For a typical trading market purchase
of ordinary common stock of a widely followed company, the investor knows that the prevailing price is probably the right price (i.e., the price that fully reflects all available information).
For a purchase from a shelf-offering of similar such stock, the investor knows that the market's
prevailing price is probably the right price for the newly issued (but wholly fungible) shares.
(This assumes that sufficient time has elapsed since announcement of the offering for the market to digest this new information.) The shelf-offering of a new class of a company's stock
presents a different problem. A right price has not yet been established in the market. Every
investor will have to determine the right price using information reflected in prevailing prices
of the company's already traded issues plus information about the new security. This may take
additional time. A similar argument could be developed for the shelf-offering of shares of a
class of stock previously issued but only thinly traded, thus raising similar questions for successive issuances from a shelf-offering of a new class of stock. Another similar argument could be
developed for noninvestment grade debt or preferred stock, which may be shelf-registered by
companies generally eligible to use the Form S-3, where bankruptcy risk might be sufficiently
great to require sophisticated analysis.
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efficiency perspective? It is important to consider this question in light of
the particular distribution techniques available in a shelf-registered offering. The technique that appears most popular thus far is the so-called
"bought deal," in which one or two large investment banks purchase the
entire offering. The banks then quickly resell the securities, generally to
institutional investors, to avoid the possibility of an adverse market
move. 162 The purchasers of the securities, the banks and the institutional
investors, are the most sophisticated investors in the market. Presumably if they feel they lack sufficient information, or time to assess information, they will refuse to purchase securities. The only parties who may be
adversely affected by the shelf-offering are open market participants, who
may suffer some temporary uncertainty in the "right" price for the company's shares. But the announcement of a shelf-offering will cause no
greater uncertainty than many other important corporate developments,
such as an earnings change announcement or the announcement of a
standard public offering. Such uncertainty we normally expect open
market participants to bear.
The other likely distribution technique for shelf-registered equity is
the "at the market offering," where a company sells shares directly into
an open market through a stock exchange or a market maker off the
exchange.' 63 The purchasers from such an offering need not be institutional investors. Rule 415 does limit the availability of this technique in
a somewhat protective way: the offered securities must be of the same
class as already traded securities. Thus if there is sufficient time for the
market to assimilate the new information about the shelf offering, the
prevailing price in the trading market is probably the "right" price for
the newly offered securities (because the securities are fungible). 1 4 But
this poses the efficient markets question directly: given the short time
periods between announcement of a "take down" from the shelf and actual distribution, is it reasonable to think that prices will fully reflect this
information? Or, rather, will investors who base investment decisions
only on prevailing prices be systematically disadvantaged vis-a-vis traders and institutions who may have independent means to assess new
162 See Banoff, supra note 144, at 148-49.
163 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(4) (1985), reprinted in 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3383. The
rule requires an issuer to use an underwriter as an intermediary in an "at the market" offering.
Id. § 230.415(a)(4)(iii). The underwriter, however, is more likely to fulfill a verification role
rather than to distribute securities. See also Banoff, supra note 144, at 146-48 (discussing other
possible innovative distribution techniques).
164 See note 161 supra for elaboration. The rule also limits shelf registrations of a company's voting stock to a maximum of 10% of the company's voting stock's public float (i.e.,
10% of the aggregate market value of the outstanding voting stock held by nonaffiliates). 17
C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(4)(ii) (1985). This may minimize significant shifts in corporate control,
the impact of which are presumably more slowly assimilated.
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If market efficiency is an important value in the distribution of securities, the best available evidence suggests it would have been prudent
for the SEC to require a "cooling off" period between announcement and
distribution of "at the market" equity offerings of perhaps one or two
days. 166 At the very least the SEC should have continued the distribution
technique as a temporary measure, subject to further tests of the market
efficiency of such offerings. During the eighteen-month period in which
Rule 415 operated experimentally, only a tiny handful of equity offerings
were shelf-registrations listing "at the market distribution" as a possible
technique (less than one percent of 7700 equity registration statements
filed during the period). 167 This is too small a sample from which to draw
conclusions about a technique that will probably become more prevalent.
We hope that investigators will consider the market efficiency question
despite the SEC's final adoption of Rule 415.168
165 Note how the arguments about the two distribution techniques conform to our intuitions
about who will engage in securities research. There is more concern about market efficiency in
an "at the market offering" because smaller market participants are likely to be among the
purchasers. For these smaller participants, it may be rational to rely on the prevailing price
rather than investing in research. See note 81 and accompanying text supra. Presumably a
company could also offer shelf-registered securities through a more conventional syndicated
underwriting. The time between announcement of such plans and the actual sale would mitigate the market efficiency questions raised in the text.
In response to these market efficiency concerns one might question why purchasers from a
shelf-offering should be better shielded from price uncertainty than trading market participants. See text accompanying note 162 supra. This might be answered by recognizing the
greater vulnerability of primary purchasers due to greater profits to the underwriters in these
transactions as compared to a brokerage transaction. See note 140 supra. One could also
attempt to determine whether efficiency gains to companies from pinpoint timing of securities
issuances outweighed such costs, the distributional consequences among shareholder groups,
or ways of forcing companies to internalize such costs. Also to be considered in this regard is
the extent to which shelf-registered offerings eliminate the observed underpricing of new issuances, see Banoff, supra note 144, at 153.
166 The SEC's original proposal would have permitted shelf-registration for companies required to use Form S-I or Form S-2, as well as Form S-3. Release No. 6276, supra note 152.
This would have been inconsistent with the assumptions of relative market efficiency underlying the three-tiered system. The SEC seems gradually to have realized this during the evolution of Rule 415. The temporary rule also limited "at the market" shelf-registered offerings to
issuances registered on Form S-3. Release No. 6383, supra note 119, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,397,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 83. The final rule limited shelf-registration to primary offerings of securities qualified to be registered on Form S-3 and to traditional shelf offerings (such as securities
issued for dividend or interest reinvestment plans, employee benefit plans, or upon the exercise
of various rights, including conversion). Release No. 6499, supra note 141, 48 Fed. Reg. at
52,894, Fed. See. L. Rep. at 86,342-43.
167 Release No. 6499, supra note 141, 48 Fed. Reg. at 52,891, Fed. See. L. Rep. at 86,337.
16 Critics also object that shelf-registration reduces the quality of disclosure because the
absence of advance notification for an offering eliminates time for underwriter due diligence.
See, e.g., Release No. 6423, supra note 152, 47 Fed. Reg. at 39,806-07, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at
83,284-88 (Thomas, Comm'r, dissenting). The SEC's answer is that underwriters will engage
in anticipatory and continuous due diligence. See text accompanying notes 140-43 supra. The
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C. The Development of Corporate Law
Our discussion of the efficient market hypothesis and the finance
theory paradigm challenges the basis of much recent legal scholarship on
corporate law. This scholarship has argued that market forces can ade-

quately resolve most of the principal-agent problems inherent in the split
of ownership and control in large publicly held corporations. In an efficient market, the market prices of the firm's securities will signal the

relative quality of management because evidence of management shirking, misappropriation or incompetence will presumably be reflected in
the firm's securities prices. Two sets of markets use these signals: the
market for corporate control, in which potential acquirors and proxy
contestants seek to identify those companies where management has not
maximized real economic returns; and the market in executive services,

which evaluates managers' ability to achieve superior results. The disciplining effects of these two markets, it is argued, render much of traditional fiduciary duty doctrine governing management conflicts of interest
at best unnecessary and, not infrequently, counterproductive. 169 Some
adherents suggest that the only rules that can be justified are those that

forbid management from attempting to impede the operation of these
two markets, for example, through defensive tactics in (or anticipating)
170
takeover bids or "golden parachute" management contracts.

This reconceptualization of corporate law proposed by legal scholars depends upon a market that is both speculatively and allocatively
efficient. This view implies that management efforts to resist a takeover
bid at a premium over market are presumptively self-interested, and that
corollary management assertions that the firm is undervalued by the
stock market are not credible.
trade-off appears to be less verification of disclosure at the moment of a distribution in exchange for more verification along the way. Given the comparative potential injury from misinformation to trading market participants versus primary purchasers, the trade-off seems
reasonable. Observe also the regulatory technique: abbreviated registration and shelf registration as an incentive for the agency's clientele to accept greater overall policing of disclosure.
169 See authorities cited in note 5 supra.
170 Such arguments about the need to protect marketplace mechanisms contain an inherent
inconsistency. For example, some argue that "race to the bottom" style criticism of Delaware's permissive corporate law ignores the disciplining effects of capital markets: if shareholders preferred more stringent corporate regimes, survival mechanisms would lead firms to
incorporate in states providing such regimes. See Fischel, Race to the Bottom, supra note 5, at
916-20; Winter, supra note 5, at 275-76. This argument should also apply to attempts to impede market operation. That is, if shareholders value the unimpeded operation of the market
for corporate control, why wouldn't the same survival mechanisms lead firms away from tactics such as shark repellant amendments? Buried in such arguments is an unarticulated theory
of marketplace failure. For a careful empirical consideration of the chartering competition
claims, see Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ.
& Organization 225 (1985).
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Marketplace Capitalization

This implication-that marketplace capitalization best reflects the
value of the firm-is not required by, and may even be inconsistent with,
the efficient market hypothesis and the associated finance paradigm.
Modern portfolio theory generally, and CAPM specifically, model security prices in light of the risk a particular security contributes to a diversified portfolio of securities. 17 ' Firm-specific risk can be isolated from
systematic or market risk; the well-diversified portfolio can eliminate
firm-specific risk. Modem portfolio theory claims that investors are not
compensated for that risk that can be eliminated through diversification.
Thus there is no basis for the assertion that prices prevailing in the stock
market measure value of a firm to a potential acquiror. The acquiror of a
firm will focus on firm-specific factors; the acquiror is not principally or
even at all concerned with assembling an efficient portfolio.172 Moreover,
CAPM's assumption of uniform risk aversion among investors may not
be tenable in the market for corporate control. Acquirors may not be
risk averse, or risk averse to the same degree as ordinary investors, and
thus may not demand the same premium for bearing identical risk. This
could help explain why bidders' prices are higher than market prices. In
short, modem portfolio theory makes us aware that the market in shares
generally and the market in all (or substantially all) of the shares of a
specific firm may be very different markets. 17 3 Nothing about the efficient market hypothesis is inconsistent with this notion of two different
markets.
2. Speculative and Allocative Efficiency
Our discussion of the efficient market hypothesis suggests that even
if we accept the efficient market hypothesis and CAPM, there may be
serious problems with legal scholars' proposed reconceptualization of
corporate law. Recall the two distinct senses of "efficiency" outlined
171 See text accompanying note 43 supra.
172 See, e.g., R. Brealey & S. Myers, supra

note 35, at 703-10 (comparing "sensible" motives
for mergers, such as economies of scale, with "dubious" motives for mergers, such as diversification). The text may help to explain claims that the prevailing market price of a firm's shares

may not fully reflect the firm-specific potential synergy gains from a combination. See Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming
1986).
173 Ordinarily the assumption of homogenous risk preferences among investors is not such a
problem for CAPM, because one function of trade is to clear markets in light of different risk
preferences. Compare Kanda & Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate
Law, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 429, 437-41 (1985), discussing the theory of "inframarginality" in
which investors may value their shares differently. Where the asset in question-control-is
not readily divisible and trading is "lumpy" (a firm makes an acquisition or does not), the
prevailing share price will not necessarily perform the clearing function.
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above. Markets may be "speculatively efficient" in that prevailing securities prices are the best guide to financial returns. Markets may also be
"allocatively efficient" in that such prices are the best guide to real economic returns. 174 The proposed reconceptualization makes a strong
claim for allocative efficiency: that prevailing securities prices will signal
whether management is employing the firm's assets in the economically
most productive way.
This claim relies on the efficient market hypothesis in two problematic ways. First, the extent of market efficiency now appears to be an
open question. While the evidence does not suggest that securities research and trading will yield exceptional returns on major stock exchanges, the absence of a satisfactory asset pricing model to serve as a
benchmark for normal returns leaves the extent of efficiency indeterminate. 175 What level of efficiency is necessary before we would trust market mechanisms to do all the work of fiduciary duty doctrines? What

markets (or market segments) will exhibit such efficiency? These unanswered questions undermine the evidence marshaled for the view that
unfriendly tender offers, by displacing entrenched inefficient managements, increase shareholder welfare. 176 The latest CAPM-based empirical work suggests that the existence of welfare gains, as measured by the
See text accompanying notes 10-15 supra.
See text accompanying notes 66, 94 supra.
176 Virtually all of the tests purporting to demonstrate increases in shareholder welfare
study "abnormal returns" in stock prices of targets and acquirors before and after transactions
to measure their economic effect. An essential element of such event studies is a benchmark of
normal returns, provided in most studies by CAPM or a CAPM-variant. See Jensen &
Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5, 9
(1983); see also Appendix A at note 203 infra (explaining technique using CAPM). We discuss
at notes 53-62 and accompanying text supra the empirical and theoretical problems with
CAPM. A shift in asset pricing models may lead to very different conclusions about the extent
to which target firms underperform in relation to the market as a whole (prior to the takeover
bid) and the extent of shareholder gains from the transaction. For example, a recent study of
stockholder gains from mergers using a revised asset pricing model with an industry performance factor (in addition to the customary market performance factor) showed no comparative
underperformance and much smaller shareholder gains than in CAPM studies. Langetieg,
supra note 54, at 381-82.
To take another example for which there are as yet no tests: the widely noted small firm
effect, in which portfolios of small capitalization companies seem to outperform portfolios of
large capitalization companies. See, e.g., Banz, The Relationship Between Return and Market
Value of Common Stocks, 9 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1981); Reinganum, supra note 55; Schwert, supra
note 55 (survey and introduction to symposium). The effect is of such magnitude and duration
that it seems more likely to show CAPM misspecification rather than market inefficiency. But
this particular misspecification problem may have particular impact on the analysis of merger
gains, because many targets are smaller companies.
It should be noted that to say CAPM is misspecified is different from saying that the stock
market inefficiently prices an industry sector or a specific group of companies (such as small
companies). Compare Coffee, supra note 5, at 1211, 1226 (suggesting that market has "undervalued" stocks in particular industries and smaller companies).
174

175
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combined gains to bidders and acquired firms, is a much closer question
than previously thought. 177 As a result, the accuracy of CAPM becomes
an important problem.
Second, and more serious, the efficient market hypothesis does not
on its own terms make an allocative efficiency claim; it claims only speculative efficiency. Recall the expected returns models of securities prices
used to develop and test the efficient market hypothesis: price at some
future time equals today's price plus anticipated returns from dividends,
178
interest, and capital gains or losses during the holding period.
Although dividends and interest are linked to real economic outputs in
that a company must generate profits to make such payouts, there is no
necessary connection between changes in security prices and economic
outputs. The efficient market hypothesis posits only that prevailing
prices are the best guess (minimum variance) of future prices, so that an
investor cannot systematically outperform the market. The hypothesis
does not explain when prices will change. Thus, contrary to suggestions
in the legal literature, 79 there is no inconsistency between the efficient
market hypothesis and the Keynesian view likening investment management to the prediction of which photograph others will choose as the
8 In an efficient market, perhaps no one (not even Keynes) can
prettiest. 13
outguess the market's assessment of which stock will be judged to be the
prettiest, but that is a claim about speculative efficiency only, not allocative efficiency.':"
177 The summary provided by Jensen & Ruback, supra note 176, at 11, of recent studies
shows a range of gains in share prices for target shareholders from approximately 17% to 34%
and for acquiror shareholders from approximately 2% to 7% (in successful takeover bids).
These percentages may be misleading as to economic effect, however, because acquirors tend to
be larger than targets, id. at 20. It is not clear whether a correctly specified asset pricing model
would show such gains. See Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Merger Activities and the Objective Function of Merging Firms, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 155 (1983).
17 See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
M7 E.g., V. Brudney & M. Chirelstein, Cases and Materials on Corporate Finance 1191 (2d
ed. 1979); R. Pozen, supra note 6, at 155.
I0 See J. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money 156 (1936); see
also W. Baumol, The Stock Market and Economic Efficiency 51-53 (1965) (supporting the
Keynesian view).
181 The distinction between speculative and allocative efficiency reopens the question
whether to limit the research in which institutional investors may engage. See text accompanying note 108-10 supra. Should we forbid research aimed at divining "market psychology?"
Is there any reason to favor fundamental research instead? Some may want to limit institutional research to promoting allocative efficiency only, which rapidly becomes a claim for a
focus on long-term rather than short-term performance objectives. But from a beneficiaryinterest perspective, it may well be that the most successful long-term performance is one that
maximizes short-term gains; the short-term player is not necessarily foregoing opportunities
for greater long-term gains. Why penalize institutional investor beneficiaries? Moreover,
short-term changes may be important signals in decisions bearing on economic outputs (such
as whether to build a new plant).
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In discussing the efficient market hypothesis, the legal literature has
more or less assumed that allocative and speculative efficiency are identical. Such an assumption may seem surprising in light of historical and
contemporary fads and bubbles in stock prices. 182 One might ask
whether such occasional demonstrations of strong allocative inefficiency
suggest that significant allocative inefficiency is pervasive. Nevertheless,
the efficient markets literature has assimilated two analytically distinct
notions in assuming that a demonstration of speculative efficiency also
shows allocative efficiency. Only recently has the link between allocative
and speculative efficiency been subjected to empirical testing of the
linkage between stock price movements and changes in real economic
outputs. Some of these tests reject the hypothesis of allocatively efficient
markets, while others have criticized the validity of the new tests. 183 Despite the controversial status of the claim of empirical evidence of allocative inefficiency, its importance for legal policy warrants a discussion of
its underpinnings.
The allocative efficiency paradigm asserts that real stock prices
182 B. Malkiel, supra note 62, at 35-80. See Shiller, Fashions, Fads and Bubbles in Financial
Markets (1985) (unpublished paper) (On file at New York University Law Review) (discussing
other anecdotal and theoretical evidence of allocative inefficiency).
183 E.g., Grossman & Shiller, The Determinants of the Variability of Stock Market Prices,

71 Am. Econ. Rev. 222 (1981); LeRoy & Porter, The Present-Value Relation: Tests Based on
Implied Variance Bounds, 49 Econometrica 555 (1981); Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too
Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 421 (1981);
[hereinafter Shiller I]; Shiller, The Use of Volatility Measures in Assessing Market Efficiency,
36 J. Fin. 291 (1981) [hereinafter Shiller II]; Shiller, The Volatility of Long-Term Interest
Rates and Expectations Models of the Term Structure, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 1190 (1979) [hereinafter Shiller III]. For a useful summary, see LeRoy, Expectations Models of Asset Prices: A
Survey of Theory, 37 J. Fin. 185 (1982). For a more accessible account, see S. Sheffrin, supra
note 8, at 141-46.
This line of research has itself received vigorous criticism. The most damaging attacks
demonstrate that the statistical tests used in Shiller I and III, for example, are biased towards
rejection of the hypothesis that markets are efficient. Flavin, Excess Volatility in the Financial
Markets: A Reassessment of the Empirical Evidence, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 929, 942-47 (1983).
Other critics have apparently contended that the observed excess volatility of stock prices over
dividends is unsurprising because companies intentionally offer a stable flow of dividends
(hence making dividend payout a nonstationary process, contrary to Shiller's assumption). See
Mankiw, Romer & Shapiro, An Unbiased Reexamination of Stock Market Volatility, 40 J.
Fin. 677 (1985) (referring to Marsh & Merton, Dividend Variability and Variance Bound Tests
for the Rationality of Stock Market Prices, Sloan School Working Paper No. 1584-84 (MIT
Aug. 1984)). Further criticism of the Shiller line of research is offered in LeRoy, Efficiency
and the Variability of Asset Prices, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers and Proceedings) 183 (1984).
Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro present a new test of Shiller's claim that stock price volatility is too great relative to dividends for markets to be allocatively efficient. Their study supports Shiller's position, although its results are less dramatic.
An earlier draft of this Article gave more weight to Shiller's findings than we now offer
because the research that questioned its methodology had not yet been published. The history
of this Article therefore illustrates one of its major themes: legal policy makers must be wary of
definitive statements in a rapidly changing, controversial area of economic research.
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equal the present value of rationally expected or optimally forecasted future real dividends. 1s 4 Stock price movements are attributable to "new
information" about future dividends. Thus stock prices, and changes in
stock prices, will serve as the most reliable signals directing real economic investment. In a series of papers published in 1979 and later, Shiller and others have challenged the allocative efficiency paradigm. 185 The
basic work has consisted of comparing actual stock prices, as represented
by broad-based market indices, against "perfect forecast" stock prices,
which are comparable indices of constructed prices that should have
been obtained if the actual future path of dividends had been known.
The comparisons, whose statistical validity has been questioned, suggest
that stock price movements are too great relative to actual subsequent
events to be accounted for by reaction to new information about future
dividends. 186
Several explanations for this discrepancy have been offered. One argument is that "stock prices are heavily influenced by fads or waves of
optimistic or pessimistic 'market psychology.' "187 Alternatively, it has
been suggested that information regarding significant changes in real dis1 4 Shiller I, supra note 183, at 424-28.
185See note 183 supra.
186 "Perfect forecast prices" may be thought of as follows: Assume that the allocative efficiency paradigm is accurate and prevailing prices are the present value of anticipated future
dividends. Then, for a particular past period, we can construct the right price for a particular
security in light of actual dividend information. We can then compare changes in actual prices
against changes in perfect forecast prices to determine if the observed price changes could have
been triggered solely by new information leading to a revised forecast of future dividends. The
finding of Shiller and others is that the magnitude of observed price changes is too large to be
accounted for by new information.
These volatility studies can be more technically understood in light of previous discussion
about the way in which EMH tests are "joint" tests of the hypothesis and the underlying asset
pricing model. Volatility studies are EMH tests using a very simple asset pricing model linking the security price directly to the value of the real investment. Thus, for instance, the
appropriate price of a stock is assumed to be the discounted sum of its expected dividend
payouts. Consequently, the variance in dividends should exceed the variance in price of the
security because the stock price is a weighted average of the expected dividends and moving
averages display less dispersion than the series from which they derive.
Significantly, several volatility studies have shown that the prices of various securities are
too volatile given the volatility of the underlying series. But see note 183 supra (discussing
criticisms of studies). In addition to work discussed in the text, LeRoy & Porter, supra note
183, at 568-71, showed that stock prices were more volatile than the underlying earnings data,
while Shiller III, supra note 183, showed that bond prices exhibited more volatility than their
underlying yields. These and related tests reject the joint hypothesis of market efficiency and
the particular asset pricing model.
Rejection of this asset pricing model is significant because it questions the link between
speculative and allocative efficiency. Ideally, we would like financial markets to reflect the real
returns underlying the security. The present value pricing models used in volatility studies
make this link in the most direct manner.
I7 Shiller II, supra note 183, at 294.
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count rates may account for the volatility.1 8
This controversy over the allocative efficiency of financial markets
suggests caution in the use of stock prices, and stock price changes, as a
simple measure of management performance.1 9 It may be inappropriate
to rely upon stock-price based mechanisms to replace the fiduciary duty
doctrine, because the market response to management overreaching,
which would diminish dividends, or to management forebearance, which
would increase them, is now controversial. Further, we may want to
rethink rules that permit the unfettered operation of the market in corporate control if our primary justification is managment discipline. The
controversy over the allocative accuracy of stock price signals raises the
possibility that the presumed benefits of an unregulated takeover market,
the movement of assets into the hands of those who can maximize economic returns, may not exceed the costs of corporate takeovers.190
CONCLUSION

Some readers of the early drafts of this Article questioned the importance of its observations about the relative failings of financial economics: that markets are at best "relatively" efficient in the speculative
sense, thus at best "relatively" efficient in the allocative sense, and that
CAPM provides at best a first order approximation of returns. Most of
the legal policy assertions that derive from the modern finance paradigm,
it is said, require only such relative claims. We have tried to demonstrate
what may turn on the retreat to relativity. If markets are only relatively
efficient, as we expect, then it is wrong to regard the search for undervalued securities by institutional investors as irrational behavior. If CAPM
is at best a first order approximation, then investors lose a relatively simple prescription for optimal investing and a relatively easy means of measuring investment performance. Moreover, the degree of inaccuracy of
188 Grossman & Shiller, supra note 183. Another challenge to allocative efficiency is
presented in Figlewski, Market "Efficiency" in a Market with Heterogeneous Information, 86
J. Pol. Econ. 581 (1978). Figlewski models market efficiency as a process in which traders
with the best information (and skill) accumulate wealth at the expense of those with inferior
information (and skill). He concludes that, although the market tends toward increased efficiency from this redistribution, it is unlikely to attain complete efficiency in either the short or
long run. Id. at 596-97.
189 The lack of "fit" between perfect forecast price movements and actual stock price movements is demonstrated using market indices, rather than individual stocks, for greater generality of result. But the same disparity should obtain for individual stocks, insofar as indices are
only aggregates of individual stocks.
190 The costs of takeovers are discussed by Coffee, supra note 5, at 1221-50, who warns of
the takeover's potential to promote inefficient transfers of control, adversely affect the labor
market for executive services and employee performance generally, and foster undesirable riskpreference behavior by managers of both prospective targets and prospective bidders. See also
Leebron, supra note 172.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

November 1985]

EFFICIENTMARKETS

CAPM severely calls into question the policy assertions in areas ranging
from takeovers to mandatory disclosure, which rely on empirical assessment of changes in shareholder welfare (as measured through share price
movements). Finally, if allocative efficiency tracks speculative efficiency
only approximately (and that may be an optimistic account), then the
usefulness of results from models based on share price changes may be

radically limited.
In a sense our critics assume that the various models they employ
are continuous functions: a result that holds where markets are efficient,
for example, will approximately hold if markets are almost efficient.191
Unfortunately they work out no particular justification for this assumption in many areas of interest to legal policy makers.192 One particular
example illustrates the problems in assuming that nothing changes if
markets are almost efficient. In a recent article, Easterbrook and Fischel
present an argument for an unequal gain-sharing rule in corporate control transactions.19 3 They argue first that unequal sharing makes gainsproducing transactions more likely and then that even a risk-averse in'll Recent work in economics provides an example of an important discontinuity: a small
amount of nonmaximizing (i.e., irrational) behavior may cause changes in the equilibrium of a
system significantly larger than the losses to the nonmaximizers. E.g., Akerloff & Yellen, Can
Small Deviations From Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria?, 75
Am. Econ. Rev. 708 (1985). "For some, it would be reassuring to find that the results of
models based on maximizing behavior continue to hold as an approximation when the assumption of maximization is relaxed just slightly. It is, after all, difficult to believe that agents
literally maximize all the time." Id. at 708 (emphasis in original). The article goes on, however, to construct a number of examples that show that small deviations from rationality can
have "first order" consequences, helping to explain, for example, business cycles and cartels.
On the other hand, Akerlof and Yellen suggest that the effect of irrationality in markets can be
dampened by rational arbitrageurs. Id. at 712. See also Haltiwanger & Waldman, Rational
Expectations and the Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of Heterogeneity, 75 Am. Econ.
Rev. 326 (1985) (in a market with "congestion effects," sophisticated or maximizing agents
will have a disproportionately large effect on the equilibrium). Russell & Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi-Rationality in Competitive Markets, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 1071 (1985) (rational
actors in financial markets can specialize in acquiring assets underpriced by quasi-rational
actors).
192 For example, Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 5, appear to argue that relatively efficient
markets will produce close to optimal results, so long as policy does not interfere with the
mechanisms that produce efficiency. But the article seems to be uncertain about which version
of relative efficiency it is prepared to embrace. At one point it suggests that the appropriate
measure of relative efficiency is "the speed with which new information is reflected in price,"
id. at 560, a -view that suggests, first, that eventually the market becomes efficient (perfectly
revealing) and, second, that the costs of inefficiency reside in the trades made during the adjustment period. At another point the article appears to embrace the Grossman-Stiglitz model,
in which the measure of efficiency is quite different: the return to investment in information,
see text accompanying note 82 supra, Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 578. In the Grossman-Stiglitz model, the market is never efficient; there is "an equilibrium degree of disequilibrium." Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 8, at 393. The cost of inefficiency resides in all
market trades. The ultimate implications of these two views are quite different.
193 Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, supra note 5, at 700-15.
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vestor would prefer a rule that permitted unequal sharing because of the
opportunity to diversify against such firm-specific events. 194 That is,
with a properly diversified portfolio, a shareholder is likely to be "on the
winning side of some transactions and the losing side of others," 195 and if
the effect of the rule is to promote gains, the expected return on the portfolio will be higher. Thus, they claim that rational shareholders will
unanimously agree in advance to an unequal gain-sharing rule and that
fiduciary duty doctrine should sustain the hypothetical shareholder
bargain. 196
The problem with this argument is that it assumes full market efficiency, not relative efficiency. If markets are only relatively efficient,
then some shareholders will derive gains from searching for undervalued
securities. It will thus not be irrational for them to fail to hold a diversified portfolio. Moreover, even fully diversified shareholders would benefit from their search efforts, which help ensure relative market efficiency
and thus greater returns from a diversification strategy.' 97 The point is
that there would be no shareholder agreement on the unequal sharing
rule: searching shareholders would not agree because they do not hold
diversified portfolios and nonsearching shareholders would probably not
agree because they derive significant benefit from the efforts of the
searching shareholders. 19 (Indeed, one might conjecture that the hypo194 Id. at 705-14.
195 Id. at 712.

196 Id. at 700-03, 711-14.
197 See note 79 supra and text accompanying notes 99-100 supra.
198Nonsearching shareholders could conceivably decide that the gains from transactionfacilitated by an unequal sharing rule would outweigh the gains from increased market efficiency resulting from the activity of searching shareholders. It seems unlikely that such shareholders, by hypothesis diversifying because risk averse, would jeopardize a degree of market
efficiency that served their global objectives in exchange for unpredictable extra gains.
In defining the content of fiduciary duties, Easterbrook and Fischel slip between a descriptive account and a normative account, at one point referring to "the bargain that investors and
agents would strike if they were able to dicker at no cost," Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, supra note 5, at 702, and at another point stating that it is "[tihe existence of diversification-not its employment-[that] supports our argument," id. at 713; they
then use the normative argument to dismiss implicitly the objection, see note 53 supra, that
many investors do not in fact diversify. But if markets are only relatively efficient, the hypothetical unequal gain sharing agreement makes no sense on either account.
There are other objections to the Easterbrook and Fischel argument. Their assumption of
diversifiability, for example, is problematic, in that investors cannot be on the "winning" side
of going private transactions, or transactions generally in which the surviving party is a private
company. Moreover, the portfolio theory argument proves too much. Easterbrook and
Fischel would limit their unequal sharing rule to instances in which there is a gain (measured
against market value) and thus would exclude looting transactions, for example, from the
rule's operation. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, supra note 5, at
714-15. But if the looting is by a public company, the properly diversified investor is as likely
to win as lose. Additionally, as the text argues, there is no necessary magic in "market value"
(by which we assume is meant "market price") for measuring gains. Moreover, on many occa-
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thetical shareholder bargain would be for an equal sharing rule on this
account.) The lack of agreement follows from the relative efficiency of
markets. 199
In the best of all possible worlds, with allocatively and speculatively
efficient markets, true theories dictate unambiguous legal policies. In our
world, which may be only "close" to the best of all possible worlds, the
insights provided by theories of financial markets require patient cultivation before legal policy flowers.
sions of unequal gain sharing, actions by a controlling shareholder may well depress the market price. See Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and
Reorganizations, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 1072, 1083-87 (1983); but see DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Rice,
Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, 27 J.L. & Econ. 367 (1984) (analyzing 72 going-private transactions announced between 1973 and 1980 and finding that minority stockholders received gains comparable to those characteristic of interfirm mergers).
For additional objections, see Coffee, supra note 5, at 1216-21.
199 The Easterbrook and Fischel argument derives directly from certain unanimity theorems in the finance literature. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, supra
note 5, at 714 n.34. These theorems refer to hypothetical value-maximizing agreements among
shareholders about the production and financial decisions of the firm, on the assumption, inter
alia, of the "spanning" of investment space, i.e., the existence of "complete" markets in which
a security exists for every risk state. E.g., DeAngelo, Competition and Unanimity, 71 Am.
Econ. Rev. 18 (1981). While in some instances spanning is not necessary for unanimity, see,
e.g., Makowski & Pepall, Easy Proofs of Unanimity and Optimality Without Spanning: A
Pedagogical Note, 40 J. Fin. 1245 (1985), spanning is necessary to guarantee unanimity if short
sales are permitted. Makowski, Competition and Unanimity Revisited, 73 Am. Econ. Rev.
329 (1983). Our current markets permit short sales. Our objection on the ground of relative
efficiency reduces, in terms of this literature, to a claim of incomplete markets, in that the
searching investor (and perhaps the nonsearching investor) cannot lay off the risk of an unequal gain-sharing rule. We offer this suggestion with some hesitation. Unanimity theorems
are complicated in their own right. No one appears to have pursued the linkage to efficient
market theories and asset pricing models, in particular, when markets are "relatively" complete, "relatively efficient" and their prices "relatively" well-modeled.
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APPENDIX A: A REVIEW OF EVIDENCE ON EMH

In this Appendix we present some of the evidence that supports and
some that contradicts the efficient market hypothesis. As noted in the

text, these studies jointly test the efficient market hypothesis and a corresponding asset pricing model. Most of the important empirical studies
employ the capital asset pricing model.

I
TESTS USING CAPM THAT CONFIRM THE EFFICIENT
MARKET HYPOTHESIS

A.

Public Announcement Tests

Public announcement tests directly examine one important aspect of
market efficiency: how rapidly the market digests new information. One
of the most important tests confirming the validity of the EMH is a
"public announcement" study conducted by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and
Roll ("FFJR"). The FFJR study examines the speed with which stock

prices adjust to announcements of stock splits.2° ° The effect of stock
splits on stock prices is a good illustration of the actual translation of
information into price by the market: it can be observed dissociated from

contemporaneous effects on other stocks in the market, because stock
splits are company-specific events relatively isolated from general market
movements.
The FFJR study used a market equilibrium model equivalent in all
relevant respects to CAPM 20 1 and a data set consisting of sequences of
200 Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10
Int'l Econ. Rev. 1 (1969). The work is well described in E. Fama, supra note 19, at 154-64.
201 The model used by FFJR is known as an "expected return" or "fair game" model, and is
based upon certain assumptions about the distribution of returns on individual securities and
the market portfolio. Formally, one writes:
E(f,)=o,+ 13ME(rM)
where E is an expected value operator, which is used to determine the expected value of a
distribution; r, is the one-period percentage return on asset i; Ci is a constant for asset i, r, is
3
the one-period percentage return on the market index of all risky assets; ,Mis a measure of the
volatility of asset i relative to the market index, and the tildes (-) indicate that r, and rm are
random variables; see note 25 supra.
The formal expression of "beta" is the same as in the CAPM equation. See note 44 supra.
For further explanation of the derivation of the market model, see E. Fama, supra note 19, at
63-77.
The CAPM equation differs from the "market model" developed above principally because it includes an additional parameter, the risk-free rate of return, rf. (Thus the FFJR
model is referred to in the literature as a "one parameter" model and CAPM as a "two parameter" model.) Conceptually this difference is very significant: while the FFJR model describes
the rate of return as a statistical relationship among sets of returns, CAPM gives substantive
content to that relationship in describing returns as the sum of a risk-free rate and a risk
premium. For testing purposes, however, the equations are effectively very similar, because
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prices for virtually all of the New York Stock Exchange stocks that split
between 1927 and 1959.202 For each stock split, FFJR examined the
price behavior of the stock over a period extending from approximately
thirty months before to thirty months after the split month. For every
month throughout the period, they calculated the difference of each
stock's actual return from the return expected in light of the stock's usual
relationship (its beta) with market returns. This difference is referred to
as the "residual. ' 20 3 To avoid the influence of factors unique to any one
they both characterize returns on securities in terms of the same linear relationship (having a
slope of beta) with returns on the market portfolio.
202 The number of splits studied was 940. The only splits during this period not included in
the data set were those that had a split ratio of less than five-to-four or that were by issuers that
had been listed for less than twelve months.
203 The FFJR study, like most EMH tests, investigates whether particular analyses of information sets can generate "abnormal residuals," which can then be translated into trading profits. Thus, the FFJR market model (or CAPM) equation must be transformed into an
expression suitable for regression analysis to be used in a test of the efficient market hypothesis.
Moreover, for testing purposes, the model as stated must be modified, because it defines a
relation only in terms of expectations, while generally we can observe only realized returns, not
expected returns. See note 49 supra. This modification is easily effected by assuming that the
realized return on a specific security can be determined by the sum of market model parameters and a random fluctuation (residual) with an average value of zero. After incorporating
these changes, we may restate the previous equation as a testable one:
i, = Ca+ R3,I+ ,
where e, is a measure of the deviation of r, from its conditional expected value, E(Q,).
To restate the modified model more specifically, the return on security i during a particular period equals the sum of (1) a constant, a,, (2) the product of a constant, 3,, and the
period's return on the market index, rM, and (3) a disturbance term, e-, which reflects the
difference--or "residual"-between this particular period's realized return for security i and
the expected value (based on all previously available information) of the return. In an efficient
market, the expected value of the disturbance term, or "cumulative average residual," E(,), is
zero. Consequently, tests of the efficient market hypothesis generally focus on the extent to
which these cumulative average residuals (CARs) deviate from zero.
A test of the efficient market hypothesis such as FFJR's would operate in the following
manner: in the absence of new information, returns on a security will remain constant vis-A-vis
the market (i.e., the observed disturbance term will on average equal zero). This serves as the
test baseline. As new information regarding the security becomes available, we would expect a
price change reflected by nonzero CARs. An efficient market quickly and completely digests
such information, then incorporates it into the security's market price so that CARs for the
security in subsequent periods equal zero. Similarly, the persistence of nonzero CARs (after
correcting for other new information events) suggests market inefficiency.
With the framework of the EMH tests thus presented, it is possible to see how problems in
the FFJR market model, or CAPM, might invalidate such tests that rely upon them. For
example, as Roll argues, see text accompanying notes 60-64 supra, if the proxy selected for
"M," the market index of all risky assets, were incorrect, then the residuals calculated on the
basis of that value would consequently also be incorrect. The correct market index (or a better,
or a different proxy) could provide a very different pattern of CARs and thus very different
conclusions about market efficiency.
Perhaps, however, if the error in the market index proxy were totally uncorrelated with
the phenomenon under study, then, on average, the CARs would be unaffected. See Roll, A
Reply to Mayers & Rice, 7 J. Fin. Econ. 391, 395-96 (1979). But we cannot be certain of the
lack of such correlation. For example, economic circumstances at particular times might lead
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security, FFJR focused on average residuals-i.e., they determined the
average residual for all observed splits for a given month before or after
the split month. The hypothesis of the study was that because stock
splits merely reslice the corporate pie into smaller pieces without any
wealth transfer among shareholders, any associated change in adjusted
stock prices was the result of a more fundamental corporate action signaled by the split, such as a future dividend increase. 2 °4
The study showed a pattern of increasingly positive average residuals over time until the split announcement month, followed by a distribuinvestors to expand or narrow their investment opportunities, thus affecting the market index
and the relation between the index and the particular proxy used in the test. Such factors may
be critical to the claims of some tests. See, e.g., Watts, Systematic 'Abnormal' Returns After
Quarterly Earnings Announcements, 6 J. Fin. Econ. 127 (1978) (examining the period from
1962 through 1968, finding inefficiency during 1962 through 1965).
Misspecification errors, such as the omission of important elements in the returns-generating process, will also affect the calculation of CARs. Indeed, those who try to explain anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency frequently claim that such evidence only shows
where CAPM has incorrectly modeled the returns-generating process. See, e.g., Ball, Anomalies in Relationships Between Securities' Yields and Yield-Surrogates, 6 J. Fin. Econ. 103
(1978). For example, one frequently hears the claim that the market "undervalues" small
firms, as demonstrated by positive CARs for investment strategies that focus on such firms.
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 5, at 1226 & n.247. But the "small firm effect" may only demonstrate that CAPM omits important variables, such as market capitalization, asset ratios, and
differential bankruptcy risk. More to the point, the small firm problem is directly correlated
with a phenomenon frequently under study in CAPM-based tests, the evaluation of merger
gains. See notes 55, 176 and text accompanying notes 53-59, 175-77 supra.
204 Some claim that the value of the firm, and thus its stock price, should not be related to
dividend payouts, at least in perfect capital markets. See Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961); but cf. Litzenberger & Ramaswamy, The Effects of Dividends on Common Stock Prices: Tax Effects or Information Effects,
37 J. Fin. 429 (1982) (positive but non-linear correlation between dividend yields and stock
prices). Some evidence suggests that changes in dividends do affect stock prices, which is attributable to information effects associated with management's signaling of future prospects.
See, e.g., Aharony & Swary, Quarterly Dividend and Earnings Announcements and Stockholders' Returns: An Empirical Analysis, 35 J. Fin. 1 (1980); Woolridge, The Information
Content of Dividend Changes, 5 J. Fin. Research 237 (1982).
It is commonly claimed that reducing the share price tends to increase the market liquidity of a company's stock and thus creates additional value. This seems highly unlikely as a
general proposition for issues that trade in well-developed national markets such as the NYSE.
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tion of average residuals around zero. 20 5 This distribution around zero
resulted even though most of the split firms experienced a dividend increase, suggesting that "the market apparently makes unbiased forecasts
of the implications of a split for future dividends, and these forecasts are
fully reflected in the price of the security by the end of the split
month."

206

Stated differently, in an inefficient market, the effects of the

stock split would have been sustained over a longer period; accordingly,
post-split average residuals would have been strongly positive and investors would be able to use a stock-split as a basis for predicting future
prices.
Various studies in the late 1960's and early 1970's used the methodology of the FFJR study in tests of other public announcements. These
tests were generally perceived as supporting the efficient market
20 7
hypothesis.
205 E. Fama, supra note 19, at 156 (reproducing graphs for FFJR, supra note 100).
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206 Id. at 163.
207 See E. Fama, supra note 19, at 165 (citing studies); Fama, supra note 1, at 408-09

(same). Other studies using the technique of analyzing "residuals" derived from market models, particularly CAPM, are canvassed in R. Brealey, An Introduction to Risk and Return
from Common Stocks ch. 2 (1983). For a summary of evidence on the efficiency of European
capital markets, see G. Hawavini, European Equity Markets: Price Behavior and Efficiency

(1984).
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Mutual Fund Tests

The development of CAPM also permitted other types of tests of the
efficient market hypothesis. For present purposes, the most noteworthy
of these scrutinized the performance of mutual funds. 20 8 Such mutual
fund tests have been particularly important in the effort to draw legal
policy implications from efficient market theory.
Recall that market efficiency is determined relative to a specific information set. For efficient market theorists this limitation in the method
of measuring market efficiency presents three problems. First, only a few
of the many readily identifiable information sets lend themselves to easy
statistical tests for market efficiency. For example, in an ideal situation
one would want to test every type of company public announcement, but
only a few types of announcements are sufficiently comparable from
company to company to permit the necessary statistical analysis. Many
important announcements-of an oil strike, an important contract, or a
new product-are company-specific; thus their impact on the market can
vary significantly. In such circumstances, aggregation and averaging
techniques are methodologically inappropriate.
Second, and related, much important information is privately produced and can be neither identified nor sufficiently defined for market
efficiency tests. For example, institutional investors analyze market,
sectoral, and company-specific data. This processing of data creates new
information-securities analysis-that the market may or may not efficiently absorb.
Third, the argument of efficient market theorists extends beyond
their contention that the market is efficient with respect to specific information sets available to it. They also claim that all relevant information
is in fact available to the market. Thus tests of efficiency relative to specific information sets can show only that the market reflects that specific
information; such tests can never prove the more general claim that the
market price reflects all relevant information.
Mutual fund performance tests avoid all of these problems. Assuming that sophisticated institutional investors such as mutual funds will
acquire virtually all publicly announced information relating to a company's prospects, we can indirectly test market efficiency for all such information sets by testing whether mutual funds outperform the market.
Similarly, tests of mutual fund performance should show whether the
market is efficient with respect to sets of privately produced information
that mutual funds produce or acquire. Finally, assuming that the vast
208 Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964, 23 J. Fin. 389

(1968) [hereinafter Jensen, Mutual Funds]; Jensen, Risk, the Pricing of Capital Assets, and the
Evaluation of Investment Portfolios, 42 J. Bus. 167 (1969).
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amounts of assets at risk lead mutual funds to seek out all relevant information, mutual fund tests address EMH theorists' general claim as
well.

20 9

The CAPM tests of mutual funds performance sought to evaluate
risk-adjusted performance. 2 10 Jensen's CAPM study, the most widely
cited test, examined mutual fund performance over the ten-year period
from 1955 through 1964.211 It employed a research strategy designed to
account for risk. First, for a several-year period the test determined the
risk of a fund's portfolio 21 2 and its return. Second, it compared this return to the return on a hypothetical portfolio consisting of the market

portfolio (for which the Standard & Poor's 500 is used as a proxy) combined with the risk-free asset, in proportions necessary to achieve the
same risk as the mutual fund. 2 13 The tests showed that mutual fund performance, when ignoring advisory fees, commissions, and other expenses,
was no better than that of a passive investor choosing a portfolio consist2 14
ing of the market portfolio and risk-free assets.
This study provided a powerful affirmation of the efficient market
hypothesis. Mutual funds cannot outperform the market on a risk-adjusted basis even assuming that they do not pay for securities research
209 The mutual fund tests thus embrace challenges to the "semi-strong" form of the efficient
market hypothesis, which assumes the availability of all public information, and the "strong
form," which assumes the availability of all relevant information including inside information.
The two information sets are not obviously separable in performance testing of mutual funds.
Superior performance could derive from keener insight or privileged access to corporate information. There is a substantial claim that the large amount of investment capital under the
control of institutional investors gives them such access through the medium of security
analysts.
210 Other studies of mutual fund performance relied on simple comparisons to market indices. E.g., I. Friend, M. Blume & J. Crockett, Mutual Funds and Other Institutional Investors
(1970). Tests that ignore risk/return relationships may produce serious problems, however.
For example, a very conservative fund that underperforms the market on absolute terms may
nevertheless be a superior performer on a risk-adjusted basis. The converse may be true of a
more speculative fund that outperforms the market.
211 Jensen, Mutual Funds, supra note 208.
212 The risk of a portfolio is the weighted average of the betas of portfolio stocks, i.e., their
volatility relative to the market index.
213 Jensen's hypothetical portfolio is based on application of the Separation Theorem, explained in note 46 supra.
214 Jensen characterized performance in terms of the appropriate definition of "return."
Where return is the measured net of loading charges, management fees, commissions, and
other costs, Jensen found that over a ten-year period, returns for 89 of 115 funds were below
the hypothetical CAPM efficient portfolio, and that average deviations were - 14.6%. Ignoring loading charges, 72 of 115 funds underperformed the hypothetical portfolio, with an average deviation of -8.9%. Even disregarding all expenses, Jensen found that mutual fund
performance was no better, on average, than that of the hypothetical portfolio. Approximately
half the funds performed worse than, and half better than, the hypothetical portfolio. Moreover there was no significant correlation for superior performance from one period to the next.
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and trading expenses. This implies that all the information employed by
mutual funds in stock selection is already impounded in the market price.
There are several objections to these tests of mutual fund performance. First, in measuring performance against a CAPM efficient portfolio, the tests incorrectly assume the opportunity for mutual funds to
leverage a market portfolio, that is, for mu'tual funds to pursue a strategy
of greater-than-market risk in the optimal way. The SEC seriously limits
direct borrowing by mutual funds or borrowing for margin purchases of
stock. 2 15 Moreover, because the SEC requires disclosure of such borrowing as a special risk factor,21 6 the sponsoring investment advisor is likely
to regard even such legally permissible borrowing as an impediment to
marketing the fund. 2 17 Thus it is not surprising that mutual funds seeking greater risk would underperform the CAPM efficient portfolio. To
illustrate this point, examine the diagram at note 46 supra. A risk-seeking mutual fund would at best be at a point on the efficient portfolio
frontier, not on the optimal capital market line above. Indeed, any evidence that such funds could systematically match the CAPM portfolio
performance would cut against the efficient market hypothesis.
Jensen's research is also criticized for methodological flaws that understate mutual fund rates of return and overstate levels of systematic
risk. 21 8 Correcting for these flaws, the results are significantly different.
On this view, mutual funds were approximately "neutral" performers on
a net return basis. That is, taking into account all expenses, mutual fund
performance equalled that of the passive investor; or, if expenses were
ignored, most mutual funds earned significant abnormal returns. 2"19 This
analysis obviously reverses Jensen's conclusion that prevailing prices reflect all relevant information.
215 Mutual funds cannot issue "senior securities," such as debt securities, and can only borrow from a bank to the extent of a 300% asset coverage for any such loan. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 18(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(1) (1982). The SEC has taken the position
that margin borrowing from a broker-dealer would be a forbidden issuance of a "senior security." Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 51,208, at 39,173 (1983) (guidelines for Form N-lA, guides 7
& 10). See 3 T. Frankel, supra note 117, ch.XXI, B § 11.2, at 289-91. This requires mutual
funds to seek margin loans from banks, which are subject to a more stringent set of margin
rules than broker-dealers, and subjects the funds to the 300% asset coverage requirement. See
generally 3 T. Frankel, supra note 117, ch. XXI, B §§ 11.1-12.2, at 288-95.
216 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 51,208, at 39,173, 39,178 (guidelines for Form N-lA, guides
4 & 21). See 3 T. Frankel, supra note 117, ch XXI, B § 11.2, at 289-91.
217 See, e.g., Value Line Leveraged Growth Investors, Inc., Prospectus 1, 6 (April 30, 1982).
218 Mains, Risk, the Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios:
Comment, 50 J. Bus. 371 (1977). Jensen's work assumed that mutual fund systematic risk
levels remained constant over time (i.e., that a given fund would have the same "beta" over the
ten-year period) and that each fund incurred the same average operating and commission expenses. Mains showed that these assumptions were factually incorrect and led to understatement of mutual fund returns and overstatement of their risk levels.
219

Id. at 384.
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The text develops the most important objection to the mutual fund
performance tests, the most serious one because it applies to all such
tests: that CAPM itself may not adequately portray the risk-return rela220
tionship in a way that provides a reliable measure of normal returns.
The objection is both empirically and theoretically based. If CAPM is
seriously flawed, the mutual fund tests lose validity, and some of the
strongest efficient market evidence loses its force.
II
TESTS USING

CAPM THAT REJECT THE EFFICIENT
MARKET HYPOTHESIS

As recently as 1976 a leading efficient market theorist could think of
only one study that seriously questioned the efficient market hypothesis
in its semi-strong form.2 21 The efficient market hypothesis was noteworthy for its strong empirical support and the "sparse" contradictory evidence. 222 Recently, however, a number of careful studies have revealed
significant lags in the stock market's reflection of public announcement
information such as earnings, stock splits, and dividends, and have
demonstrated the potential for profitable trading strategies based on
these observations. 223 These studies are thus inconsistent with market
efficiency. 224 Moreover, other recent studies have shown the potential for

trading profits on the basis of analysts' forecasts.

A.

Public Announcement Tests

Most public announcement tests study the impact of announceSee text accompanying notes 53-65 supra.
See E. Fama, supra note 19, at 379 (citing Jaffe, Special Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. Bus. 410, 413 (1974) (significant abnormal returns from use of published SEC data
on insider purchases and sales)).
222 Fama, supra note 1, at 416.
223 See, e.g., Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. Fin.
Econ. 95 (1978) (symposium papers presenting anomalous evidence and citing to others); Symposium, Valuation Anomalies-Empirical, 39 J. Fin. 807 (1984).
A recent study co-authored by a major proponent of the use of the modem finance paradigm in portfolio management questions the weak form of the hypothesis. Rosenberg & Rudd,
Factor-Related and Specific Returns of Common Stocks: Serial Correlation and Market Inefficiency, 37 J. Fin. 543, 551 (1982). See also Rosenberg, Reid & Lanstein, Persuasive Evidence
of Market Inefficiency, 11 J. Portfolio Mgmt. 9 (1985) (significant abnormal returns for strategies based on ratio of book value to price and on previous month's return). Another very
recent study is somewhat inconsistent with the weak form hypothesis in its claim that an
investor can use past prices to determine if certain firm-specific information has been impounded in price. Treynor & Ferguson, In Defense of Technical Analysis, 40 J. Fin. 757, 773
(1985).
224 Observe the potency of public announcement tests questioning market efficiency. If the
market is not efficient with regard to such widely disseminated data, how could it possibly be
efficient with regard to other available information?
220
221
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ments of firms' earnings on security prices. A recent survey discussed
twenty separate studies questioning market efficiency in connection with
earnings announcements. 225 It concluded that securities appear to "yield
systematic excess returns in post-announcement periods." This evidence
suggests that the excess returns increase as the extent of any earnings
"surprise" increases, and that such excess returns persist over time. 226
Two subsequent studies merit more detailed discussion. In a study
of quarterly earnings announcements, 227 Watts identified NYSE companies whose announced quarterly earnings deviated from their predicted
earnings. He then tested whether stock prices adjusted quickly to this
unexpected earnings information, as the efficient market hypothesis
would predict. According to the study, market adjustment takes place
over the two quarters (up to twenty-six weeks) following the earnings
announcement. 228 Because of transaction costs, individuals could not ordinarily benefit from this inefficiency, but brokers and those rearranging
their portfolios for unrelated reasons (and thus incurring no marginal
cost for trading) could earn abnormal returns. Watts concluded that his
study did not show a "gross inefficiency" but did point to "a profit op225 Ball, supra note 59, at 118-24.
226 Id. at 103. After having rejected the possibility of systematic experimental error as an
explanation for the anomalous returns, Ball hypothesized that the capital asset pricing model
is misspecified. In particular, he suggested that the earnings and dividend variables examined
in post-announcement studies "proxy" for missing variables in the CAPM. Id. at 110-11. See
text accompanying note 59 supra.
227 Watts, Systematic Abnormal Returns after Quarterly Earnings Announcements, 6 J.
Fin. Econ. 127 (1978). Watts's study is particularly important because it attempts to address
some of the issues raised by Ball regarding experimental design and errors in CAPM.
228 Id. at 139. Watts generated quarterly earnings forecasts from three models that extrapolate from previously reported quarterly earnings. In order to adjust for risk in evaluating
whether returns were abnormal, Watts used a technique that avoids some of the complexity
inherent in differently specified versions of the CAPM.
For each quarter and each forecast model the firms under investigation are split into two
portfolios: the firms with positive forecast errors for the quarter; and the firms with
negative forecast errors. The weights applied to the securities within each portfolio are
calculated to make the beta of each portfolio equal to unity. Since both portfolios have
equal risk, abnormal returns can be measured as the difference in returns between the
two portfolios.
Id. at 130. That is, abnormal returns are calculated on the assumption that the investor
bought shares of companies with positive earnings forecast errors and sold short an equal
dollar amount of the shares of companies with negative forecast errors.
The evidence showed that for all three forecasting models there were substantial abnormal
returns in the quarter following the announcement of unexpected earnings. Id. at 145. This is
not surprising; it indicates only that earnings announcements convey or reflect new information not previously anticipated by the market. These abnormalities persisted, id. at 146, however, through the second quarter following the announcement, which is not consistent with the
efficient market hypothesis. (It is also true, however, that a large portion of the ultimate adjustment did occur in the quarter immediately preceding the announcement.)
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portunity foregone, an inefficiency."

229

Charest examined market reaction to stock split announcements for
NYSE stocks during the period 1947 through 1967.230 The study in
many respects replicates the influential Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll
study of NYSE stock split announcements from 1927 through 1959,231
but with a very different conclusion: the new study found that utilization
of a relatively simple trading rule would produce significant excess returns for three months beyond the public announcement date. 232 The
discrepancy in the studies is accounted for by a difference that should be
immaterial in an efficient market: FFJR used the announcement of the
split realization as the relevant public announcement; Charest focused on
the announcement of the split proposal, on the theory that stock-split
proposals are seldom rejected by shareholders2 33 and that an efficient
market should recognize this.2 34 Although the study found evidence of
229 Id. at 142. Watts studied the period from 1962 through 1968. The observed market
inefficiency occurred primarily during the September 1962 through October 1965 period. He
speculated that the observation of inefficiency might have been by chance or that the market
might have become more efficient after 1965. Id. at 146. A subsequent study of earnings announcements covering the period from 1963 through 1971 concluded that the market was not
more efficient in later periods. Nichols & Brown, Assimilating Earnings and Split Information: Is the Capital Market Becoming More Efficient?, 9 J. Fin. Econ. 309, 311 (1981). The
two studies are not entirely comparable. Whereas Watt used all cases of unexpected earnings
from his random sample of firms, Nichols and Brown focused on "outliers," instances where
earnings increases were far greater than the median increase. A possible conclusion consistent
with both studies is that the market became more efficient with respect to earnings announcements generally, but not for significant unexpected earnings. Id. at 311-12.
230 Charest, Split Information, Stock Returns and Market Efficiency-I, 6 J. Fin. Econ. 265
(1978).
231 See text accompanying notes 200-06 supra. Charest used an equilibrium returns generating model of the form:
F, = f. + Bf(tM-.) + i,
following Black's respecification of the CAPM interms of the rate of return on a minimum
variance, or zero beta, portfolio (r,), rather than the risk-free rate of return (rf), as described at
note 53 supra. Thus the return on a particular security in a given period is the sum of (1) the
market's return on a zero beta portfolio, (2) the product of the security's beta, or systematic
risk, and the return premium per unit of beta, and (3) a disturbance term of zero expected
value. This model is an elaboration on the market model used by FFJR, and should not
systematically bias results. See also notes 201 supra and 234 infra.
232 To determine whether average residuals and cumulative average residuals were statistically significant, Charest employed the following trading rule: after the relevant split announcement event, buy the stock, hold for x months, then sell. The result will be rolling
portfolios of securities, each held for the same time span. The study found significant residuals
where the event was the split proposal announcement and the holding period was three
months. Id. at 266.
233 Of the 1,080 stock split proposals during the 1959 through 1965 period covered by the
study, Charest selected every tenth case for follow-up investigation and found no rejections.
Id. at 279.
234 The significance of the split proposal/realization distinction is underscored by other results in the Charest study that largely correlate with the split realization conclusions in FFJR.
Charest did raise the possibility that the inefficiencies were attributable to other factors. He
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excess returns, Charest cautioned that the observed inefficiency was not
"acute," and raised questions whether transaction costs would erode any
potential trading profits. 235 Nevertheless, he regarded the evidence of
236
inefficiency as significant.
Charest produced an important companion study that examined
market reaction to announcements of significant cash dividend changes
for NYSE stocks during 1968 through 1974.237 This study found that a
relatively simple trading rule could generate significant abnormal returns
for dividend-changing stocks for up to two years after the announcement
of the increase or decrease in the dividend. 238 The evidence of abnormal
returns with respect to dividend decreases was so striking that Charest
stated: "On the surface, it appears that the market is clearly inefficient
noted: "Another disturbing explanation might be that other good news (about earnings for
example) would tend to follow split proposals and accompany split approvals, generally given
in months (+2) and (+3)." Id. at 287. But an efficient market would ordinarily understand
the implications of such announcements. Id. at 287.
235 Id. at 284. Like Watt, Charest identified a specific subperiod, here 1956 through 1960,
during which a significant proportion of the excess residuals accumulated. Nichols and
Brown's study of market efficiency also examined the effects of stock splits on the market. See
Nichols & Brown, supra note 229. The study found no evidence of market inefficiency during
the 1960 through 1967 subperiod, agreeing with Charest, but did find evidence of market inefficiency in a later time period, 1968 through 1975. Id. at 314.
236 Charest, supra note 230, at 288.
237 Charest, Dividend Information, Stock Returns and Market Efficiency-II, 6 J. Fin.
Econ. 297 (1978). The study considered relatively large changes (ten cents or more per share
after two or more years of stable dividends) for seasoned NYSE stocks (listed at least five
years) from January 1947 through June 1968, "a period of recognized stability in risk levels, tax
laws, and inflation rate." Id. at 298. The selection criteria produced 1,193 dividend increases
and 527 decreases. Id. at 300.
238 The equilibirium returns model used to determine excess returns, or "residuals," was the
same model used in the Charest study on stock splits, see note 231 supra. Charest determined
the average monthly residuals for the observed stock for a 49-month period. The period included the 24 months preceding and following the stock's dividend change announcement
including the month of the announcement.
For dividend increase announcements, he noted that although the market "appears to
react briskly to such announcements, it may not react enough, since we witness sizable postannouncement residuals." Id. at 306. The accumulated data revealed that during the dividend
increase announcement month, the average residual was 3.18%. But subsequent cumulative
average residuals amounted to 1.74% after 6 months following the month of the increase announcement, 2.19% after 12 months, 2.80% after 18 months, and 3.96% after 24 months. Id.
at 305 (Table 4). Thus, if the period of market adjustment was 24 months, less than half of the
adjustment occurred within one month of the announcement.
The results with respect to dividend decrease announcements were even more striking.
During the dividend decrease announcement month, the average residual was -7.42%. Subsequent cumulative average residuals amounted to -4.13% after 6 months following the month
of the decrease announcement, -5.49% after 12 months, -6.18% after 18 months, and
-7.69% after 24 months. Id. at 307 (Table 5). Again using 24 months as the market adjustment period, less than half of the adjustment to a decrease announcement occurred within one
month of the announcement, and the residual numbers were approximately twice as large as
for increases.
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with respect to dividend decrease information." 2 39 This inefficiency led
changing
Charest to conclude that a "systematic trader in dividend
' 24 °
stocks would have earned significant abnormal returns.
B. Analysts' Forecasts Tests
Recent studies of analysts' forecasts present important evidence inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis. These studies evaluated
the extent to which analysts' forecasts contain information not previously
impounded in market price. A very important recent study by Dimson
and Marsh 24 1 directly addressed this issue. It compared actual analysts'
forecasts for specific stocks made privately to an institutional investor
over a yearlong period with realized returns, and concluded that the
comparison revealed a small but potentially useful degree of forecasting
ability.242 The study further concluded that such forecasts can be translated into actual trading profits: the particular investor used such forecasts to achieve significantly superior risk adjusted returns over a year
(on the order of 1.7 percent after deducting all avoidable transaction
costs). 243 These conclusions are of course inconsistent with the efficient
market hypothesis's claim that prices reflect all relevant information, and
further undercut Jensen's claim that mutual funds cannot earn even a
competitive return from investments in securities analysts' forecasts.
239

Id. at 308.

Id. at 326. In order to determine whether the observed residuals indicated actual market
inefficiency, Charest tested portfolio trading rules as he did in his stock-split study, see note
232 supra. His data indicated that trading following dividend increase announcements generated significant excess returns for holding periods of 2, 3, 4, and 5 months. Id. at 315. Trading
following dividend decrease announcements generated even larger excess returns, for all holding periods considered (1 through 5 months). Excess returns ranged from 1.5% a month for a
1-month holding period strategy and 1% for a 2-month holding period strategy, to 0.25% for a
5-month holding period strategy. Id. at 311-14 (Tables 7, 8). Charest observed that given the
average normal returns (of approximately 1.1% a month) earned by NYSE stocks in the 1947
through 1967 period, these excess returns were "rather impressive." Id. at 311. The practical
results were that "(1) systematic buyers of dividend decreasing stocks would stand to lose
significantly on their investments; (2) shortsellers would likely gain abnormally, and (3) portfolio managers would avoid non-negligible capital losses by jettisoning such stocks at the time of
a dividend decrease." Id. at 311, 314. In contrast to his stock split study, Charest observed no
subperiod of particular efficiency or inefficiency.
241 Dimson & Marsh, An Analysis of Brokers' and Analysts' Unpublished Forecasts of UK
Stock Returns, 39 J. Fin. 1257 (1984).
242 Id. at 1288. This conclusion was based on a study of more than 400 specific stock return
forecasts made by 35 UK stockbrokers and the internal analysts of one large UK institutional
investor. Id. at 1274.
243 Id. at 1274. This conclusion was based on an analysis of approximately 3000 transactions motivated by and executed at the time of the forecasts. Id. Accord Bjerring, Lakonishok
& Vermaelen, Stock Prices and Financial Analysts' Recommendations, 38 J. Fin. 187 (1983)
(investor following recommendations of Canadian brokerage house would have achieved significant positive abnormal returns after transaction costs).
240
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Another set of analysts' forecast studies employed a different testing
strategy. Instead of examining market reaction to public announcements
of company information, these studies examined market reaction to the
publication of analysts' forecasts. The evidence showed that investors
having knowledge of analysts' forecasts (particularly revisions in forecasts) can make trading profits. Furthermore, market reaction to public
disclosure of the forecasts is relatively slow, providing further opportunity for trading profits. 244 These studies challenge the efficient market
hypothesis in two ways. First, if analysts' forecasts can provide the basis
for a profitable trading strategy, then it would seem that the information
contained in them is not already impounded in the market price. This is,
of course, inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis's claim and
suggests that mutual fund purchases of analysts' forecasts could be profitable. Second, the market's slowness in digesting analysts' forecasts after they are publicly announced strongly suggests market inefficiency.
Prevailing prices in an efficient market should quickly reflect new publicly announced information known to affect price.
All of these studies are inconsistent in varying degree with the efficient market hypothesis. In particular, if the market is not demonstrably
efficient in digesting public announcements and other information supplied to the market free of charge, how likely is it that the market will be
efficient with respect to information costly to obtain or analyze? The
studies thus represent serious challenges to the capital market theory of
the past two decades, including the efficient market theory and the equilibrium return generating models used to test it.245
244 Davies & Canes, Stock Prices and the Publication of Second-Hand Information, 51 J.
Bus. 43 (1978); Givoly & Lakonishok, The Information Content of Financial Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings, I J. Acct. & Econ. 165 (1979); see also Stickel, The Effect of Value Line
Investment Survey Rank Changes on Common Stock Prices, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 121 (1985) (adjustments of a security's price in response to changes in Value Line ranking occurs over a
multiday period).
245 Contemporaneous and subsequent studies of similar effects include Beaver & Landsman,
Note on the Behavior of Residual Security Returns for Winner and Loser Portfolios, 3 J. Acct.
& Econ. 233 (1981) (abnormal returns observed after earnings announcement in some years
may relate to the securities tested rather than the announcement itself); Brown, Earnings
Changes, Stock Prices, and Market Efficiency, 33 J. Fin. 17 (1978) (adjustment time to announcements of unusual earnings information for NYSE and AMEX stocks during the 1963
through 1971 period is sufficiently lengthy to permit trading profits); Latan6 & Jones, Standardized Unexpected Earnings--1971-77, 34 J. Fin. 717, 723-24 (1979) (market is more efficient for stocks closely followed by analysts than for others); Nichols & Brown, supra note 229
(market was somewhat inefficient from 1968-1975 and may not efficiently digest unexpected
earnings changes); Reinganum, supra note 55 (market efficiency anomalies strongly suggest
that CAPM is misspecified); Rendleman, Jones & Latan6, Empirical Anomalies Based on Unexpected Earnings and the Importance of Risk Adjustments, 10 J. Fin. Econ. 269 (1982) (abnormal returns could have been earned during 1970's because of significant standardized
unexpected earnings).
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B: THE "RANDOM WALK" OF STOCK PRICE MOVEMENTS

The "random walk" hypothesis 246 is based on an asset pricing model
that makes a very restricted claim. The hypothesis asserts that the
change in price from period t to period t + 1 does not depend upon the
price change from t - 1 to t; instead, each price change is drawn inde247
pendently from some stable distribution.
What does the random walk hypothesis imply about the mechanism
246 The random walk hypothesis originated from examinations of common stock price
movements on the New York Stock Exchange, as did the efficient market hypothesis. Work in
the late 1950's suggested that patterns of price changes were very similar to those produced by
a random number generator. E.g., Osborne, Brownian Motion in the Stock Market, 7 Operations Research 145 (1959), reprinted in The Random Character of Stock Market Prices 100 (P.
Cootner ed. 1964); Roberts, Stock-Market "Patterns" and Financial Analysis: Methodological
Suggestions, 14 J. Fin. 1 (1959). Subsequent work in the 1960's led to formalization of these
perceptions as the "random walk" hypothesis. See generally J. Lorie & M. Hamilton, supra
note 36, at 70-97.
The random walk hypothesis leads to a "weak" form of the efficient market hypothesis,
which posits that prevailing prices incorporate all information contained in the history of price
movements. The "story" that accompanies the random walk, however, suggests much
stronger forms of market efficiency: price changes are random because the market quickly and
fully reflects all available information (because there were no patterns of correlation suggesting
a period over which the market was "digesting" information). Further price movements come
from the random appearance of new information, which by hypothesis had previously been
unavailable.
247 It may be helpful to think of the random walk in these terms: Imagine an urn containing balls each inscribed with a number representing a possible price change. At each period t,
a ball is drawn from the urn and the security price changes by the amount specified on the ball.
The ball is then replaced in the urn and the process repeated in the next period. The random
walk process has two important properties. First, the price change from t - I to t tells nothing about the prospective price change from t to t + 1, because the composition of balls in the
urn used to determine the price change at t does not depend in any way on the draw at t - 1.
This property is called statistical independence. Second, the composition of the urn-the distribution of possible price changes-remains unchanged from period to period, i.e., in every
time period t, the price change is drawn from the same urn and the ball is returned to the urn.
Consequently, the probability of any given price change occurring (a number determined by
the ratio of balls with a given price change to the total number of balls), is the same in each
period. This property is called stationarity.
Stationarity is important to the efficient market hypothesis in two ways. First, the sophisticated asset pricing models used in important EMH tests rest on the assumption that the
distribution of securities returns is stationary. This is necessary for the estimation of the key
variables in the models, for example, "beta" in CAPM. See notes 44, 53, 74, 201 supra. Second, stationarity plays a significant role in one of the current formulations of the efficient
market hypothesis. Most theorists interpret the efficient market hypothesis to include an assertion that investors have "rational expectations," i.e., that their estimates of the distribution of
returns (from which they calculate expected returns and risks) accords with the true distribution. See note 49 supra. The requirement of rational expectations of individual investors is
justified by a "learning process": if investors do not have rational expectations they frequently
make erroneous predictions that they then attempt to correct. Supporters of rational expectations argue that if the distribution of returns was stationary, investors would eventually discover the true distribution and the underlying returns-generating process. If the distribution
was not stationary, however, it would be difficult to learn the underlying process. It is worth
noting that the possibility of learning the process even under stationarity is controversial. See
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of setting asset prices? First, it indicates that the price-setting mechanism will be a fair game. That is, on average, in a random walk process
the price at t + 1 equals the price at period t that people expect to prevail
at t + 1. A roulette wheel with forty numbers that pays $40 for a winning bet of $1 is an example of a fair game. Second, if prices follow a
random walk, the price change from t - 1 to t will not affect the
probability that a particular price change will occur at period t + 1.248
Early empirical evidence on stock price movements substantially con2 49
firmed this second implication.
These claims about asset pricing seem to be minimal, yet actual
price movements do not entirely conform to the hypothesis. Large daily
price changes appear to follow one another-although the signs of such
changes are not correlated.25 0 On any given day price changes appear in
successive patterns of continuation or reversal. 25 1 The important quesFrydman, Towards An Understanding of Market Processes: Individual Expectations, Learning, and Convergence to Rational Expectations Equilibrium, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 652 (1982).
248 This independence assumption does not imply that the history of prices says nothing
about the process of price formation. One might know that the process was a random walk but
not know from what distribution price changes were drawn. In that case, a good estimator of
the distribution of price changes would be the history of past price changes. The longer the
available history the better the estimator will be.
249 The early generations of high-speed computers in the 1960's allowed the rigorous testing
of the random walk hypothesis. Among the most important tests were those that looked for
serial correlation or covariance among stock prices over various "differencing intervals." For
instance, an investigator would choose some time lag over which he thought a price change
might have an effect: say four time periods, as an example. He would then examine a series of
prices and calculate the price changes. These price changes would then be paired with the
price at four periods later, and the two sequences would be examined for any consistent pattern. If the two sequences moved together, i.e., were correlated or had nonzero covariance,
one could improve a prediction of a future price from knowledge of the price change four
periods before. Extensive testing found, however, no evidence of "substantial linear dependence between lagged price changes or returns." Fama, supra note 1, at 394. See also J. Lorie
& M. Hamilton, supra note 36, at 75-77 (discussing serial correlation tests).
The conclusion that prior price information did not allow prediction of future price
changes made the random walk hypothesis highly controversial. On Wall Street, many security analysts, tagged "technical analysts," sold predictions based on precisely this type of information. Moreover, the hypothesis contradicted earlier academic research that purported to
find trends in stock price movements. E.g., Cowles & Jones, Some A Posteriori Probabilities in
Stock Market Action, 5 Econometrica 280 (1937), withdrawn as erroneous, Cowles, A Revision of Previous Conclusions Regarding Stock Price Behavior, 28 Econometrica 909 (1960).
See generally R. Hagin, The Dow Jones-Irwin Guide to Modem Portfolio Theory 15-28 (1979)
(catalogues early research and more recent and rigorous testing of the random walk hypothesis
concluding that no research has refuted the hypothesis, given a differencing interval of 1-16
days); Working, A Random-Difference Series for Use in the Analysis of Time Series, 29 J. Am.
Statistical Ass'n 11 (1934). For recent studies challenging the weak form of efficient market
hypothesis, and thus, the random walk claim, see note 223 supra.
250 See, e.g., Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. Bus. 34 (1965); Osborne,
Periodic Structure in the Brownian Motion of Stock Prices, 10 Operations Research 345
(1962), reprinted in The Random Character of Stock Market Prices 262 (P. Cootner ed. 1964).
251 See, e.g., Niederhoffer & Osborne, Market Making and Reversal on the Stock Exchange,
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tion, however, is the significance of these apparent patterns. What does it
matter if one can predict that the next price change will probably be
large, if one cannot predict the direction? The realization that price
movements are not totally random, but that dependencies can not be exploited by market participants to produce trading profits, led economists
to search for another model of asset pricing: one that preserves the conclusion that knowledge of past prices does not allow investors to earn
abnormal trading profits but that conforms to the evidence of nonrandomness in price changes. This is the positive expected returns model
252
discussed in the text.
61 J. Am. Statistical Ass'n 897 (1966); see also Niederhoffer, A New Look at Clustering of
Stock Prices, 39 J. Bus. 309 (1966) (noting traders' tendency to issue buy or sell orders when
stocks reach a round number).
252 See text accompanying notes 23-29 supra.
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